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Abstract 
This project enhances understanding of the politics surrounding public sector 
labor relations reforms pursued and enacted across the American states surrounding the 
Great Recession. First, I examine the relationship between state-level patterning in the 
direction and intensity of state collective bargaining reform agendas and key political and 
fiscal characteristics of states. Next, I provide a detailed analysis of the content of 
collective bargaining reforms pursued and enacted across the states during the Great 
Recession. I find that partisanship and labor union influence shape lawmakers’ choices in 
meaningful ways: states with strong public sector unions and Democratically-controlled 
legislatures were reluctant to pursue union formation restrictions, presumably because 
they did not want to upset their influential labor allies. Nonetheless, Democratic 
lawmakers still sought to limit the influence of entrenched labor unions in the context of a 
weak state economy, especially with a Republican Governor at the helm. Finally, I assess 
the relationship between state political and economic characteristics and occupational 
targeting in the reform agenda. I find that where teachers unions are more influential in 
state politics, measured in terms of their average yearly political campaign donations (to 
any party or issue), there were more anti-teacher reforms on state legislative agendas. 
Conversely, I find a significant negative relationship between Republican-friendly state 
teachers unions and a reform agenda predominantly aimed at weakening teachers’ 
collective bargaining rights. I conclude that the prominence of “anti-teacher” legislation 
in many states’ collective bargaining reform agendas has an important political basis: 
weakening teachers unions and their Democratic political allies. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE NEW RIGHT-TO-WORK 
ERA IN THE AMERICAN STATES 
 
A fierce battle over the future of the American labor movement is playing out 
across the American states—and it is not being fought by those you might expect. At 
present, teachers, police officers, firefighters, and other public employees comprise the 
majority of the unionized American workforce. They are thus serving on the front lines of 
a war over their collective bargaining rights in an era where 70% of the public supports 
the enactment of “right-to-work” laws, and 40% hold a negative perception of 
government employee unions (Jones 2014). 
State lawmakers have apparently taken note of the public’s increasingly critical 
assessment of organized labor. Coinciding with the height of the Great Recession in the 
United States, a surge of state legislative activity seeking to restrict the labor organizing 
rights of public employees began in 2009. By 2010 the public’s overall favorable opinion 
of labor unions had decreased 17%, to an all-time low of 41% (Pew 2011). Propelled by 
negative public sentiment (or perhaps contributing to it), the contemporary anti-union 
movement has gained considerable traction in the post-Recession era. A wave of labor-
restrictive activity gained momentum following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, 
peaked in 2011-2012 following the GOP’s decisive midterm victory, and continues at the 
time of writing. By 2015, three former notably labor-friendly states—Indiana, Wisconsin, 
and Michigan—had enacted sweeping right-to-work-laws in four years, while legislatures 
in Ohio and Missouri passed similar laws that were later overturned through a voter 
referendum and Governor veto, respectively. Around this same time, dozens of states 
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across the country pursued and enacted various laws aimed at weakening the formation 
and influence of public employee unions.  
I suggest that the backdrop of the Great Recession provides a useful lens through 
which to examine contemporary labor relations because it inarguably kicked off an 
intensive public sector workforce reform agenda that state governments have sought to 
carry out with varying ferocity and success. Unique aspects of this particular downturn 
lend insight into the resulting reform agenda because a commensurate level of public 
sector reform activity accompanying previous financial crises is conspicuously absent 
from the record. Legislative battles occurring across key states surrounding the Recession 
provide further insight into key structural changes occurring in the public sector that are 
shaping the future trajectory of an American labor movement heavily reliant upon public 
employee unions. 
This project provides a bird’s eye view of these contemporary legislative battles 
occurring across the American states. To do this, I examined over 2500 bills related to 
labor union organizing and collective bargaining rights introduced across the fifty states 
from 2007-2014. I then categorized and coded individual bills based on their partisan 
(introducer) origin, policy content, occupational target, and status outcomes. With this 
data, I identify patterns in the direction, intensity, approach, and occupational target of 
state collective bargaining reform agendas. I then discuss what these patterns indicate 
about the factors contributing to the surge of labor-restrictive reforms by more closely 
examining the content of proposed and enacted reforms in certain states and “clusters” of 
states. Specifically, I assess how local political and economic contexts shape state 
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governments’ approaches to reforming the public sector. Finally, I consider what my 
findings reveal about the persisting influence of organized labor generally and public 
employee unions in particular as political forces in American Politics. 
At the time of writing, exactly half of the American states have a form of statutory 
or constitutional provision governing labor relations known as a “right-to-work” law on 
the books. Such laws bar labor organizations from collecting fees from individuals who 
choose to opt-out of union membership. The legacy of right-to-work can be traced to the 
late-1940s after the Taft-Hartley Labor Relations Act of 1947 outlawed the closed or 
“union shop.” Following Taft-Hartley, which amended the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) of 1935, belonging to a union could no longer serve as a prerequisite for 
employment in many of the nation’s leading industries. Consequently, unionization in the 
private manufacturing and construction sectors began to steadily decline. The American 
labor movement never recovered, however, pockets of resistance to declension are 
identifiable across particular states and occupational sectors. 
This is because the NLRA and therefore the Taft-Hartley amendment does not 
apply to government employees, leaving it up to state governments to pass laws 
stipulating the conditions of collective bargaining for state and local employees. What 
accompanied Taft-Hartley, then, was an initial surge of right-to-work laws being enacted 
across the American states. Notably, twenty of these laws were passed in a “wave” 
occurring between 1944 and 1963. After this, the pace of subsequent right-to-work law 
enactments continued slowly, at a rate of less than one per decade, until the early 2000s 
(NCSL 2015). Soon came the Great Recession, a Democratic “shellacking” across state 
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legislatures, and the election of Governors like Scott Walker (WI), John Kasich (OH), 
and Rick Snyder (MI) who vocally decried public employee unions while championing a 
new wave of labor-restrictive legislation. Lawmakers enjoying unified Republican 
government in a “Rust Belt turned red” have thus led the charge toward a new right-to-
work era in state government. However, many solidly blue states have also sought 
collective bargaining restrictions in the contemporary area. What explains this 
phenomenon? 
TALES OF POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND FISCAL NECESSITY  
Critics of the recent wave of collective bargaining reform activity have offered a 
general narrative to explain the reform frenzy: that such reforms are part of a carefully 
orchestrated, politically-conservative, union-breaking agenda aimed at weakening an 
important source of revenue and support for the Democratic Party. This view is concisely 
summarized by Cantin:  
Since the onset of the Great Recession, anti-union conservatives have been 
hammering out an arguably bogus yet politically potent argument: collective 
bargaining with government workers is unaffordable as their wages, health 
benefits, and pensions are driving states into deficits. What is going on in 
Wisconsin and other states ought to be seen for what it is: an attempt to exploit 
the economic crisis to win an eminently political victory over organized labour 
and allied Democrats. (2012) 
 
According to Cantin, the proponents of such “anti-union” reforms are merely taking 
advantage of the economic crisis to implement laws that serve primarily political ends. 
The counterpoint to Cantin’s argument, then, is that state collective bargaining reforms 
have thrived out of fiscal necessity.  
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State lawmakers, Republican and Democratic alike, proffered this rationale to 
justify spending cuts and reductions to the state and local workforce. Faced with an $11 
billion dollar budget deficit in 2010, Chris Christie-R of New Jersey remarked: “I don’t 
think we have any alternative...We’ve been pushing this problem under the rug for 20 
years. It’s time to deal with it” (Christie 2010). Similarly, when asked about California’s 
budget woes in 2011 Governor Jerry Brown responded: "You either cut or you tax. There 
is no third way, there is no alternative," he said. California faced a $13 billion budget 
shortfall this year, and according to Governor Brown the Republican-controlled 
legislature would not approve tax increases. By such accounts, addressing state budget 
crises required slashing big spending items like public workers’ salaries and pensions. 
Collective bargaining restrictions were also increasingly sought in order to facilitate such 
cuts. 
These competing narratives suggest that the wave of restrictive collective 
bargaining reform activity pursued across the states surrounding the Great Recession was 
motivated either by political opportunity or economic necessity. However, I argue that it 
is false to juxtapose the enactment of “right-to-work” laws and other collective 
bargaining restrictions as being either politically-subversive or fiscally necessary. This is 
because not all collective bargaining restrictions are created equally, nor were they 
applied evenly across all segments of the public workforce surrounding the Great 
Recession. Instead my research reveals significant patterning in state collective reform 
agendas, as well as economic and political factors shaping policy outcomes. I offer 
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various empirical observations to support these assertions from my original data 
collection efforts. 
I collected legislative content and outcome status information for over 2500 labor 
relations bills introduced across the fifty states during the four legislative sessions 
occurring between 2007-2014. By concentrating on the legislative sessions that 
bookended the financial crises, this original dataset aims to capture the universe of labor-
related reforms being pursued during this time. My analyses of this data reveals that 
negative state economic indicators such as strained budgets and underfunded pensions 
appear correlated with more intensive labor-restrictive reform agendas. However, this 
observation is complicated by two further observations. First, that not all labor relations 
reforms had the same intended consequence of labor union organizing and influence, and 
second, that not all occupations were targeted evenly for collective bargaining 
restrictions, with K-12 teachers facing the brunt of reforms.  
To reveal that not all reforms are created equally, I coded and categorized 
individual collective bargaining bills based upon their content. I then identified two core 
objectives that bills aimed to satisfy: 1) restricting the formation of unions; and 2) 
weakening the influence of unions. Using this information I assessed the degree to which 
identifiable “packages” of legislation seeking to satisfy either objective were present in 
state legislative agendas. Upon finding that states pursued distinct labor relations reform 
packages (with unique objectives), I sought to identify the political and economic 
determinants of states’ preferences. My research indicates that partisan forces are 
particularly important in determining whether states sought to restrict the formation of 
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unions versus seeking to merely restrict their influence in collective negotiations. In other 
words, there are political forces at work shaping the content of state reform agendas. 
Moreover, the prevalence of occupational targeting in state reform agendas sheds 
light on another important political objective of these reforms: weakening the formation 
and influence of teachers unions. This is particularly true in states where teachers unions 
have been prolific campaign contributors, but not to Republican candidates. At the same 
time, public safety personnel like police officers, fire fighters, and other first responders 
have frequently been exempted from pursuits to restrict public employees’ collective 
bargaining rights. I conjecture that Republican-controlled governments have 
disproportionately targeted teachers for collective bargaining reform because teachers 
unions tend to be more friendly toward the Democratic party, whereas public safety 
unions tend to be either mixed in their partisan loyalties or relatively pro-Republican, 
insulating them from attack.   
In sum, lawmakers pursued a multi-prong approach to addressing the “problem” 
of powerful public employee unions during the Recession. On the one hand, ambitious 
Republican Governors like Scott Walker of Wisconsin, John Kasich of Ohio, and Rick 
Snyder of Michigan seized upon the fiscal crisis theme and worked with friendly 
legislatures to enact sweeping restrictions to public employees’ collective bargaining 
rights. On the other hand, reformers from both parties also worked to enact various legal 
changes aimed at weakening the political influence of unions in order to facilitate much-
needed fiscal reforms to public pensions and healthcare plans. Finally, there are many 
instances in which sweeping reforms targeted K-12 teachers but exempted public safety 
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personnel from the changes, lending weight to the argument that particular aspects of 
state reform agendas are rooted in partisan political maneuvering. Resultantly, a new 
right-to-work era has descended upon public employees, one that is notably impacting 
teachers living in Republican-controlled, fiscally-stressed Midwestern states.  
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE AND STATES POLICY AGENDAS 
Diminishing public sector employment, unionization, and collective bargaining 
rights in the US following the 2008-2012 recession run counter to both longitudinal 
trends and academic projections. In light of this observation, my scholarly contribution is 
to establish a framework specifying the conditions under which key state-level labor 
union organizing and collective bargaining reforms were more likely to be introduced and 
enacted. Significant variation and patterning found across the states presents a challenge 
and an opportunity when seeking to explain what spurred and facilitated labor-restrictive 
reform agenda. It is challenging because national-level regime characteristics are 
complicated by federalism, hence making it unclear what individual states will do when 
faced with a crisis. Examining state variation also provides dual opportunities to examine 
state-level policymaking and national-welfare state developments. Ideally, this will 
advance our scholarship beyond regime-level approaches to broaden our understanding of 
the relationship between sub-national politics and national welfare state developments.  
For these reasons, this project aims to bridge the national/subnational divide in the 
scholarly literature on American social policy (Howard 1999). This is important because 
federalism affects many aspects of social policy-making in the American case (Quadagno 
1987; Rom 1996; Petersen 1995). Moreover, as Howard argues: “this separation produces 
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dubious generalizations about the structure of the American welfare state and incomplete 
explanations for its development” (Howard 1999, 421). I suggest that state-level reform 
activity is driving nationally observable trends in public sector employment and 
unionization in the United States. Previous examinations of social policy-making in the 
United States have illustrated that state-level policies influence national longitudinal 
trends (Skocpol 1996; Amenta, et al. 1988; Amenta and Skocpol 1986; Skocpol 1986). I 
hypothesize that the prevalence and intensity of state reforms helps explain what occurred 
during the Great Recession to facilitate an unrivaled restructuring of the public sector 
workforce. Following this logic, my examination of collective bargaining reforms 
introduced across US states in the wake of the Great Recession compliments three 
prominent research programs in the social sciences: comparative political economy, US 
state politics, and labor studies.   
Studies that seek to situate the “exceptional” American case in a comparative 
welfare states framework have been quick to attribute the US’s lag in social spending and 
the development of comprehensive, national social insurance programs compared to 
western European welfare states to federalism and a weak labor movement (Wilensky 
1975; Stephens 1979; Korpi 1980, 1983; Castles 1982; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; 
Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 1995; Robertson 1981; Quadagno 1987; Korpe and 
Palme 1998). Similarly, the “New Politics” of the welfare state framework points to 
federalism and the political influence of labor unions (or lack thereof) to explain the 
reform agenda in mature welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2001; Stephens, Huber and 
Ray 1999; Pierson 2001). National-level research has been slower, however, to integrate 
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findings from examinations of policy-making under federalism that explore the 
determinants of state-level variation in social programs and spending (Dawson and 
Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Fry and Winters 1970; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Peterson 
and Rom 1990; Mettler 1998; Gottshalk 2000; Karch 2010).   
Howard (1999) observes that the literatures on US national and state-level social 
policy-making seldom converse because fundamentally different questions motivate each 
strand of research. Most national-level scholarship seeks to explain the US’s remarkable 
lack of national social insurance programs, while state-level examinations tend to focus 
on state variation in social spending, thus reinforcing their separation (Howard 1999). As 
a consequence, the relationship between US state politics and national trends remains 
under-theorized. My research helps to elucidate this relationship by examining state-level 
public sector reforms that are ostensibly restructuring the American welfare regime in 
line with neoliberal rationality. Moreover, national economic trends are seen shaping 
state collective bargaining reform agendas. My analysis thus concurrently contributes to 
US state social policy-making research and comparative welfare states reform literature. 
Further, as collective bargaining restrictions threaten to undercut public unions’ resources 
and membership base, I assess the conditions under which state employee unions have 
been more or less successful in opposing reforms. In doing so, I aim to further our 
understanding of the policy-making influence of public sector unions in the American 
case, and in mature welfare states generally.   
This is an important topic of inquiry because political science suffers from a 
notable dearth of research examining the influence of US labor unions on policy-making. 
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This is primarily because “power resources” theorists have commonly attributed the US 
welfare state’s laggard status to the relative weakness of American labor as a mobilizing 
force for the political left (Korpi’s 1980, 1983; Stephens 1979; Huber and Stephens 
2001). Resultantly, relatively few studies have examined the influence of labor unions in 
shaping US social or fiscal policy at either the national or sub-national levels. Instead, 
most political science scholarship on labor unions has concentrated on explaining the 
downward spiral of the US labor movement since the 1940s through the proliferation of 
state “right-to-work” laws (Farhang and Katznelson 2005; Dixon 2005; Lichtenstein 
2010). However, several points of departure on the topic of labor unions in political 
science should be noted.  
Most recently, in 2012 various political scientists and labor scholars came 
together to seriously consider the evolving influence of organized labor in American 
Politics. In a special issue of The Forum, scholars considered several key issues 
organized along this theme. These included: the structural and political factors 
contributing to organized labor’s rise and decline; the emergence of an alliance between 
public sector unions and the Democratic Party; the influence of unions on elections; the 
impact of teachers unions on education reform; and the ways structural economic changes 
have differently impacted the fortunes of private versus public sector unions in the 
postwar era. 
Additional studies by Gottschalk (2000), Moe (2009, 2011, 2012), Berkman and 
Plutzer (2005), and Saiz (1998) have contributed to our understanding of the ways in 
which labor unions influence public policy outcomes. However, similar political science 
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studies linking state policy outcomes to public sector labor union influence remain few 
and far between. This is a considerable omission, given the upward trajectory of public 
sector unionism in recent decades and the observation that public sector union density is 
higher than 50% in over a dozen US states (McCartin 2007; unionstats.com). As such, 
my research seeks to broaden our understanding of labor union influence on state policy-
making. Moreover, a context of growing union density should have favorably positioned 
public employee unions to preserve their members’ interests by blocking workforce 
reforms. Nonetheless, financial resources, political strategies, and the ability to court and 
win public opinion are essential aspects of labor union influence shaping public policy in 
the United States. As such, it is important to examine whether and why public sector 
unions’ influence diminished during the 2008-2012 crisis, and how waning union 
strength was related to states’ reform agendas. Further, because union density may not 
adequately measure the political influence of particular labor unions, my research 
considers the interplay of union density, resources, and state political and economic 
factors in shaping state policy outcomes.  
According to Moe, [teachers] unions are: “centrally concerned with their 
membership base and financial resources, and thus with protecting teacher jobs, attracting 
members, and keeping dues coming in” (2009, 158). It is presumable, then, that public 
sector unions naturally oppose reforms that aim to reduce their membership base or 
restrict their collective bargaining rights. So it follows: why weren’t putatively powerful 
public employee unions more successful in blocking public sector reforms during the 
Great Recession? Is the “insider” status of public sector unions beginning to wane? 
  13 
LABORS LAST STAND? PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS AS INSIDERS NO 
MORE 
 
The so-called “Great Recession” reached its peak in the United States between 
late-2009 and early-2010. Responding to the proliferation of bankruptcies, mortgage loan 
defaults, and unemployment claims dominated the national political agenda during this 
time against a backdrop of mounting federal debt. Around the same time, ambitious 
Governors sparred with state lawmakers over which expenditures to cut in response to 
worsening state fiscal conditions. Confronted with double-digit budget deficits and record 
revenue shortfalls, Rust Belt politicians claimed that the public sector had gotten too big. 
A particularly distinctive and severe retrenchment of the state and local workforce 
followed, with numerous teachers, cops, and firemen being purged from the payrolls 
(Oliff, Mai and Palacios 2012).  
This retrenchment was brought to the attention of the American public when the 
Democratic president called for additional federal aid to prevent further layoffs of 
teachers, cops, and firefighters by struggling state and local governments. Alternatively, a 
Republican presidential hopeful attempted to rally his base by vocally opposing further 
stimulus to hire more firemen, policemen, and teachers, arguing that it was time to “cut 
back on government and help the American people” (Dwyer 2012). Notwithstanding the 
imminent election, President Obama and Governor Romney’s characterization of the 
situation was far from sensational. Personnel costs (wages, salaries, and benefits) 
consume roughly half of state and local government expenditures; consequently, state 
lawmakers seeking to “cut back on government” in response to the Great Recession 
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targeted the public workforce for considerable downsizing measuring including layoffs, 
redundancies, and early retirements (McNichol 2012).  
However, in the minds of many reformers, such measures do not go far enough in 
addressing the source of state budget woes. A more permanent solution, lawmakers 
posited, requires diminishing the collective bargaining power that public employees had 
amassed in recent decades. It was through successful negotiations at the bargaining table 
that public employees had managed to ensure the regular cost of living allowances, 
defined-benefit pensions, and employer-subsidized health plans that were driving up state 
and local expenditures to “unsustainable” levels. This is because permissive labor laws 
and strong unionization are key mechanisms through which public employees have come 
to enjoy considerable “insider” status through their privileged position in the labor 
market. As a result, public employees via their unions are both poised to oppose reforms 
that might alter their privileged status and empowered enough to successfully block them.  
By such accounts, comprehensive public sector reform aimed at shrinking 
government would not be accomplished through workforce downsizing alone. What was 
additionally needed were provisions to eviscerate public employees’ rights to collectively 
bargaining over such conditions of their employment forever more. Further, the unions 
who represented public employees in their resistance to belt-tightening reforms would 
necessarily be weakened in the process. Collective bargaining rules determined at the 
state level are a significant determiner of public employee unions’ abilities to attract and 
retain members. Resultantly, public employee unions have increasingly become powerful 
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actors in state politics due to permissive labor laws, which have enabled them to increase 
their membership bases and financial resources, and hence political clout over the years. 
In light of such observations, the pursuit of comprehensive labor relations reform 
across the US states during the Great Recession represent a puzzling departure from 
historical trends. This is particularly true in traditionally pro-labor “rust belt” states like 
Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, where public employee unions enjoyed a supportive 
political and institutional environment for half a century while their private sector 
counterparts were experiencing a steady decline in membership, resources, and political 
influence. As such, the “insider status” enjoyed by politically influential public employee 
unions in many states may explain why the US public sector has historically been 
resilient to large-scale reform in spite of domestic economic pressures and international 
downsizing trends. Following this, the possibility that public employee unions are being 
rendered ineffective and obsolete through the enactment of reforms aimed at weakening 
union organizing and contact negotiation rights is a consequential development.  
This becomes apparent when one considers that in the post-WWII-era public 
worker unions became ascendant while blue-collar manufacturing unions marched 
steadily toward obsolescence. In fact, by the 1980s, about twice as many (30-40%) state 
and local government workers where unionized compared to private sector employees 
(15-20%). Moreover, in the decades that followed public employee unions continued to 
maintain a sizeable and stable membership while private sector unionization steadily 
decreased to less than 10% by 2013 (Statistics 2013). Indicative of this, the Association 
for Federal, State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSME) is today 50 percent 
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larger than the United Auto Workers (McCartin 2006). Consequently, labor historians 
quite recently argued that the trajectory of public sector unionism in the US directly 
challenges the mainstream “death of labor” narrative (McCartin 2006). Activists have 
similarly hoped that an empowered public workforce might revitalize a half-century 
atrophied US labor movement (Clawson and Clawson 1999; Schmitt and Warner 2009).  
Moreover, the notable existence of pockets of relatively high private sector union 
density in states like Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Nevada, suggest that the dominant 
narrative about the decline of private unions — and the reasons cited to explain it are also 
overdetermined and simplistic. Further, public employee unions, especially those 
representing specific occupational constituencies like teachers, police officers, and fire 
fighters, frequently remain highly unionized in so-called “right to work” states as a result 
of occupation-specific laws that have enabled them to maintain considerable union 
membership and financial resources, and hence political influence for decades.  
However, recent trends suggest that history may be catching up with public sector 
unions: public sector unionization fell over one percent from 2012-2013, and in 2014 
continued to sit at its lowest level since the 1930s due in large part to declining union 
membership among teachers and public sector losses due to layoffs, hiring freezes, and 
ostensibly, recently enacted laws limiting collective bargaining rights (Chumley 2013). In 
Wisconsin, for instance, where Republican lawmakers recently limited union bargaining 
rights for teachers and other “non-uniform” public employees, union membership in the 
public sector decreased to 37.6 percent in 2013, from 53.4 percent in 2011, the year the 
legislation was enacted (Higgins 2014).  
  17 
It is noteworthy that during the Great Recession the insider status of public 
employee unions was successfully challenged on various fronts across the America states. 
“Insider-outsider” theories of political behavior assume that some labor market actors 
hold more privileged positions than others, and hence greater influence over 
employment-related policies (Lindbeck 2001). So-called “insiders” derive their political 
clout by being seemingly irreplaceable—or at least expensive to substitute in the labor 
market. Therefore, as labor turnover costs such as hiring, relocation, and training 
increase, those employees currently working in an industry or firm exercise 
disproportionate influence in the market compared to their costly potential replacements, 
contributing to their insider status. Insiders thus maintain an interest in keeping labor 
market costs high and will exercise political influence to increase such costs by engaging 
in rent-seeking activities like institutionalizing severance pay, seniority rules, and other 
legal protections against dismissal. Following this logic, the insider-outsider theory helps 
us to see the ways in which labor unions exercise influence over markets and politics: 
Unions provide leverage for these turnover costs since firms are more likely to 
grant wage increases when the alternative is the replacement of all unionized 
employees than when the alternative is just firing a single employee. Unions also 
provide new tools of rent-seeking, such as strikes, work-to-rule activities and 
picket lines, which tend to be more effective when workers act in unison. 
Moreover, unions act as interest groups in the political process, lobbying for job 
security legislation and other sources of labor turnover costs. (Lindbeck 177) 
 
In line with Lindbeck, various studies illustrate the ways in which public 
employee unions exert influence over politics and policymaking in the American case. 
For instance, Chandler and Gely’s (1995) examination of the relationship between the 
electoral political activities of police and firefighter unions and outcomes related to these 
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union members’ pay and employment levels found that the electoral political activities of 
protective service unions are significant determinants of wages and employment for 
police and fire personnel. Similarly, Obrien (1994) finds nearly identical results in his 
article examining the impact of union political activities on public-sector pay, 
employment, and budgets. Recent work by Anzia and Moe (2015) also frames the 
relationship between strong public sector unionization and higher wages, salaries, health 
benefits, employment levels, and pension liabilities in terms of cost-related outcomes to 
arrive at a comparable result.  
On the policy spectrum, the relationship between teachers unions and education 
policy outcomes is well documented by the work of Moe (2011, 2012), Berkman and 
Plutzer (2011), and Weber et al. Additionally, Kellough and Selden assessed the diffusion 
of various personnel reforms implemented by the federal government to state and local 
governments. They find that while state-level legislative professionalism is positively 
associated with reform, unemployment levels and the percent of state employees that are 
unionized are negatively associated with reform. They conjecture that the reason the 
probability of reform declines as union density increases relates to unions’ opposition to 
increased managerial discretion over policies pertaining to their members (Kellough 
2003).  
Finally, several mechanisms through which unions are able to assert their 
influence in opposing or promoting particular policies are highlighted by Francia’s 
(2013) analysis of organized labor’s contemporary political resources. These are: 1) vast 
financial resources, as indicated by the observation that labor unions (especially those 
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representing public employees) comprised twelve of the top twenty PAC donors from 
1989-2009 and are also among the leading donors in independent expenditures; and 2) 
substantial grassroots mobilization capacity as a result of having immense human capital 
to draw from when waging get-out-the-vote and issue education campaigns. Nonetheless, 
Francia notes that notwithstanding such resources, union membership is still “ever-
declining” (2013). This observation, coupled with the dramatic restructuring of public 
sector labor relations that is underway across many states indicates that public employee 
unions’ insider status is increasingly threatened. So it follows: how did state fiscal crises 
coinciding with the Great Recession pave the way for such a dramatic reordering of labor 
relations in the public sector? (Francia 2013) 
FROM ENVY TO ENMITY: WHY AMERICANS NO LONGER SUPPORT 
UNIONS  
 
A unifying theme in much of the labor studies and political economy scholarship 
on unions observes that the fate of organized labor would have seemed far bleaker had it 
not been for the uptick in union organizing among public employees, which served to 
obscure the massive declination occurring in the private sector. Moreover, this 
divergence is also the root of labor’s persisting inability to build a movement, particularly 
during periods of economic austerity where public and private sector workers are pitted 
against each other in a zero sum contest over labor protections and wages and benefits. 
For instance, according to Camfield, the global economic crisis created an environment in 
Canada that was particularly friendly to neoliberal reforms aimed at restructuring the 
public sector.  
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Such works bring to light the fraught relationship that the American public has 
with labor unions, particularly those representing government employees. Multiple 
interrelated perspectives to account for this are offered. For instance, Salvatore argues 
that Americans have long been ambivalent about labor unions because the heyday of 
organized labor following the end of WWII was remarkably brief. He notes that, 
“Labor’s predicament is not simply the product of a perennial struggle with capital, or its 
own strategic errors” (2012). Rather, the emergence of a conservative political vision 
among the working class has shaped the trajectory of the American labor movement, 
effectively thwarting its advancement. 
As a result, most members of the working class have never formed a class 
consciousness derived from their membership in a union and in fact more commonly feel 
pitted in antagonism to the few remaining unionized segments of the workforce. This 
feeling might be summed up by simply stating that American workers are skeptical of 
labor unions, while remaining envious of union members’ advantages in the economy. 
According to Salvatore, this is because “…many working people themselves never 
understood their lives through the prism of a union identity…” (2012).  
Extending this observation, Alquist (2012) finds that in contexts where private 
sector workers have never experienced strong unionization, public sector unions face 
considerable challenges to their growth because they need this alliance to cultivate 
working class solidarity. As such, Alquist argues that the battles occurring in Wisconsin 
and other Rust Belt states over public employees’ collective bargaining rights reveal the 
institutional weakness of organized labor. This is because in spite of widespread 
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mobilization in opposition to Scott Walker’s Budget Repair Bill, Walker was not 
successfully recalled and he was also re-elected two years later and later yet ran for the 
Republican presidential nomination.  
The reason for public employee unions’ inherent structural weakness, argues 
Alquist, is that they have not effectively allied with private sector workers to create a 
unified working-class front (2012). Instead, public sector unions have used electoral 
politics, and campaign monies to Democrats in particular, to primarily advance the 
interests of public employees who operate as political “insiders.” By not bringing private 
sector employees into the fray—either out of tactical error or because private sector 
unions remain a weak mobilizing force themselves—public sector movements have taken 
on a divisive character that fails to unify the working class.  
Alquist writes: 
With the erosion of private sector unionism and the broad compositional shifts in 
the labor market, private sector workers, especially those without college degrees, 
have seen their pay stagnate, their rights at work diminished, and have come to 
bear a larger share of the costs and risks associated with sickness, unemployment, 
skill training, and retirement…It is therefore unsurprising that calls for class 
consciousness ring hollow when uttered by college-educated workers whose job 
security and (relatively) generous health insurance and pension benefits are paid 
out of public tax revenues. 
 
Moreover, rather than contributing to apathy, such circumstances might actually create 
antipathy toward public employees and their unions. A good example of this was seen 
during the Scott Walker recall attempt in Wisconsin in 2012. According to exit polls from 
the election, there was a clear distinction in the voting patterns of union members and 
those living in “union households.” Union members, as expected, turned out heavily in 
support for removing Governor Walker and placing Democratic Milwaukee Mayor Tom 
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Barrett in his place, by a margin of 71 to 29 percent. Voters merely living with a union 
member (i.e. a private sector worker married to a teacher), however, only favored the 
Walker recall by a margin of 51 percent to 48 percent  (Blake 2012). 
Such findings indicate that significant political divisions within union households 
exist. The possibility that these divisions may have motivated family members to vote 
against one another’s material interests in an election that was explicitly about labor 
rights suggests a precarious position for organized labor in the 21st century. What 
explains the inability of labor unions to garner political support from even their own 
members’ families?  
According to Wilson, one potential explanation for societal and even intra-
household divides regarding support for organized labor relates to the “politics of envy” 
(2012). Wilson notes that although the American Labor Movement survives largely in 
part of the past several decades of growth in the public sector, the overreliance on public 
employee unions to fill out labor’s ranks has been a double-edged sword for the 
movement. Public sector unions’ successes, in other words, has made public employees, 
“objects for resentment and anger among the rest of the workforce” (Wilson 2012). A 
primary reason for this is because public employees have interests that may be seen in 
conflict with other key constituencies. For instance, Wilson observes: “…unions’ shift 
into representing public sector workers has the disadvantage that union interests 
necessarily conflict with the short term interests of homeowners (hence property tax 
payers) in minimizing the costs of running local government services such as schools…” 
(2012). 
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So, when teachers unions negotiate for higher pay and reduced class sizes, the 
implication is that property taxes will be increased to pay for them. The predominantly 
non-unionized constituency of homeowners views their interests in antagonism to public 
sector unions as a result, making them viewed unsympathetically by large swaths of 
society. As Wilson observes, this is exactly what motivated differences of opinion among 
the public during epic battles over public employees’ collective bargaining rights: “many 
low income voters resented what they saw as the privileged treatment of public sector 
workers with somewhat better incomes and decidedly better benefits (especially health 
insurance) than private sector workers” (2012). 
Following this, Wilson argues in agreement with Alquist that antipathy toward 
unions is a major cause for the declining influence of organized labor in the United 
States. He further links this to the shift in US unionism away from manufacturing and 
trades and toward the public sector. By highlighting this conflict of interest between 
unionized public employees and largely non-unionized voters and taxpayers, Wilson 
draws attention to the paradox of 21st-century unionism: organized labor no longer no 
longer draws ideological support from wide swaths of the working and middle classes. 
He observes: “Given the inherent conflicts of interest between taxpayers and public 
sector unions, it is perhaps less surprising that teachers have been attacked with even 
more vehemence; at times it has seemed as if grade school teachers not bankers caused 
the global financial crisis of 2008” (2012).  
In light of these tensions, Wilson argues that these attacks on public sector unions 
surrounding the Great Recession should have been anticipated. Moreover, as increasing 
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numbers of workers remain non-unionized, and thus not political mobilized along 
economic lines, the labor movement’s linkages to the Democratic Party and the political 
left are also increasingly tenuous. However, Wilson cautions reading too much into these 
developments, including declining union membership, increasing public wariness of 
organized labor, and weak linkages to the left, especially when considered from a 
comparative perspective.  
In Wilson’s view, “One of the lazy comments made often made in comparative 
politics is that American unions are not politically engaged. This has long been untrue.” 
As evidence of such, Wilson harkens to the sheer lobbying influence that public 
employee unions wield in American politics. In line with Francia, who also seeks to 
examine the influence and strength of organized labor by assessing electoral influence 
more than sheer union density, Wilson asserts that unions are major interest group players 
in spite of dwindling membership numbers.   
For instance, Wilson shows that labor organization comprised fourteen of the top 
thirty largest political donors to candidates for federal office between 1989-2012. And in 
spite of the so-called tenuous links to activists on the left and voters from the working-
class, much of this money is still funneled to Democratic candidates. Moreover, under the 
post Citizens United campaign finance regime, unions are able to spend limitless amounts 
to advance candidates that are sympathetic to labor’s cause. In light of these observations, 
Wilson cautions making a false association between union decline and “disappearance.” 
He asserts, “Substantially weakened, American unions survive.” He makes a good point – 
what other interest group’s membership hovers around 12% membership among the 
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general American population? However, the potential for long-term union survival is 
mitigated, he acknowledges, because much of it depends on the sustained power and 
influence of increasingly maligned public sector unions. 
As a result, private sector workers now more frequently view labor unions as the 
enemy of the working class instead of an ally. Resultantly, the working class is much 
more likely to mobilize around taking away union members’ existing collective 
bargaining rights than in demand of attaining their own legalized labor protections. Many 
scholars argue that such sentiments are heard more loudly under contexts of creeping 
societal neoliberalism during periods of austerity. If this is the case, why was everyone so 
surprised when Scott Walker and a host of Republican Governors led the charge to strip 
public employees of collective bargaining rights? Neoliberalism and labor unions are 
antithetical social forces—or are they? 
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC SECTOR 
UNIONS 
 
According to Camfield, deficit-reducing fiscal policies have stark implications for 
the public sector (2007). This is because so-called “neoliberal” economic and social 
reforms seek to use the power of the state to reorganize welfare regimes around market-
driven principles such as efficiency and economic competitiveness. Related to this, 
neoliberal reformers, contrasted with Keynesians, are staunchly opposed to running 
budget deficits. What follows from this is a desire to diminish social programs and reduce 
the size of the public sector in order to shrink the state.  
Most clearly, there are the expected effects like workforce downsizing, wage 
freezes, and benefit reductions. However, there is also a more subtle effect resulting from 
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the neoliberal fixation on budget deficits: increased hostility toward the public sector. 
Camfield states, “the influence of the idea that deficits and debt must be reduced 
contributes to an ideological climate that is more hostile to the public sector. In such a 
climate it is easier for governments to redesign the public sector in neoliberal ways” 
(2007). Moreover, as Camfield observes, cost-cutting in not the only thing that neoliberal 
public sector restructuring aims to accomplish. Other key aspects of the agenda include 
shrinking states in the name of competitiveness as well as enabling the privatization of 
public sector functions so that profit-driven firms can begin to provide key social 
services. But is the inability of organized labor to defend itself against neoliberal trends 
that intensified during the Great Recession really anything new?  
Even during the period preceding the recession, public sector unions had had little 
success in opposing neoliberal reforms (Camfield 2007). Moreover, reforms aimed at 
restricting collective bargaining rights for public employees are part and parcel of the 
“lean state project” underway across various countries since the 1980s. The lean state, is 
the “neoliberal” state. Camfield writes:  
The lean state project is to reorganize social reproduction in ways that facilitate 
the spread and consolidation of lean production methods of work organization. It 
involves a new mode of the political administration of civil society by state 
power, a host of legal and administrative measures to produce ‘flexible’ workers 
and ‘lean’ persons. Within the public sector, lean state formation involves 
reducing the number of workers, introducing more precarious employment 
relations, and shifting service delivery into the hands of non-profit agencies and 
private corporations. (Camfield, quoting Sears, 1999).  
 
In this way, public sector reforms that seek to curtail collective bargaining rights for 
public employees are understood as one part of an essentially neoliberal process that 
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seeks to restructure capitalist societies in order to build states capable of thriving in line 
with an ethos of “lean production” (Camfield 2007).  
In conclusion, Camfield argues that, “the challenges that public sector workers 
experience have roots that are both systemic and global.” What then, can a comparative 
analysis of public sector reforms underway across the American States reveal about the 
“systemic and global” process they are a part of? Is asserting that these reforms are part 
of a broader project of neoliberalism another way of saying that they are pre-determined, 
inevitable, and being compelled by forces much greater than state politics, partisanship, 
and economics? Or rather, does thinking about what is occurring in terms of 
neoliberalism help further our understanding of why public employee unions that are 
seemingly “insiders” in American politics, especially at the state level in key places like 
New York, California, and formerly Wisconsin and Michigan, have been unable to fight 
the tide of neoliberal reforms?  
Comporting with the literature on this topic, Camfield argues that public sector 
unions can be most effective when they are able to frame their demands in line with the 
greater good, thus opposing neoliberal reforms as being adverse to the interest not only of 
union members but as the users of public services. The wave of right-to-work style 
legislation descending upon the American states surrounding the Great Recession 
provides a good indication of what occurs when the users of such services are dissatisfied 
and actually blame unions and public employees for the current state of affairs (2007).  
As political insiders with massive lobbying influence, public sector unions should 
have been able to fend off the tide of neoliberal reforms aimed at undercutting their 
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members’ collective bargaining rights, especially the most draconian ones. But the 
experience has varied, with wins (or “draws”) and losses for organized labor. However, 
the record suggests that organized labor has suffered far more losses than gains. Why, 
then, have these political insiders be so ineffective in preserving their status? Are public 
sector unions [still] the goliaths in American Politics that researchers like Moe (2009, 
2011, 2012) have demonstrated them to be? What does thinking about these reforms as 
part of a greater neoliberal project reveal about the persisting influence and putative 
“insider status” of public employee unions in the American context?  
A great deal, according to a recent examination of North American Labor 
Movements by MacDonald (2014). According to MacDonald, trade unions no longer 
serve as instruments of the working-class. Resultantly, prospects for labor movement 
“renewal” (led by ascendant public employee unions, as many labor scholars have hoped) 
are significantly diminished. As evidence of this, MacDonald draws attention to tactical 
and institutional changes impacting both the Canadian and US labor movements since the 
1980s that have created a “contradictory reorganization of organized labor along 
neoliberal lines and the impasse of the renewal project” (2014). Following this, the recent 
wave of union-restrictive reform activity occurring across the American states is nothing 
novel or isolated. Rather, it is best conceptualized as part of a process of neoliberalism 
that has been occurring for decades.  
MacDonald writes: “The 2008 crisis has resolved itself into another moment in 
this recurring pattern, affording capital the opportunity of sloughing off workers’ 
accumulated benefit claims, introducing lower wage and benefit tiers and extending 
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precarious forms of employment” (2014). In this way, the fact that public employees 
were the primary focus of the wave of anti-union restrictive activity says less about the 
unique nature of public employment and public sector unionism than it does about the 
reality that public employee unions were just the only ones left. MacDonald further 
suggests that rather than resisting neoliberal processes, unions have accommodated them 
by hollowing out the content of collective bargaining (by agreeing to a narrowed 
bargaining scope, for instance) for the sake of maintaining status quo forms of collective 
bargaining. Examples of this come to light in my examination of introduced and enacted 
collective bargaining reforms. I find that roughly equal numbers of labor-restrictive 
reforms may be viewed as accommodations made with some agreement by organized 
labor and Democratic lawmakers. I discuss these in chapter two under the context of 
union influence- restricting versus union formation-restricting collective bargaining 
reforms.  
According to MacDonald, neoliberalism has emerged as the norm in advanced 
capitalist economies to the detriment of social democratic and socialist projects. In this 
way, the worldwide economic collapse of 2008-2009 and the Great Recession that 
followed merely renewed a neoliberal project that was already well underway. As such, 
efforts to dismantle public employee unions as the last remaining bastion of the labor 
movement are seen as a return to the status quo by this form of capitalism that sees trade 
unions as anathema to its central neoliberal tendencies (MacDonald 2014). However, 
MacDonald cites several examples to show that unions have managed to coexist with 
neoliberal capitalism, for instance, collective bargaining agreements that increase profits 
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by compressing wages and extending shift times. The key issue of importance is that 
unions have themselves reorganized along neoliberal lines. As a result, small victories for 
organized labor are frequently taken out of context if they are taken as a loss for 
neoliberalism. Rather, where unionism still exists, it is because it has adapted to 
neoliberalism, not overcome it. 
This is particularly harmful for the fate of public employee unions, according to 
MacDonald, because repeat accommodation may begin viewed as an admission of 
culpability. “When public sector unions bargain concessionary contracts in periods of 
austerity, they similarly reinforce a spurious neoliberal notion that public sector workers 
are responsible for budget deficits” (2014). Another issue with concessionary contracts is 
that they frequently drive wedges between different classes or categories of union-
members within the same bargaining unit, for instance between new hires and old-timers, 
part-time versus full-time workers, women versus men, etc). Moreover, when these 
accommodations are placed in context of increasing or at least union density holding 
steady, as in the case of public employee unions in the US, sheer membership numbers 
are revealed to be a weaker indicator of union influence and mobilizing capacity. This 
might explain why unions were actually most vulnerable where they were strongest, not 
only did they have the most to lose, but they also were not as capable of preventing 
reforms as membership numbers and union density might indicate.  
Another reason that union density is not a straightforward indicator of union 
capacity is because not all union members are equally politically active and savvy. This is 
because today, most workers become union members when they are hired into an 
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occupation that is represented by an existing bargaining unit, rather than because they 
rose up, allied with fellow workers to demand representation from a (potentially hostile) 
employer. These divergent experiences among unionized workers have a direct impact on 
whether workers view their relationship to the union in instrumental terms versus a 
vehicle for their workplace and political activism. In other words: demanding union 
representation is very different than being handed it (or having it imposed, as some may 
view it). And in fact, many younger employees and recent hires may opt out of union 
membership altogether because they perceive little to gain when many of the major 
workplace issues have long been settled. This is why recent reforms that require annual 
union recertification are expected to have such a profound impact on union membership 
numbers. With the bargaining scope significantly narrowed, and costs associated with 
supporting a union increased, younger and/or newer hires will likely lack any strong pro-
union consciousness leading them to vote in support of recertification. Over time, the 
number of bargaining units will dwindle.  
There will remain cases of new bargaining units being certified and specific 
unions winning in collective negotiations, however, the implication of such “small 
victories” must be measured against the ongoing tides of neoliberalism. Rather than 
serving as catalysts that might encourage other classes and occupations of workers to 
demand greater workforce protections, union victories in the neoliberal era where labor 
markets are polarized and the working classes are fragmented and largely unorganized 
seek to stoke antipathy rather than inspiring similar activism. Therefore, as union 
protections becoming more seemingly out of reach for increasing majorities of workers in 
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places like the US or Canada, non-union workers have begun to view their relationship to 
unionized workers as a zero sum game, particularly in the context of miniscule private 
sector unionization compared to somewhat stable, sizable unionization in the public 
sector. Gains for unionized public employees amount to tax increases for other. The 
result: resentment and even enmity: 
According to MacDonald: “Emulation is not seen as a viable strategy given the 
many obstacles raised to unionization and collective bargaining in the private sector. 
Rather than emulation, envy engenders rage at strikes borne of union refusal to agree to 
concessions. This forms the basis for an ugly, irrational politics of resentment that now 
cuts through North American working classes and is directed with particular vehemence 
at public sector workers” (2014). Moreover, this impulse may be heightened during times 
of economic decline, when the majority of non-union protected workers do not have 
employment protections to insulate them from economic shocks.  
As evidence of this, scholars such as Kersten (2011) observe that political leaders 
have used the “rhetoric of class warfare” in justifying their appeals for collective 
bargaining reform. For example, during a campaign debate: 
Walker asserted that Wisconsin had a “have and have-not” problem. But by 
turning this class analysis on its head (and leaving the wealthy elite completely 
out of the equation), he claimed that the ‘haves’ were the unionized state workers 
and the “have-nots” were the rest of the state’s citizens. He promised to rectify 
that by taking wages and benefits away from state workers. (Kersen 2011, original 
emphasis)  
 
Propped up by the logic of “class warfare”, legislation aiming to restrict or altogether 
repeal public sector collective bargaining rights proliferated across the American states 
during the Great Recession. Myriad bills sought to tip the scales [back] toward the 
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employer, i.e. the government, in labor negotiations over items like wages, benefits, 
staffing, and work conditions. Such legislation had one overarching goal - to diminish the 
bargaining power of [public] employee unions in order to elevate the [government] 
employer’s status in relation to their employees. Moreover, according to critics like 
Kersten, who maintains that “the idea that state workers are the haves and private 
workers are the have-nots is ludicrous,” Republican politicians capitalized on widespread 
economic uncertainty caused by the Great Recession to largely manufacture state budget 
crises in order to justify their politically-motivated collective bargaining reform agendas.   
It is easy to understand why Andrew Kersten, a Wisconsin native, labor historian, 
and faculty member in the University of Wisconsin (UW) system was ruffled by this 
surge of labor-restrictive activity occurring across the states during the Recession. In 
2011, the Governor of his state signed into law a now infamous piece of legislation, 
Wisconsin Act 10, referred to as the “Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill.” This legislation 
addressed a $3.6 billion dollar budget gap by making changes to [most] public 
employees’ sick leave, compensation, retirement, and health insurance benefits. At the 
same time, it severely restricted public employees’ collective bargaining rights: the 
permissible bargaining scope was narrowed to wages only, constrained by the 
requirement that future wage increases be capped to Cost of Living Allowances 
determined by the Consumer Price Index; limited the length of collective bargaining 
contracts to one year; required bargaining units undergo annual recertification elections; 
outlawed the assessment of “fair share” fees; and stripped UW employees of their right to 
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collectively bargain while eliminating the collective bargaining units previously 
established to represent UW employees.  
Claims similar to Kersten’s assertion that Walker was “ginning up a political 
crisis so that he can force a solution that transforms Wisconsin from a progressive state to 
a conservative, privatized state,” have been a common refrain among leftist academics, 
labor activists, and public employees responding to the surge of labor-restrictive reforms 
occurring surrounding the Great Recession (2011). For instance, Cantin places the 
legislative developments in Wisconsin in broader economic and political context, arguing 
that, “The legislative attack on public sector unionism that gave rise to a political 
firestorm in Wisconsin and other union strongholds since the election of 2010 was not 
just a reaction to the contemporary economic difficulties faced by the government. 
Rather, it was the result of a longstanding political hostility of the USA’s modern 
conservative movement to unionism and collective bargaining per se” (2012).   
Cantin proceeds to argue that three main factors have increased public employee 
unions’ vulnerability to political attack “under the guise of the politics of austerity” 
(2012). First, the “private-public divergence” in unionization, employment protections, 
and compensation has created antipathy toward public workers. Second, the Great 
Recession, and the popularity of “Austerity Policies” in response to fiscal crises. And 
finally, the rise of the anti-government, Tea Party movement among conservative 
Republicans. McCartin (2011) additionally argues that enemies of public sector unions 
had actually been waiting for decades for the opportunity (i.e. a deep and protracted 
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recession) to curtail public sector unions through the justification of fiscal necessity and 
the assignment of blame.  
Moreover, particular public sector employees and their unions might 
disproportionately be a target of reforms during bad economic times in spite of their 
notable political influence in recent decades. For instance, my research reveals that 
teachers unions were highly vulnerable to labor-restrictive reforms during the Great 
Recession. This is somewhat surprising when considered in light of research by scholars 
such as Moe (2012) and West et al (2012) who have revealed teachers unions to be “by 
far the most powerful groups in the politics of education reform,” and engaged in a 
“classic iron triangle” in American politics. However, Moe begins to shed light on why 
the Recession provided an opening for recent attacks on teachers’ collective bargaining 
rights. He observes, “…the financial crisis that began in 2008, compounded by the 
crushing obligations of teacher pensions and retiree health benefits, has forced districts to 
be more confrontational with their unions over money and organization.”  
Moe points out how teachers unions have acted to stall education reform at the 
local and national levels for decades, concluding that under normal circumstances they 
would retain such power (“you can’t take away the power of powerful groups, because 
they will use their power to stop you”), but then adding the caveat that “these are not 
normal times.” In fact, according to Moe, various events have coalesced recently to create 
just the type of critical juncture that might be necessary to weaken the formidable 
teachers unions. These were in their early stages in 2012, according to Moe but still serve 
to illustrate underlying weakness. First, is that education reformers began going on the 
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offensive against “bad teachers” while publically criticizing unions for defending them. 
This course has been facilitated, asserts Moe, by the “perfect storm” of state fiscal crises 
arising out of the Great Recession and the 2010 Republican midterm victories, which 
“emboldened [Republicans] to use the financial crisis as a vehicle for major change. This 
was Republicans’ opportunity to overcome the usual checks and balances, enact 
education reforms the teachers unions had long blocked—and go after collective 
bargaining itself, the unions’ power base, which heretofore has been politically 
untouchable.” 
However, just as state economies have rebounded, at least somewhat, Moe 
acknowledges that “the perfect storm will pass.” The question, then, is: will the decline of 
teachers unions (and public sector unions broadly) continue? According to Moe, there is 
one additional, perhaps more important reason to believe that teachers unions are in 
dwindling – they are losing support among their Democratic base. 
With many urban schools abysmally bad and staying that way, with accountability 
putting the spotlight on poor performance, and with school choice offering 
attractive opportunities for escape that the unions systematically snuff out, 
respected advocates for the disadvantaged are fed up. More than ever before, they 
are demanding real reform, and they are overtly critical of the unions for 
obstructing it. Moderate and liberal opinion leaders—writing in Time, Newsweek, 
and other major outlets—regularly excoriate the unions for putting job interests 
ahead of children. (Moe 2012) 
 
In sum, political and economic changes are occurring in state economies that have 
impacted the abilities of public employee unions to defend their members’ interests 
against various affronts to their collective bargaining rights. In an attempt to understand 
the political underpinnings and distributional implications of public sector workforce 
restructuring, I examine state and sector-level differences in public sector reforms 
  37 
pursued and enacted across the US states. Through these analyses, I aim to illuminate the 
conditions under which public employees’ “insider” status is more likely to be threatened 
in state legislative agendas. I additionally assess what the winners and losers (or those 
who “lost less”) of recently enacted public sector workforce reforms indicates about the 
political influence of particular public sector workers and their unions.  
In chapter 2, I provide a detailed description of the period of heightened collective 
bargaining reform activity that ensued across the US states surrounding the Great 
Recession. I do this through an examination of state legislative agendas using the original 
data set categorizing approximately 2600 collective bargaining reforms introduced across 
state legislatures from 2007-2014. These labor relations bills variously sought to: extend 
or restrict collective bargaining rights for certain classes or occupations of workers; alter 
the collective bargaining scope and contract negotiation process; change impasse 
resolution procedures; regulate public contracting; and restrict labor unions’ political and 
activities.  
Examining frequencies of bill introductions for specific reform components I find 
that the roughly one-fifth of all proposals related to the assessment of union dues and 
fees, over 400 bills sought to change the collective bargaining scope and/or alter 
mediation procedures, while 240 sought to establish or alter bargaining unit certification 
processes. I further observe that roughly equal numbers of labor-restrictive versus labor-
permissive legislation were introduced across state legislatures, with collective 
bargaining reform activity surging during the 2009-2010 legislative session, coinciding 
with the Recession’s peak. I then assess the influence of such factors on the frequency of 
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“anti-labor” compared to “pro-labor” proposals on state legislative agendas using event 
count models and statistical stimulation techniques to reveal that labor reform agendas 
were more intensely directed against organized labor in states where private sector 
incomes and home price values were weak, and yet public sector unionization remained 
strong.  
These findings suggest that ostensibly partisan public sector reform agendas have 
important material bases, too. Following this, I conjecture that discontent over the 
economy heightened public perceptions that government employees in union-friendly 
states are uniquely (and unfairly) insulated from economic shocks. By stoking this 
discontentment among disgruntled private sector workers, I argue that Tea Party-
endorsed lawmakers and market fundamentalist interest groups like the American 
Legislative Exchange Council were able to seize upon a unique opportunity to hobble 
formerly formidable public employee unions while dramatically restructuring employer-
employee relations in the government sector. 
Next, in chapter 3, I provide a more detailed analysis of the content of collective 
bargaining reforms pursued and enacted across the States during the Great Recession. 
First, I group labor relations proposals into two broad reform categories or “packages” 
based upon whether their provisions seek to alter: 1) labor union membership, or 2) labor 
union influence. I then provide a justification for classifying labor laws in this way based 
upon the observation that states tended to pursue one reform package over the other. I 
argue this suggests that these packages represent two distinct ways of resolving the same 
concern: what to do about labor unions in the midst of the Recession. Next, I analyze 
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potential explanations for why states might pursue one type of labor-restricting reform 
package over the other. I find that partisanship and labor union influence shape 
lawmakers’ choices in meaningful ways: states with strong public sector unions and 
Democratic-controlled legislatures appear reluctant to pursue union formation 
restrictions, presumably because they do not want to upset influential labor allies. 
Nonetheless, Democratic lawmakers still sought to limit the influence of entrenched labor 
unions in the context of a weak state economy, especially with a Republican Governor at 
the helm.  
Finally, in chapter 4, I examine an under-explored aspect of the Great Recession-
era public sector collective bargaining reform movement: the occupational target of such 
reforms. Using the original dataset categorizing collective bargaining reforms based on 
the occupational category of workers they seek to affect, I show that public primary and 
secondary (K-12) school teachers were the primary subject of labor-restrictive reforms 
introduced during the Great Recession. I then compare the prevalence of K-12 teachers 
on state reform dockets to that of public safety employees. Finally, I assess the 
relationship between state political and economic characteristics and occupational 
targeting in the reform agenda.  
I find a significant relationship between the presence of a Republican governor in 
a state and disproportionate labor-restrictive reforms targeting teachers. I further find that 
where teachers unions are more influential in state politics, measured in terms of their 
average yearly political campaign donations (to any party or issue), there were more anti-
teacher reforms on state legislative agendas. Conversely, I find a significant negative 
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relationship between Republican-friendly state teachers unions and a reform agenda 
predominantly aimed at weakening teachers’ collective bargaining rights. Additionally, I 
find that a weak state economic situation diminishes rather than increases the proportion 
of labor-restrictive bills aimed at teachers.  
I surmise that when a state is in greater fiscal dire straits and more public sector 
reforms are introduced overall, the legislative focus on teachers is diluted as additional 
occupational groups are targeted by reforms. Moreover, I find no similar relationship 
between state political, economic, and fiscal characteristics and the percentage of labor 
restrictive reforms targeted toward other public sector employees like police and 
corrections officers. I conclude that the prominence of “anti-teacher” legislation in many 
states’ collective bargaining reform agendas has an important political basis (i.e. 
weakening teachers unions in states where they are politically active), while general 
public employee reforms may be more firmly grounded in fiscal necessity. 
Ultimately, my research reveals significant patterning in states’ approaches to 
resolving the fiscal challenges presented by the Great Recession via various public sector 
reforms. Some states pursued and implemented more draconian collective bargaining 
restrictions, while others sought compromises with public employee unions that have 
enabled unions to maintain key aspects of their collective bargaining power such as the 
ability to levy union fees on people who opt out of joining the union. However, much as 
MacDonald (2014) suggests, many of these so-called “gains” for labor are really just 
efforts to stem the tide of restrictive activity and come at the expense of hollowing out 
collective bargaining process of any real issues of consequence, for example by 
  41 
narrowing the bargaining scope so much that there is little room for union influence in 
contract negotiations. Unions have also made considerable concessions and political 
compromises that have driven wedges between new hires versus longer-term employees, 
as well as school teachers versus public safety providers. Finally, although the national 
Recession officially ended in 2014, state labor relations reform projects remained very 
much underway. For instance, going back on his promise to not make Wisconsin a right-
to-work state, Governor Scott Walker did just that in 2015. In the post-Recession era, 
state legislatures and Governors have also been increasingly seen at loggerheads over the 
issue of collective bargaining rights, especially during occasions of divided government.  
In Missouri, for example, both [Republican-controlled] houses of the state 
legislature vote to make the “show-me” state into a right-to-work state in full awareness 
that the Democratic Governor intended to veto any such legislation (he did just that). 
Then, in a role reversal, the Republican Governor of Illinois, Bruce Rauner, issued an 
executive order upon assuming office in 2015 that barred public employee unions from 
collecting “fair share fees” (which is essentially a right-to-work reform) in spite of 
opposition from the state lawmakers who enjoyed Democratic supermajorities in both 
houses. The court later struck down Governor Rauner’s executive order, and the 
legislature subsequently put “right-to-work” up for a symbolic vote that received not one 
single “yay” vote because all the Democrats opposed it, and all the Republicans either 
voted “present” or abstained from the vote by taking a walk. Various Republican 
Governors, including Rauner have also sought to establish local right-to-work zones in 
cases where they do not enjoy enough legislative support to enact a state-level law. 
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In closing, it is incontrovertible that the Great Recession sparked a collective 
bargaining reform movement that has resulted in a very polarized legal and political 
environment for organized labor. With half of the states now falling into the category of 
right-to-work, the question remains as to how long organized labor can hold the line 
before becoming a total political outsider in a majority of the states. As my research 
reveals in the chapters that follow, this will have a lot to do with the political and 
economic characteristics of individual states, as well as private sector workers’ attitudes 
toward organized labor moving forward.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE GREAT RECESSION AND AN “ASSAULT” ON 
ORGANIZED LABOR  
 
 The tendency for the incumbent President’s party to lose ground during midterm 
elections rang especially true in the midst of the Great Recession. In addition to the 
Democrats being notoriously “shellacked” on the national stage, 2010 marked a pivotal 
time in state party politics: In a spectacular reversal of partisan control, a new wave of 
Tea-party-endorsed conservatives unseated Democratic lawmakers and governors all 
across the country. Legislatures in several “rust belt” states with legacies of Democratic 
or bi-partisan control notably flipped for the Republican Party. Newly empowered 
Republican leaders seemingly held a mandate to address imminent state fiscal crises 
according to conservative principles. Governors like John Kasich of Ohio, Rick Snyder of 
Michigan, Mitch Daniels of Indiana, and Scott Walker of Wisconsin promised to shrink 
government, reduce taxes, and make government friendlier for business during their 
election campaigns. As public employees working in these states would soon find out, a 
key component of this agenda entailed restructuring public sector labor relations through 
the enactment of labor-restrictive collective bargaining reforms. This chapter examines 
the politics of collective bargaining reforms pursued across the American states during 
the Great Recession, paying particular attention to the political and economic foundations 
of state labor reform agendas. 
 In Wisconsin, for example, those familiar with the state’s legacy as the first to 
grant public employees collective bargaining rights were astonished when Republican 
lawmakers under the leadership of Governor Scott Walker ushered in a new “right-to-
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work” era for government employees. These reforms, implemented in 2011 as part of an 
omnibus reform package referred to as the “Budget Repair Bill” were startling in their 
draconian nature. In this legislation, lawmakers utilized two widely held legal maneuvers 
to reduce unions’ abilities to attract and retain members. First, they banned the hallmark 
collective bargaining practice of public employees being required to pay fees to a union 
even if they do not wish to become members (otherwise known as the “fair share fee” for 
being covered under a union-negotiated contract). Secondly, the law restricted union 
members from having their dues automatically deducted from their paychecks, thereby 
increasing the time costs associated with membership. Next, rights to exclusive union 
representation were eliminated for faculty and academic staff at the University of 
Wisconsin campuses, home health-care workers, nurses, and other health-care workers at 
the UW Hospitals and Clinics. Finally, approximately 200,000 public employees lost the 
right to collectively bargaining over issues related to promotion, seniority, and pensions 
and health benefits, while future wage increases were pegged to the cost of living index, 
effectively removing salaries from the bargaining scope as well. Moreover, all state 
bargaining units would have to undergo annual recertification elections, and those unions 
that did not win majority support would subsequently be disbanded. Incidentally, the 
public sector reform agenda in Wisconsin notably (and some have argued strategically) 
exempted police officers, state troopers, and firefighters (Ballotpedia 2011).  
Following the enactment of the now infamous “Budget Repair Bill,” a highly 
publicized battle over collective bargaining rights in the state ensued led by an uproar of 
organized labor that attempted to (unsuccessfully) recall Governor Walker from office. 
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However, the affront that labor leaders and supporters felt notwithstanding, the events 
that led up to clashes between labor unions and reformist lawmakers in Wisconsin were 
neither novel nor isolated. As Cantin points out: “What makes Scott Walkers assault on 
labor unions so striking, is that in its prominence it called attention to a wave of anti-
public-sector-collective-bargaining statutes that were introduced across dozens of states 
following the 2010 mid-term congressional and state elections” (Cantin 2012). Hard 
fought battles over public employees’ collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin, Ohio, 
and Michigan merely served to publicize a nation-wide surge of labor-restrictive 
lawmaking activity that ensued surrounding the Great Recession.  
For instance, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels actually came out ahead of the 
curve in 2006 when he rescinded public employees’ collective bargaining rights. Then, in 
2012, Indiana lawmakers shifted their attention toward private sector workers to pass 
legislation making Indiana the 23rd “right-to-work” state. Michigan and Ohio also 
followed Wisconsin’s lead to implement similar collective bargaining restrictions for 
both public sector workers (in the case of Ohio) and all workers (as in Michigan). Chris 
Christie also signed an executive order on his first day in office that restricted public 
employee unions in the state from making political campaign contributions, and has 
engaged in numerous struggles with public employee unions over salaries, pensions, and 
health care benefits. 
To shed light on this nationwide phenomenon, I have compiled an extensive 
original data set containing bill content and status information for these and similar 
reforms introduced across state legislatures between 2007-2014. This data was obtained 
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utilizing a combination of state legislative archives key word searches and the National 
Conference of State Legislatures Collective Bargaining database. With this information I 
categorized individual bills according to their purpose in restructuring labor relations. So, 
bills seeking to change labor relations in ways that advantage employees and their unions 
are considered to be “pro-labor,” while those that would give the advantage to the 
employer at the detriment of workers and unions are classified as “anti-labor.” My data 
collection efforts reveal that Cantin’s (2012) observation about the “wave of anti-public-
sector-collective-bargaining statutes” was potentially understated. Indeed, approximately 
2500 bills seeking to weaken, strengthen, or preserve workers’ union organizing and 
contract negotiation rights were introduced across a majority of states surrounding the 
economic downturn. In the sections that follow, I offer more detailed descriptions of the 
content of this legislation while shedding light on how state labor relations agendas 
evolved over the course of the Recession.  
THE LABOR RELATIONS REFORM AGENDA IN THE STATES 
 Collective bargaining rights are legal protections extended to workers permitting 
or requiring employers to meet with employees regarding the terms and conditions of 
their employment. However, collective bargaining rights for state and local government 
employees are not generally extended or restricted through a single legal provision; 
myriad occupation-specific laws regulate union organizing and contract negotiation 
rights. For this reason, state lawmakers pursued a multi-prong approach to reforming 
public sector labor relations during the Great Recession. This is indicated by the wide-
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ranging content of bills related to union organizing and employee rights introduced in 
state legislatures from 2007-2014.  
I find that over 1000 labor-restrictive bills were introduced across the American 
states from 2007-2014. Notably half of these bills were introduced during the 2011-2012 
legislative session, indicating a dramatic increase in labor relations reform activity 
following the midterms. Moreover, in earlier sessions, the number of pro-labor proposals 
actually exceeded the number of anti-labor reforms. The “anti-labor” bent that the reform 
agenda took following the 2010 midterms indicates that a sea change in public sector 
labor relations was underway: between 2011 and 2012 nearly 5 times as many employer-
advantaging or labor restricting bills were introduced compared to the 2007-2008 session. 
(See Tables 1& 2). 
Table 1. Introduced labor relations reform bills, pooled sessions 
Session   Pro-labor Anti-labor Neutral  
2007-2014    1216  1195  151 
 
Table 2. Introduced labor relations reform bills, 2007-2014, by session 
Session   Pro-labor Anti-labor Neutral 
2007-2008   312  119  18 
2009-2010   288  198  14 
2011-2012   359  523  68 
2013-2014   257  355  51 
 
Similarly, we observe significant changes over time in the frequency of state 
labor-restrictive legislation being either passed by at least one chamber of the legislature 
or enacted into law. In fact, the data reveals somewhat of a gradual reversal of course for 
organized labor occurring from the ‘07-‘08 session to the ‘09-‘10 session, which then 
increases more dramatically by ‘11-‘12. (See Tables 3&4). For instance, in the first 
session included in the dataset, only eight total labor-restrictive or “anti-labor” reforms 
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were either engrossed or enacted, compared with 60 pro-labor reforms that were at least 
partially successful in ascending through state legislative processes. Then, by 2011-2012 
over 90 bills with a labor-restrictive bent were passed by at least one state house or 
enacted across the states.  
Table 3. Legislation passed by at least one chamber, by session 
 
Session   Pro-labor Anti-labor Neutral 
2007-2008   26          4          0   
2009-2010   20         18          1 
2011-2012   18          23          2 
2013-2014   13          18          3 
 
Table 4. Enacted legislation, by session 
 
Session   Pro-labor Anti-labor Neutral 
2007-2008   34       4          3   
2009-2010   31  13  3 
2011-2012   44  71  15 
2013-2014   41  39  10 
 
Additionally, we find significant divergence between executives and legislatures 
during the observed timeframe, with 39 pro-labor bills being vetoed by (mostly 
Republican) Governors in 2007-2008 and handfuls of both pro-labor and anti-labor 
reforms being vetoed by Governors of both stripes, with the occasional veto being 
overridden by a legislative supermajority, in later sessions. (Table 5.)  
 
Table 5. Legislation vetoed and vetoes overridden (OR), by session 
 
Session   Pro-labor Anti-labor Neutral 
2007-2008   39 (1 OR)     3 (1 VOR)      0   
2009-2010   7  (3 OR) 1  0 
2011-2012   7   6  0 
2013-2014   9  5  0 
 
A content analysis of this legislation further elucidates roughly 11 components of 
the labor relations reform agenda (Table 6). As indicated by the bill content analysis, 
various aspects of state labor relations bills introduced surrounding the Recession sought 
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to: extend or restrict collective bargaining rights for certain classes or occupations of 
workers; alter the collective bargaining scope and contract negotiation process; change 
impasse resolution procedures; regulate public contracting; and restrict labor unions’ 
political and activities. 
Table 6. Labor Relations Reform Components, Bill Introductions 2007-2014* 
Labor Relations Reform Components*    Total # of Proposals  
Representation and Bargaining Rights    1017 
 (1) Restricts: 436  
 (2) Expands: 581  
Mandatory Bargaining Scope       437 
 (1) Narrows: 192  
 (2) Widens: 245  
Impasse Arbitration         410 
 (1) Restricts: 121   
 (2) Expands: 289  
Contracts and Negotiations      92 
 (1) Voter/legislative approval required: 28  
 (2) Public posting required: 15  
 (3) Continuation/expiration clauses: 49  
Union Certification and Election Procedures    240  
 (1) Secret Ballot: 171  
 (2) Majority Card Check: 60  
 (3) Legislative Recognition/Exempt from Election: 9  
Employee Strikes       129 
 (1) Striking prohibited: 116  
 (2) Striking permitted or punishment lowered: 13  
Transparency of Bargaining and Union Activities    75 
 (1) Favors transparency: 56  
 (2) Favors confidentiality: 19   
Union Security/Agency Shop Provisions    318 
 (1) Agency Shop prohibited: 194 
 (2) Agency Shop negotiable: 87  
 (3) Agency Shop compulsory: 37  
Union Dues Deduction Provisions     189 
 (1) Dues check-off prohibited: 80  
 (2) Dues check-off negotiable: 32  
 (3) Dues check-off compulsory: 51  
 (4) Dues check-off requires authorization: 26  
Politics, Money, and Influence      129 
 (1) Regulates union organizing: 28  
 (2) Regulates union political expenditures: 82  
 (3) Regulates union financial reporting: 19  
Contracting Out and Privatization:      152 
 (1) Authorizes/enables: 105   
 (2) Permits within guidelines: 39    
 (3) Restricts: 8   
* Components are not mutually exclusive 
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Examining frequencies of bill introductions for key reform components I further 
found that the roughly one-fifth of proposals sought to change provisions related to the 
collection of union dues and fees, over 400 bills sought to change the mandatory 
bargaining scope and/or alter mediation procedures, while 240 sought to establish or alter 
union certification processes. (A further description of introduced and enacted legislation 
in each category can be found in Appendix 1.)  
I consider the proposals detailed in Table 6 to be components of a broad labor 
reform agenda following Boehmke because they reflect various ways of altering the 
institutional or political framework in which employees collectively negotiate contracts 
and resolve impasses with their employers (Boehmke 2009). So, individual components 
of the larger collective bargaining reform agenda might include provisions related to 
union certification, representation, dues, political activities, or public contracts. In this 
way, components of state labor reform agendas might be complementary or alternative 
ways to accomplish the policy objective of restructuring labor relations in the public 
sector. Moreover, an individual bill may contain none, some, or all these components. 
Considering this assortment of labor-related policy proposals in a comprehensive 
analysis, then, permits conceptualization of the various methods through which states 
seek to accomplish the policy goal of weakening (or strengthening) public employee 
unions.  
WHERE WILL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES SOON BE “BARGAINING ALONE”? 
 Labor scholars and activists argue such heighted collective bargaining reform 
activity amounts to an assault on organized labor and question whether state lawmakers 
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will soon pound the final nails into the coffin of the American labor movement (McCartin 
2011). Scholars of state politics and public policy, on the other hand, are interested in 
identifying the set of circumstances that coalesce to shape state policy reform agendas. 
As public employees are increasingly forced to “bargain alone” to secure workforce 
protections, this project sheds light on the economic determinants of the Great Recession-
era labor relations reform agenda. The time frame of the analysis additionally spans 
economic and partisan changes occurring across states during the peak and recovery 
phases of the recession. I assess the influence of such factors on the frequency of “anti-
labor” compared to “pro-labor” proposals on state legislative agendas using event count 
models and statistical stimulation techniques. 
Clearly, the enactment of draconian collective bargaining restrictions targeting 
government employees is a significant development with stark implications for public 
sector unionism. (Observers are already assessing the damage in terms of declining 
public sector union membership in Wisconsin and Michigan, and the prognosis is not 
good, especially for teachers unions). Further, I suggest that the explosion of anti-labor 
bill introductions surrounding the Great Recessions is also consequential, irrespective of 
individual bill passage or failure. This is because bill introductions are an important 
“position-taking” activity engaged in by lawmakers (Rocca 2010; Schiller 1995). As 
such, introducing legislation that is identifiably labor-restrictive or permissive yields 
important information about legislators’ preferences while signaling their existing (or 
aspirational) relationships with interest groups.  
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The proliferation of anti-labor legislation, then, may indicate that relationships 
between state lawmakers and organized labor have become strained in the current fiscal 
and political environment. Legislators seeking to court support from a different donor 
class (thereby distancing themselves from increasingly unpopular unions) may seek to 
signal these preferences by introducing labor-restrictive bills even in instances when they 
know they are unlikely to be adopted. In support of this, journalists, scholars, and labor 
activists have called attention to the role the American Legislative Exchange Council has 
played in providing lawmakers with “boilerplate” union-busting legislation since the 
financial crisis ensued (Vail 2013; Lafer 2013).   
Nonetheless, critics may assert that bill introductions are relatively “costless” (and 
hence, uninteresting) because few states limit bill introductions and variations on the 
same proposal can be introduced session after session, ad infinitum. I argue, however, 
that it may be particularly “profitable" for lawmakers to introduce bills favored by 
interest groups (like ALEC or public employee unions). For instance, Rocca and Gordon 
(2010) have linked the positions that House Democrats take through bill sponsorship to 
campaign contributions from labor and gun control PACS. Lazarus (2013) similarly 
found a positive relationship between the number of policy-related bills introduced by a 
Member of Congress and his or her constituents’ heightened interest in that policy. Such 
research suggests that bill introductions data is a valuable source of information about 
lawmakers’ constituent preferences and interest group loyalties. This is because 
sponsoring legislation is a visible, traceable way for lawmakers to signal the direction 
and intensity of their preferences on an issue regardless of whether a bill is likely to make 
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it to a floor vote or survive an executive veto. This may explain why Republicans in 
states where Democrats enjoy legislative dominance still introduce labor-restricting 
legislation and why one fervently pro-labor bill introducer exists in even the deepest red, 
Right to Work states.  
For this reason, I suggest that lawmakers used bill introductions during the Great 
Recession to convey information to interest groups and voters about the direction and 
intensity of their preferences related to organized labor, fiscal policy, and/or free market 
principles. Following this, I categorize labor reform proposals based on their direction: 
pro-labor or anti-labor. I then use this information to assess how intensely lawmakers in a 
state supported a labor-restrictive versus labor- permissive reform agenda in response to 
the financial crisis. My examination of the data reveals that most states cluster into 
identifiable anti-labor or pro-labor reform camps. So, although the labor relations reform 
agenda pursued across the states during the recession ostensibly aimed to strengthen the 
[government] employer in labor negotiations, dozens of states actually aimed to extend or 
reaffirm existing labor protections. States additionally sought to implement labor 
relations reforms with varying intensity: In 21 states, greater than 1.5 times as many anti-
labor bills were introduced compared to pro-labor bills. Pennsylvania and Michigan, for 
example, introduced over forty more bills that aimed to advantage the employer versus 
employees in labor relations. Conversely, 15 states including New York, Massachusetts, 
and Maryland, introduced 25% fewer anti-labor than pro-labor bills (See Tables 7&8.). A 
detailed description of introduced and enacted collective bargaining reform legislation 
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broken down by “pro” versus “anti” labor for each legislative session contained in the 
dataset can be found in Appendix 2. 
Table 7. “Pro-Employer” States: Greater than 1.5x as many anti-labor bills were introduced 
 
State  Anti-labor Pro-labor 
FL  22  0 
MS  12  1 
OK  22  2 
KS  9  1 
VA  26  3 
SC  17  2 
GA  8  0 
MT  8  0 
UT  8  1 
LA  7  0 
ID  18  3 
TN  44  12 
CO  17  5 
IN  35  11 
WY  3  1 
MI  67  24 
PA  70  26 
MO  44  17 
IA  23  11 
AR  8  4 
NV  13  7 
 
 
 
Table 8. “Pro-Employee” States: Greater than 1.5x as many pro-labor bills were introduced 
 
State  Anti-labor Pro-labor 
AK  13  17 
HI  51  68 
WV  12  16 
KY  11  15 
RI  57  85 
AZ  36  59 
WI  20  34 
CA  26  53 
DE  5  11 
VT  9  20 
SD  3  7 
MA  29  80 
MD  21  72 
WA  21  72 
NY  35  155 
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Table 9. Battleground (or borderline) States 
 
State  Anti-labor Pro-labor 
OH  11  7 
NH  24  18 
MN  39  30 
NE  7  6 
IL  59  53 
OR  38  35 
NJ  63  60 
CT  26  26 
TX  14  14 
ME  13  13 
NM  11  11 
ND  2  2 
AL  14  15 
NC  9  10 
 
Looking at enacted legislation, similar patterns emerge, with Michigan being 
revealed as the most labor-restrictive reformist state (Tables 10&11). Under the 
leadership of Rick Snyder, the unified Republican-controlled government (after 2010) 
was one of the leading public sector reformers.  
Table 10. “Pro-Employer” States: Greater than 1.5x as many anti-labor bills were enacted  
 
State  Anti-labor Pro-labor 
MI  18  1 
ID  9  1 
FL  7  0 
TN  7  1 
OK  6  0 
VA  6  0 
IN  6  1 
AZ  5  1 
RI  5  3 
KS  4  0 
SC  4  0 
UT  4  0 
PA  3  0 
AL  2  0 
GA  2  0 
LA  2  0 
MO  2  0 
NJ  2  0 
ND  2  0 
SD  2  0 
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Ostensibly, fiscal crises occurring in this deindustrializing state and the city of 
Detroit suggest that steep budget deficits, underfunded pensions, high unemployment 
rates, and weak housing markets potentially created a “perfect storm” for lawmakers 
seeking to impost draconian collective bargaining reforms in order to push for neoliberal 
reforms while weakening the political influence of organized labor in the state.  
Conversely, several states with presently strong public employee unions (in terms 
of union density and permissive collective bargaining laws which have contributed to 
significant political influence in terms of voter mobilization and campaign contributions) 
emerge as being either stanchly “pro-labor” during this period, or at least labor-
permissive. These are Maryland, California, Illinois, Washington, New York, and to a 
lesser extent, Maine, and Massachusetts. Overall, these are also states that mostly enjoyed 
unified Democratic control of the government for at least part of the 2007-2014 
timeframe. These are also states with notably smaller “gaps” in private compared to 
public sector union density (due to relatively higher private sector union density than in 
other states), and states were relatively larger numbers of overall workers are covered by 
a union contract.  
Table 11. “Pro-Employee” States: Greater than 1.5x as many pro-labor bills were enacted  
 
State  Anti-labor Pro-labor_ 
MD  0  26 
CA  1  17 
IL  3  14 
WA  1  12 
NY  1  10 
MN  0  8 
MA  0  5 
DE  0  4 
HI  1  5 
OR  1  5 
NH  3  6 
WI  3  6 
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VT  2  4 
CT  0  2  
TX  0  2 
ME  2  3 
 
In 2009, the average union density for private workers across the states was 
roughly 6.5%, while it was 34.2% for public employees. However, in many “pro-
employee” reform states, private sector union density was more likely to be above 
average. For example, private sector workers enjoyed 12.6% union density in 
Washington state and over 21% union contract coverage. In Maryland, private sector 
unionization as a weak 7.3% but nearly twice as many workers were covered by a union 
contract, while in Illinois, almost 11% of private sector workers were unionized but 18% 
are contract protect, and in New York over 27% of workers are. I argue that such findings 
suggest states cluster both in their legal environments related to collective bargaining 
rights and their relationships to organized labor. The Great Recession brought these 
relationships under an intense amount of stress, but the preexisting linkages to organized 
labor coupled with state fiscal and political characteristics presumably shaped states’ 
responses (Hirsch 2014).  
As these descriptions of both introduced and enacted legislation in state labor 
reform agendas reveal, states exhibited significant patterning in their approaches to 
tackling labor relations in light of the fiscal challenges and political opportunities 
presented by the Recession. What, then, explains variation in the direction and intensity 
of the labor reform agendas pursued across the states in response to the Great Recession? 
In particular, what factors contributed to the labor-restrictive tone of much of the 
legislation arising following the 2010 midterm elections? Ostensibly, legal moves to 
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restrict or extend collective bargaining can be seen as a matter of policy, or a matter of 
politics, or both. One the one hand, weakening public employee unions may be regarded 
by lawmakers as an essential component of government downsizing operations because 
public employee unions stand in the way of the mass layoffs, pay freezes, and benefit 
reductions that they seek. On the other hand, reforming labor relations in ways that 
weaken unions may be seen as part of a political strategy aimed at de-unionizing 
particular segments of the workforce in order to weaken the political influence of unions 
who are generally supportive of Democratic causes and candidates.   
Related to this, collective bargaining reform crusaders proffered various rationales 
to justify their labor-restrictive agendas. Some clearly expressed a desire to weaken 
unions, while others offered more veiled justifications using arguments framed about 
enhancing worker freedom and spurring job creation. For example, Ohio’s Governor 
John Kasich campaigned on fiscal responsibility, supported pre-existing legislation aimed 
at restricting public sector collective bargaining, and spoke publically about the need to 
“break the back of organized labor in the schools” (Rowland 2010). Similarly, Wisconsin 
State Senate majority leader Scott Fitzgerald claimed that the goal of the Wisconsin 
legislation was, “to break the power of unions…once and for all” (Slater 2012). However, 
not all leaders were as open about their union-restricting intentions in their promotion of 
collective bargaining reforms.  
For instance, Lawmakers in Michigan appeared to acknowledge their state’s 
legacy as the birthplace of the American labor movement during the halcyon days of the 
UAW by avoiding the use of anti-union rhetoric. Instead, when discussing the state’s 
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pursuit of a union-restricting right-to-work law, leaders described the legislation in terms 
of worker choice rather than union-busting unions. Senate majority leader Randy 
Richardville stated: “If I were you, I'd join that union…But I think it would be wrong to 
not have a choice to join that union.” Michigan’s Speaker of the House Jase Bolger added 
that the legislation was not anti-union, but rather “pro-worker,” stating: “this is not about 
Republican vs. Democrat, this is not management vs. labor, this does not change 
collective bargaining, this is not anti-union…This is about Michigan's hard workers” 
(Woods 2012). Governor Snyder also framed lawmakers’ efforts in making Michigan a 
right-to-work state in terms of worker “freedom” (from being forced to pay fees to a 
union as a requirement of employment). Similarly, Sen. Carlin Yoder, the chief sponsor 
of the Indiana right-to-work bill stated that it was “about jobs” and proclaimed that 
unions would thrive in spite of it, while Governor Daniels touted the law’s potential for 
boosting statewide economic investment. 
The undeniable subtext in each of these narratives—that public employees 
bankrupted state finances and labor unions prevent economic growth—implies that 
restricting collective bargaining is essential in healing ailing economies. Right-leaning 
media outlets further perpetuate this narrative: The Wall Street Journal has repeatedly 
characterized public-sector unions as potentially the “single biggest problem” with the 
US economy, while National Affairs suggested that public sector unions were at the root 
of state debt problems because elected officials feared crossing influential public sector 
unions (Disalvo 2010). The 2012 Republican National Convention platform additionally 
lauded efforts of Republican state lawmakers to weaken public sector unions while 
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casting reforms as a fiscal imperative. The platform stated: “We salute Republican 
governors and state legislators who have saved their states from fiscal disaster by 
reforming their laws governing public employee unions” (RNC 2012).  
Leftists, on the other hand, vociferously argue that labor relations reforms are 
about no less than busting unions in order to cut off an important revenue stream for the 
Democratic Party. In a pithy account of the lead-up to the Wisconsin “battle” over public 
sector collective bargaining rights, labor historian and Wisconsin-native Andrew Kersten 
argues: “Public unions are the last bastion of the labor movement, and everyone from the 
kindergarten teacher to the conservative pundit in the corporate-sponsored think tank 
knows it. The goal of the latest breed of Republican politicians is to smash those unions 
once and for all” (2011). Similarly, in an article bluntly titled: “The Politics of Austerity 
and the Conservative Offensive against US Public Sector Unions, 2008-2012” Étienne 
Cantin asserts: “What is going on in Wisconsin and other states ought to be seen for what 
it is: an attempt to exploit the economic crisis to win an eminently political victory over 
organized labour and allied democrats” (2012). 
The common thread in such assessments of state collective bargaining reforms is 
that fiscal crises have been somewhat contrived in order to promote an anti-labor agenda. 
In support of this, Kersten asserts, “Walker has manufactured a budget crisis in 
Wisconsin so that he can apply the principles of his political faith and create a new 
Wisconsin” (2012). Cantin similarly argues: “Since the onset of the Great Recession, 
anti-union conservatives have been hammering out an arguably bogus yet politically 
potent argument: collective bargaining with government workers is unaffordable as their 
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wages, health benefits, and pensions are driving states into deficits” (2012). It has been 
further noted that the “rhetoric of class warfare” is frequently deployed in political 
appeals supporting collective bargaining reform (Kersten 2012). For example, Governor 
Scott Walker justified the dramatic restructuring of public sector labor relations in the 
midst of the recession through claims that Wisconsin had a “haves and have-nots” 
problem in which unionized state workers were the “haves” while everyone else were the 
“have nots.” Governor Daniels of Indiana similarly framed the impetus for the reforms he 
pursued in 2006 in terms of class warfare by asserting that government workers 
comprised a “new privileged class in America,” who, rather than being lowly public 
servants were now “better paid than the people who pay their salaries” (Smith 2010).  
In light of such observations, the politics surrounding state labor reform agendas 
seem mired in the economic crisis and worker discontent on the one hand, and partisan 
maneuvering on the other hand. In the analyses that follow, I consider what 
characteristics of states, both political and economic, may have compelled the pursuit of 
comprehensive labor-restrictive agendas in the wake of the Great Recession. I find that 
during the recession, negative state fiscal characteristics related to budget reserves, 
underfunded pensions, housing prices, and unemployment rates contributed to more 
intense “anti-labor” reform agendas. Additionally, conservative state ideology and greater 
divergence in unionization rates for private versus public sector workers further 
intensified anti-labor reform agendas.  
Highlighting these relationships between state economic and political conditions 
and collective bargaining reform agendas sheds light on three key changes occurring in 
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the American political economy contributing to organized labor’s diminishing influence 
in the post-Great Recession era: 1) Economic uncertainty among the working class stoked 
by the weak housing and job markets; 2) Envy experienced by non-unionized private 
sector workers toward the more job-secure public sector in high unionization states 
contributing to enmity rather than a desire for emulation; and 3) Real fiscal stress 
experienced by states in the form of budget shortfalls and underfunded pensions. I 
conjecture that the confluence of these factors coinciding with a partisan “sea change” 
across state governments in the midst of a worldwide financial crisis created a political 
opening for reformers seeking to facilitate greater neoliberal reform projects (and 
advance political objectives) through the implementation of collective bargaining 
restrictions aimed at weakening the “insider” status of public employee unions.  
THE 2010 MIDTERMS AND A RUST BELT TURNED RED  
During this so-called “Tea Party” revolution, the GOP rested control of twenty-
one state legislative chambers from Democrats to secure party control in 25 state 
legislatures compared to the 16 controlled solely by Democrats. 11 governorships also 
flipped to Republican, resulting in Republican Party unity in 21 state governments across 
the US in 2010; this increased to 23 in 2012 (NCSL 2010). A dramatic restructuring of 
public sector labor relations followed. As noted, between 2011 and 2013 four formerly 
pro-labor “rust belt” states—Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio and Michigan—enacted laws 
barring unions from collecting fees from non-members while placing additional 
restrictions on union formation and contract negotiations. Windfalls of comparable labor-
restrictions were also introduced in nearly all of the states on the heels of historic gains 
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made by Republicans in state elections in 2010. It is further important to note that each of 
the “big four” (Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan) are not historically Republican-
dominated states. Rather, these are deeply divided states that are neither solidly red nor 
blue: for over two decades Midwestern Governorships have alternated between the 
parties while state legislatures have frequently experienced Democratic and split control. 
In fact, Republicans had not seen a majority in Wisconsin until the early 2000s, and even 
then it was short-lived. Indiana further has a long history of split legislative control: 
between 1990 and 2010, neither the Republican nor Democratic Party could secure a 
legislative majority, except in 2004 when the state went Red briefly before returning to 
split control in 2006. Michigan has a similar history of split legislative control, as does 
Ohio, although Ohio has trended toward Republican control since the mid-1990s (NCSL 
2014). 
 Ostensibly, then, the nation-wide uptick in labor-restrictive lawmaking activity 
appears to have followed the partisan tides. However, Republicans handedly defeated the 
Democrats in 2010 for an important reason: the economy. Unemployment soared, 
housing prices plummeted, and voters demanded that someone—initially the incumbent 
party, but soon thereafter public employees—share in their distress. However, not all 
states experienced the recession in the same way. Economic characteristics including 
dominant industries, workforce demographics, compensation trends, and housing markets 
vary significantly across the states. For this reason, I suggest that state economic 
indicators like employment levels, home values, and income growth should be considered 
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as key factors that may have emboldened partisan lawmakers to pursue comprehensive 
public sector reforms in particular times and places.  
 Further, by illuminating the relationship between material economic conditions 
and state-level variation in the direction and intensity of the labor reform agendas, I shed 
light on another key outcome of interest: the dwindling popularity and political clout of 
American public employee unions. I argue that the recent advent of a wholesale reform 
movement targeting public employees and their unions is a puzzling turn of events. This 
is because at the dawn of the 21st century, public employee unions enjoyed considerable 
“insider” status in American politics and as such, should have been able to exercise their 
leverage to successfully block threatening proposals.   
 However, if the assertion that labor unions are insiders in American politics seems 
counterintuitive, it is because organized labor occupies a paradoxical place in American 
politics. Echoing Lindbeck, it is important to recognize that the distinction between an 
insider and an outsider “is a matter of degree” (Lindbeck 2001). Roughly 10 percent of 
workers today belong to labor unions, compared to 20% in the 1980s (BLS 2013). 
However, public employee unions enjoy far greater strength in numbers and political 
influence than these figures indicate. While unionization among workers in 
manufacturing and the construction trades rapidly declined during the latter-half of the 
20th century, it significantly increased among public employees. By the 1980s, about 
twice as many (30-40%) state and local government workers were unionized compared to 
private sector employees. Indicative of this, the Association for Federal, State, County, 
and Municipal Employees (AFSME) is today 50 percent larger than the United Auto 
  65 
Workers (McCartin 2006). Resultantly, state and local government employees backed by 
influential labor organizations have come to function as politically powerful insiders in 
state and local politics with the numbers and resources (via membership dues) to access 
lawmakers and mobilize voters to influence policy outcomes. Public employees like 
schoolteachers, police officers, and firefighters have come to enjoy a significant degree of 
job security, coupled with generous fringe benefits like low premium health insurance 
and “defined benefit” pension plans as a result of their insider status.  
 Moreover, labor unions exert considerable influence in national elections. In sum, 
unions contributed nearly a billion dollars to federal candidates from 1990-2014. So, in 
spite of dwindling overall union membership, campaign contributions from labor unions 
steadily increased over recent decades, reaching a peak of over $143 million in 2012. 
This is because public employee unions like the National Education Association and the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees are among the top labor 
donors. In the 2014 election cycle, public employee unions donated over ten million 
dollars to Congressional campaigns, with Democratic candidates receiving the over 94% 
of these funds (Open Secrets.org 2014).   
 Public sector unions also assert considerable political clout trying to influence 
state and local politics. The growing influence of public employee unions, especially 
teachers and public safety officers unions, on state and local politics and policy-making 
has been documented (Page 2008; Moe 2009; Grissom 2010). Related to this, a 2012 
Wall Street Journal analysis found that organized labor spends significantly more money 
on politics and lobbying in state and local elections than on federal campaigns (Mullins 
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2012). This makes sense because as federal labor protections do not apply to state and 
municipal government employees, state and local employees are governed by a unique 
set of labor laws and hence rely on a favorable state institutional environment in order to 
maintain their political influence. In states with permissive laws governing union 
formation and dues collection, then, public employee unions maintain significant 
membership and financial resources.  
 Further, the experience of public employee unions within a state may differ 
markedly from that of their private sector counterparts because states may restrict union 
organizing and bargaining rights for certain classes or occupations of workers. The most 
common way of restricting union formation is by barring unions from requiring non-
members to pay them a “service fee” in return for receiving union-negotiated protections 
in the workplace (Moore 1998). States with provisions like this that apply to all workers 
are referred to as “Right-to-Work” (RTW) states because membership or non-
membership in a labor union is not a legal requirement for work in these states.  
 Right-to-work provisions restrict the ability of labor organizations to attract 
members and raise revenues because they incentivize free-riding. At their core, such 
legislation is designed to reduce the attractiveness of joining a labor organization by 
enabling non-members to receive the benefits of a union-negotiated contract without 
having to pay union membership dues or representation fees. Because the potential to free 
ride in a so-called right-to-work state creates a disincentive to unionize, there is 
significant variation in labor union density, and potentially, union influence across the US 
states as a function of labor-related legislation (Moore 1998). Over time, in the context of 
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right-to-work laws and other labor negotiation restrictions, union membership declines as 
the incentive to join a labor union is weakened.  
 Right-to-work laws are thus largely credited with the declining membership of 
private sector manufacturing and construction unions, and overall union density is lower 
in such states. However, even within right to work States, public employee unions 
representing teachers and police officers often enjoy occupation-specific collective 
bargaining rights that enable them to attain and maintain substantial membership bases. 
For example, in 2012, although teacher union density averaged 58% in RTW states, 
compared to 85 % in non-RTW states, teachers in “outlier” RTW states like Alabama and 
Nebraska enjoyed density levels hovering around the non-RTW average of 85%, while 
states like Idaho (62.2), Missouri (76.6), North Dakota (74.7), Texas (62.7) and Utah 
(63.6) maintaining above average sized memberships for RTW states. Resultantly, public 
sector union density even approaches upward of 50% in Republican-dominated right to 
work states where trade and manufacturing unions are practically non-existent (Hirsch 
2014). 
 In contrast to private sector unions, labor unions representing state and local 
government employees have persistently enlarged their membership bases and financial 
resources in the postwar era. Economists have even characterized state and local 
government employment prior to the Great Recession as historically “recession-proof” 
(Polak and Schott 2012). Favorable state institutional and economic conditions have 
facilitated this course. For this reason, the enactment of laws restricting collective 
bargaining by barring dues collection from non-union public employees in Michigan, 
  68 
Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana following the Great Recession received significant 
attention in the news media, and from labor organizers and activists. Does the 
proliferation of reforms specifically targeting public employees following the 2008-2009 
financial crisis suggest that history is catching up with public sector unions?  
 Recent trends indicate that membership losses due to layoffs, hiring freezes, and 
ostensibly, recently enacted laws limiting collective bargaining are weakening public 
sector unions. In Wisconsin, for instance, public sector unionization fell over 15%, from 
53.4 percent in 2011 to 37.6 percent in 2013. Nationwide public sector unionization also 
fell over one percent from 2012-2013, and in 2014 continues to sit at its lowest level 
since the 1930s, due in large part to declining union membership among teachers 
(Chumley 2013).  
 During the Great Recession, fiscal imperatives, public discontent, and interest 
group activity appear to have combined to create a perfect storm for unified Republican 
governments to pursue sweeping labor relations reforms. The enactment of laws 
restricting public employees’ collective bargaining rights in several Republican-
controlled states suggests that this reform movement has political underpinnings. 
However, anecdotal evidence from the most visible cases like Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin do not tell the complete story of the reform agenda across the states. These 
cases highlight major losses (and subsequent wins in the case of Ohio) for public sector 
unions, however, they lack context. My research seeks to provide a more comprehensive 
overview of the political and economic contexts that state legislative agendas arose out 
utilizing bill introductions data from the four legislative sessions that surrounded the 
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Great Recession, from 2007-2014. By revealing the contours of state reform agendas, I 
aim to highlight characteristics present in individual states that contributed to the pursuit 
of sweeping changes to public sector labor relations.  
As noted in tables 7-11, variation in the frequency of bill introductions indicates 
that states “cluster” in their reform agendas, with some states decidedly favoring the 
government/employer in labor relations, and others identifiably favoring labor unions and 
public employees (or at least favor maintaining the status quo). Moreover, several 
“battleground” states also emerge in which there was significant activity on both sides, 
suggesting pro-labor bill introductions may have risen in response to the uptick in anti-
labor activity, resulting in a “tit for tat” reform agenda in which pro-labor lawmakers 
sought to offset their constituents’ potential losses by pursuing subsequent gains for labor 
unions.  
 Highlighting changes occurring over time in the intensity and direction of 
individual state legislative agendas also reveales interesting variation. This is where we 
find that prior to the 2011-2012 session, many states were more pro-union in their 
legislative activity than is popularly known (Tables 1&2). For example, before the 2010 
midterm elections, Wisconsin has formerly been a Democratic stronghold, introducing 22 
and enacting 6 pro-labor bills from 2007-2010. It was not until the election of a 
Republican governor and legislature in 2010 that anti-labor collective bargaining reforms 
dominated the state’s agenda. What explains the surge of anti-labor legislative activity in 
the 2011-2012 session, relative to 2007-2008? Moreover, why did some states pursue 
more intense labor reform agendas during this time than others?  
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Prior to the Great Recession, public employee unions enjoyed relatively favorable 
political and institutional conditions across a majority of states. Exemplary of this, 
recessions occurring in the 1980s 1990s, and early 2000s also did not compel state 
lawmakers to pursue significant labor relations reforms (Polak and Schott 2012). I 
suggest this is because public sector unions were previously more influential in their 
ability to shape (particular) states’ legislative agendas to block reform proposals coming 
out of the gate. Such an expectation follows from the understanding that public sector 
unions are well-documented as powerful policy players because they possess strength in 
both numbers and resources, exercising veto power over unpopular policies in their 
abilities to influence electoral politics (Page 2011; Berkman and Plutzer 2011; More 
2011, 2012; Francia 2013; Anzia and Moe 2015;).  
Gottschalk, however, observes that labor union strength is not attributable to 
manpower alone (Gottschalk 2007). Financial resources, political strategies, and the 
ability to court and win public opinion are essential aspects of labor union influence in 
shaping public policy. Indeed, research suggests that public sector unions derive their 
considerable influence from having support from the public gained through strategic 
alliances with other interest groups and waging successful public imagine campaigns 
(Johnston 1994; Page 2011). Drawing on this important lesson, we should expect 
unpopular unions, no matter how expansive or well financed, to exert less influence over 
state political agendas. While I do not have public opinion data to assess the relationship 
between aggregate public attitudes and policy outcomes at the state level, national 
opinion polls taken during the recession suggest that significant public majorities came to 
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support collective bargaining reform during downturn (Rasmussen 2012). I conjecture 
that this relates to working class discontent over the economy coupled with envy-born 
enmity toward government workers resulting in weakening the popularity and hence 
influence of public employee unions. This, taken with my analyses that indicate that anti-
labor reforms were more likely to be pursued in states with weaker housing and job 
market conditions, coupled with greater public-private sector unionization divergence, 
suggests that labor union influence is also impacted by economic conditions that may 
affect the public’s attitudes toward so-called labor market insiders. 
According to scholars like Salvatore (2012) and Alquist (2012), the sharp 
divergence in union membership among private sector workers compared to public sector 
employees that began following WWII has contributed to significant problems for 
organized labor. This is because the working class is not mobilized equally by labor 
unions and the idea of working-class solidarity based around class consciousness cannot 
take root when the private sector has never experienced significant union membership. 
This lack of an alliance between private sector workers and public employees (as a result 
of unionization divergence) makes organized labor institutionally weak and movements 
for the protections of public employee rights inherently divisive. Moreover, as Wilson 
observes, the relationship between non-unionized private sector workers and the heavily 
unionized public sector is fraught by the “politics of envy” (2012). Following Wilson’s 
logic, private sector workers come to angrily resent public employees when they feel as 
though their interests as taxpayers and homeowners conflict with the demands of public 
employees for higher wages and benefits, which may result in higher income and 
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property taxes with no net gain for private sector employees. Extending Wilson’s logic, it 
would make sense that times of economic uncertainty (like the Great Recession) would 
stoke the envy of the private sector toward the unionized public employees who do not 
appear to be fairly sharing in the pain of recession, resulting in antipathy toward unions 
(who are the seeming  or actual defenders of public employees insider status). 
Resultantly, reformist lawmakers may be able to harness working-class discontent among 
the private sector to weaken the influence of public employee unions to oppose reforms 
that seek to restrict their members’ collective bargaining rights.  
 Related to this, McCartin (2011) contends that adversaries of public sector unions 
have been waiting for decades for the opportunity (i.e. a deep and protracted recession) to 
curtail public sector unions through the justification of fiscal necessity and the 
assignment of blame. As such, I expect that in states with weaker economies marked by 
budget and pension crises, housing price depreciation, high unemployment, stagnant 
incomes, and greater divergence between the unionized public and private workforce, 
there will be more intense anti-labor reform agendas pursued. Conversely, in states with 
stronger economies, working-class discontent was weaker and lawmakers did not feel as 
emboldened to pursue comprehensive public sector restructuring, resulting in a less 
prolific reform agenda.  
 My data provide abundant empirical evidence to allow us to consider such 
relationships by examining relationships between legislative agendas and fiscal 
characteristics of states. In sum, the collective bargaining bill data that I have collected 
reveals significant variation in the labor relations reform agenda coming out of the Great 
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Recession. State-level differences in the direction and frequency of introduced legislation 
suggest that states cluster in either “anti-labor” or “pro-labor,” camps, while states that 
experienced heightened reform activity on both sides emerge as “battleground states” in 
which some of the fiercest labor relations debates occurred. Moreover, the observed 
changes in the tone and intensity of state legislative agendas across sessions indicate that 
economic factors may have propelled partisan collective bargaining reform agendas.  
 However, I challenge the common wisdom offered by conservative lawmakers 
that state budget crises and unfunded pensions offered no alternative but to pursue labor 
restrictive reforms in order to balance state budgets and get the economy back on track. I 
additionally question arguments on the left that claim this reform movement is strictly 
partisan and fail to consider its economic foundation. Instead, I argue that lawmakers on 
both sides of the aisle pursued public sector reforms during the Great Recession because 
they were responding to (or taking advantage of) constituent discontent stemming from 
the poor economy. Indeed, many voters supported the actions taken against unions by 
Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin and Rick Snyder of Michigan; Walker even 
survived a union-orchestrated recall election following his efforts to strip public 
employees’ of their collective bargaining rights. In light of such developments, it is 
important to acknowledge that voter support for efforts to “take on the unions” may have 
been reflected in state legislative agendas.  
To advance this argument, I highlight economic determinants related to variation 
in the direction and intensity of state labor relations reforms pursued surrounding the 
Great Recession. First, I consider the relationship between state fiscal characteristics and 
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the direction and intensity of the reform agenda. Next, I turn to market conditions to 
explain the reform agenda in the states. Following this, I expect that in states where 
wages have stagnated, housing prices depreciated, and unemployment is the highest there 
will be more intense anti-labor reform activity. I further suggest that in states with higher 
public/private sector unionization divergence there will be more anti-labor reforms. I 
conjecture that greater demand for reforms spurs not only from lawmakers’ desires to 
empower the employer (in this case the government) in labor relations, but also for 
bringing public sector employment more in line with the private sector: insecure, lowly 
remunerated, and most importantly–deunionized. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Constructing the Dependent Variable 
Data on state collective bargaining bill introductions was obtained from the 
National Conference of State Legislatures Collective Bargaining database, as well as each 
states’ online bill archives database. Search terms used to locate and identify relevant 
legislation included “collective bargaining,” “labor union,” “public employee,” and “right 
to work.” Bill content returned through these searches was coded for reform type and 
intention, and organized into four legislative sessions1:  
Session 1: 2007-2008 
 Session 2: 2009-2010 
 Session 3: 2011-2012 
 Session 4: 2013-2014 
 
                                                 
1 In states with “off-year sessions” that do not map onto this timelines, the following dates were used: Session 1: 2006-2007; Session 2: 
2008-2009; Session 3: 2010-2011; Session 4: 2012-2013. 
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In line with with Boehmke (2005), I collapse bill introductions data over each 2-
year legislative session. For each state, there four state-session observations, N=200. 
State legislative agendas during each two-year legislative session are then described in 
three ways using ratio variables constructed from the frequency of bill introductions in 
each state-session across two categories: 1) Anti-labor introduced bills; and 2) Pro-labor 
introduced bills. Neutral bills are omitted from the current analysis. These variables 
alternatively serves as the dependent variable in each of two statistical models used in the 
analysis.  
Independent Variables 
In most instances, the date chosen for the independent variables corresponds with 
the value of the variable during the first year of the legislative session. In states with off-
year sessions the independent variables are lagged in order to maintain consistency across 
predictors. Information on state budgets “days in budget reserve” was obtained through 
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.2 Unfunded pension liabilities for 2007-2012 
were obtained from a Morningstar consulting firm report (Barkley 2012). State-level data 
on private (non-farm) annual income compensation growth averages, unemployment 
rates, and public/private sector union membership divergence were obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. House Price Index changes from the 2006-2008 peak were 
calculated using HPI index data from the Federal Housing Agency.  
                                                 
2 FY2014 data shows no budget gaps or is not available yet, so FY2013 data is substituted. Another way might be to drop the 4th session 
data or make all values "zero" for this year, if all states have indeed recovered. However data from 8 states suggest that they haven't fully 
addressed budget gaps. 
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Additionally, following Banducci (1998) and Boehmke (2005), I include controls 
for party majority in the legislature, legislative professionalism, and state ideology. Data 
on partisan composition of state legislatures was obtained from the National Conference 
of State Legislatures database (NCSL 2014) The hypothesis about the relationship 
between partisanship and the reform agenda is directional, so in the anti-labor bill 
introduction model as well as the pro-labor bill model I control for Republican control of 
the legislature using a dichotomous variable. Next, the level of “professionalism” in a 
legislature, conceived of as an index including how many days a legislature is in session, 
how much legislators are paid, how much staff support and resources they have is 
controlled for with the most recently available (2003) State Legislative Professionalism 
rankings from Squire’s 2007 article. Squire’s index assigns state legislatures a value 
ranging from least professional, 0 to most professional 1. For example, California ranks 
as the most professional legislature with a score of .626, while New Hampshire ranks as 
the least professional with a score of .034. More professional legislatures are expected to 
produce a greater number of bill introductions per session, as lawmakers have more time, 
resources, and monetary incentives to research and write legislation (Maestas 2000).  
Citizen and government ideology in a state are also expected to shape policy 
outcomes in conservative or liberal directions. Some scholars argue that state ideology is 
a better predictor of policy outcomes than partisan control of government because it can 
better account for “variation in the meaning of party labels across states” (Fording et al 
1998). Partisanship notwithstanding, more liberal states are expected to protect and 
extend collective bargaining rights, while conservative states are expected to restrict 
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them. I use Fording’s measure of state ideology to examine linkages between ideology 
and labor reform agendas to provide an index on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being 
perfect liberalism and 0 being perfect conservatism.3  
These models are first estimated first using negative binomial regression, with 
robust clustered standard errors (by state) to control for cross-case dependency. 
Significant statistical relationships between the predictors and the outcomes of interest 
are detected at this stage. Next, I use Clarify statistical simulation package described in 
King (2000) to simulate expected values for the dependent variable. 
RESULTS – EVENT COUNT MODEL USING NEGATIVE BINOMIAL 
REGRESSION 
 
Using Clarify statistical simulations software (King 2000) to estimate a “baseline” 
model for the expected number of labor-restrictive bill introductions in a state-session, I 
find that when all continuous predictors are held at their means and dichotomous at “0”, 
roughly 5 anti-labor bills would be introduced. In the negative binomial regression for 
anti-labor introduced bills, I additionally found significant and positive relationships 
between higher levels of unfunded pensions, unemployment, and public/private sector 
union divergence, and significant and negative correlations between liberal state 
ideology, a stronger budget outlook, and housing price appreciation (See Table 12).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For each state-session, I use the state’s ideology in the beginning of the first session, or the most recent data that is available. So, for the 
2011-2012 and the 2013-2014 session, I use Fording’s ideology measure from 2010 which is less than an ideal measure. 
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Table 12: Explaining the Direction and Intensity of the State Labor Relations Reform 
Agendas: Expected change in the number of introduced bills when predictor is set at one 
s.d. above mean4 
 
Baseline bill introductions:  Anti-labor   Pro-labor  
 
Expected values    5.02   5.63 
(standard errors)    (.75)   (.95) 
      
Expected value + 1 s.d.  
 
Days in budget reserve   4.21**   5.28 
     (.63)   (.87) 
  
Republican-controlled legislature 5.86   3.54 
      (1.03)   (.79) 
 
Legislative professionalism  6.13   8.21* 
     (1.47)    (1.97) 
 
Ideology    3.66**   7.01 
     (.49)    (1.07)  
 
Unfunded pensions   6.54**   5.78 
     (1.09)   (1.08) 
 
Incomechange    5.24   6.52 
     (.90)    (1.21) 
  
Hpichange    3.97*   3.97* 
     (.59)   (1.14) 
  
Unemployment    6.14+   5.08 
     (1.01)   (1.17) 
 
Public/Private union gap  7.11**   6.78 
     (.95)    (1.40) 
  
RTW state    3.33   3.11+ 
     (.77)   (.96) 
 
 
Number of original observations  200   200  
Number of simulations    1000   1000  
Prob> chi2     0.000   0.000  
+  Significant at the .10 level *Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level. 
                                                 
4	Note,	this	table	is	not	displaying	coefficients	of	the	original	analysis.	Rather,	following	King	(2000)	I	have	used	
Clarify	statistical	simulation	techniques	to	calculate	expected	values	of	the	dependent	variable	based	upon	
increasing	the	values	of	the	predictors	by	one	standard	deviation.	The	values	in	this	table	indicate	the	expected	
change	in	the	mean	number	of	introduced	bills	to	occur	by	increasing	the	value	of	the	predictors	from	their	
mean	by	one	standard	deviation,	or	by	increasing	the	dichotomous	predictors	from	zero	to	one,	holding	all	other	
predictors	at	0	or	their	means.			
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To illustrate, if the measure of unfunded pension liabilities in a state-session is 
increased from its mean of 23.55% by one standard deviation, the baseline anti-labor bill 
count expected value is increased by over one. Next, increasing the rate of unemployment 
from its mean of 6.9% to over 9% would also result in an additional anti-labor bill being 
introduced. Similarly, increasing the divergence between public and private sector 
unionization in a state from its mean of 26.9% to 42.9% increased the expected value of 
anti-labor bill introduction with all other predictors held at their means by roughly two 
bills. 
Conversely, increasing the predictor value for the number of days in a state’s 
budget reserve from a mean of about 46 to roughly 95 decreases the expected number of 
anti-labor bill introductions by almost one, as does increasing the housing price index 
change from an average of -8.36 (recall that the period in question is one of significant 
home value appreciation) by one standard deviation, to 2.78 (indicating positive growth). 
Finally, increasing ideology from a mean of 52.41 by one standard deviation to 68.43 
(indicating a more liberal state) also decreases the number of expected anti-labor bill 
introductions in a state by over one. 
Next, in the opposite direction—the pro-labor reform agenda—a less clear picture 
emerges. The only factors that significantly impact the number of “pro-labor” bills being 
introduced are: legislative professionalism, stronger housing prices, and presently being a 
right-to-work state. This leads to the supposition that different factors were driving labor 
restrictive versus labor-permissive reform agendas during the Great Recession. The 
insider status enjoyed by organized labor in many American states has already been noted 
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as a potential explanation for this, so I next concentrate on illuminating the relationship 
between state economic characteristics and labor-restrictive reform agendas. To illustrate, 
I manipulated quantities of the significant independent variables from their minimum to 
maximum values in order to demonstrate the strength of the aforementioned relationships 
between anti-labor bill introductions, fiscal characteristics, and union density using real 
examples from the states. To summarize, here are the MinMax effects expressed as 
mean expected values for the significant continuous predictors. 
Table 13. Counts of introduced labor-restrictive bills (mean expected values) 
 
Predictor Min     Max  
Days in budget reserve** 5.70  1.03 
 (.90)  (.43)  
  
Ideology** 10.24 2.35 
 (3.36) (.53)  
  
Unfunded pension liabilities (%of total)** 2.51  9.82 
 (.61)  (2.33)  
 
Housing Price Index (changes from peak)* 15.45 2.25 
 (9.97) (.93)  
 
Public/private sector union density gap** 3.11  10.23 
 (.93)  (2.15) 
 
Unemployment rate+ 3.56  8.99 
 (1.01) (2.74)    
 
+Significant at the .10 level. *Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level.  
 
For example, setting unfunded pension liabilities to their minimum of -12.2 
(Oregon’s pensions in FY2008 were overfunded, along with several other states one or 
two fewer anti-labor bills were introduced than in states with totally funded (or 
overfunded) pensions. Moreover, setting unfunded pensions at the maximum of 56.6% 
(Illinois in 2013-2014) we find that the number of anti-labor bill introductions increases 
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dramatically, from fewer than 5 (at the minimum) to between 7 and 16 bills, with a mean 
of 11. Setting ideology at the minimum value of 18 (Oklahoma in 2012-2013) the results 
indicate that, all else equal, roughly 12 anti-labor bills, or from 7-20 were introduced in 
the most conservative states. What about the most liberal? Setting ideology at the max of 
91.8 (Massachusetts) we find that a mean of nearly 10 fewer anti-labor bills were 
introduced in the most liberal compared to the most conservative states. There is also a 
lot less variance in anti-labor bill introductions in liberal states compared to conservative 
states, which indicates that factors other than ideology are important in driving the anti-
labor reform agenda even in the most conservative states.  
 Moreover, when housing price index changes from the 2006-2007 peak are set at 
the minimum level, a colossal HPI depreciation of -54.61% (Nevada in 2011-2012) we 
find that a mean of 23 anti-labor bills were introduced, or anywhere between 2 and 11 
times the number of anti-labor bills introduced in the baseline model. On the other hand, 
in times and places of substantial positive HPI growth (32.7% in North Dakota in 2013-
2014) we observe the same trend of exceedingly few anti-labor bills being introduced as 
we did with income growth. (Keeping in mind that these are all Republican-controlled 
non-RTW states with mean values of all the other predictors.) 
My findings suggest that the ostensibly partisan public sector reform agendas 
promoted by Tea Party-endorsed Governors like Scott Walker of Wisconsin and Rick 
Snyder of Michigan have important economic bases. I argue that public discontent over 
the economy heightened perceptions that public employees in union-friendly states are 
uniquely (and unfairly) insulated from economic shocks. De-unionized private sector 
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workers, after all, are hardly provided a modicum of security during a recession. Public 
employees, on the other hand, are protected by collective bargaining agreements that 
prevent against dismissal while providing for generous pay and benefits without regard to 
market whims. In response to this “awakening” among disgruntled private sector 
workers, strategic lawmakers have seized upon a unique opportunity to pursue the most 
comprehensive overhaul of collective bargaining rights in the United States in over half a 
century. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 The unprecedented pursuit of public sector labor relations reforms that occurred 
across the US states during the Great Recession presents a puzzle of substantive 
academic and political interest. The particularly intense anti-labor focus of the reform 
agenda departs from the historical record in which public sector unions have been 
remarkably influential in state and local politics, and hence resilient to retrenchment. I 
argue that public demand for weakening collective bargaining rights for government 
employees is best understood by taking into account broader changes occurring in the 
American economy during the Great Recession. I conjecture that public opinion turned 
against state employees and their unions due to the negative economic climate.   
 Related to this, my research suggests that state-level economic factors help 
explain why the public sector workforce was targeted for reform during the Great 
Recession. The global financial crisis and American housing market crash resulting in 
rapid home value depreciation and high unemployment rates was felt more acutely in 
some states than others. Ostensibly, the Recession’s impact was also felt more acutely by 
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some segments of the workforce than others. Private sector workers in particular 
experienced a heightened sense of economic insecurity as a result of the faltering 
economy. Behind a backdrop of genuine fiscal stress exacerbated by state budget 
shortfalls and underfunded pensions, public sector job protections, wages, and benefits 
arrived at through collective bargaining were increasingly scrutinized by elected officials 
and the media. A sweeping reform project aimed at weakening public employees’ 
collective bargaining rights for public employees then descended upon the American 
states.  
My analysis of these reforms reveals that in states with weaker housing and labor 
markets and greater divergence between the unionized public sector and nonunionized 
private sector, a more intense, labor-restrictive reform agenda materialized. In states 
where these reforms have been successfully implemented, such as Wisconsin, Michigan, 
and Indiana, public sector unionization has notably decreased, and organized labor has 
been substantially been hobbled. Such findings comport with McCartin’s (2011) 
supposition that organized labor’s enemies seized upon the Great Recession as an 
opportunity to implement a long-sought project of deunionization and union-busting. By 
this account, working-class discontent was high, providing conservative politicians and 
interest groups with the needed justification for pursuing public sector collective 
bargaining restrictions designed to diminish the “insider” status of public employees. In 
the chapters that follow, I more closely consider the content and intended outcome of 
state collective bargaining reforms. 
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CHAPTER 3: ADDRESSING THE “UNION PROBLEM” DURING THE GREAT 
RECESSION: STATE POLICY REFORM APPROACHES  
 
In the previous chapter, labor relations or collective bargaining reforms were 
broadly conceived of as any legislation pertaining to union organizing, contract 
negotiations, and political influence activities. These reforms were then categorized as 
either “pro-labor” or “anti-labor” based upon their intention in either restricting or 
enabling employee organizations to form and negotiate gains for their members. Using 
this information I was then able to account for the determinants of the direction and 
intensity of state labor reform agendas. I found that in addition to partisanship, state labor 
reforms agendas have important economic foundations; strained budgets and unfunded 
pensions, coupled with weak housing prices and high unemployment rates were all 
associated with more intense anti-labor reform agendas. 
In this chapter, I provide a more detailed analysis of the content of collective 
bargaining reforms pursued and enacted across the states during the Great Recession. My 
research highlights two key approaches states took toward resolving labor issues in the 
midst of the financial crisis. First, I group labor relations proposals into two broad reform 
categories or “packages” based upon whether their provisions seek to alter: 1) labor union 
membership, or 2) labor union influence. I then provide a justification for classifying 
labor laws in this way based upon the observation that states tended to pursue one reform 
“package” over the other. I argue that this suggests that these packages represent two 
different ways of resolving the same concern: what to do about labor unions in the midst 
of a recession. Next, I evaluate potential explanations for why states might pursue one 
type of labor-restricting reform package over the other. I find that partisanship and labor 
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union influence shape lawmakers’ choices in meaningful ways: states with strong public 
sector unions and Democratic-controlled legislatures appear reluctant to pursue union 
formation restrictions, perhaps because lawmakers do not want to upset influential labor 
unions. Nonetheless, lawmakers still sought to limit the influence of entrenched labor 
unions in the context of state with a weak economy and a Republican Governor at the 
helm.  
In sum, this chapter further contributes to our understanding of the politics 
surrounding collective bargaining reform during the Recession by shedding light on and 
offering explanations for states’ unique approaches to resolving labor issues, i.e. 
“addressing the union problem” during the recession.  
SOLVING A PROBLEM LIKE UNIONS: OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
A significant amount of attention was called to the myriad “problems” associated 
with labor unions, and in particular, government employee unions during the Great 
Recession. The image of greedy teachers and police union bosses defending their 
members’ profligate salaries and pensions while the rest of the American workforce 
suffered deep losses in earnings and real estate became synonymous with government 
waste, greed—and even corruption. Public employees, in the words of former Minnesota 
Governor Tim Pawlenty, were “over-benefited and overpaid” (Kimball 2010). On this 
topic, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie hedged, adding: “I don't think teachers are the 
problem. I think unions are the problem" (Portnoy 2013). Such logic extends from the 
observation that in many states, public employee unions have become quite effective in 
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their ability to negotiate for the “overly generous” benefits and salaries enjoyed by 
teachers and other public employees.  
In an era where so few among the American working class belongs to a labor 
organization (12.4% overall, and merely 7.6% among private sector workers), an 
unfavorable view of labor unions also prevails among large swaths of the American 
public: in 2009, fewer than half of Americans reported to Gallup that they supported 
unions (Saad 2009). Moreover, by 2010, a Pew Research poll found that almost 60% of 
Americans had an unfavorable view of unions and felt they had too much power 
(Surowiecki 2011). Around this same time, a barrage of academic and media reports 
sought to show that public employees are paid more than their private sector 
counterparts. However, such research proved inconclusive and dependent on both 
geography and how public employee compensation is measured (Biggs 2014; Wilson 
2013; Orr 2011).  
Objective reality notwithstanding, compared to the private sector, public 
employees are still deemed to be in an enviable position, especially during a protracted 
recession. Some suggest this stems from covetous feelings felt by private sector workers 
toward the generous pensions and benefits of unionized government employees. Olivia 
Mitchell, economist and executive director of the Pension Research Council, has coined a 
term to describe this feeling: “pension envy” (Schurenberg 2010). And it is easy to see 
why: public employees may very well represent the only segment of the American 
workforce that is still guaranteed (at least until the recent reform movement) a retirement 
package with defined benefits paying out amounts approaching 90% of peak salary. As 
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Schurenberg observes: “Only two sorts of people survived the Great Recession with their 
retirement plans intact. The first were a handful of market geniuses who moved their 
portfolios to safety in late 2007, just before the crash. The second were…well, garbage 
collectors” (2010).   
Tongue-in-cheek aside, the issue of public sector pensions is highly politicized, 
and has become even more due to the flagging economy. This is because, according to 
Schurenberg, public pensions are seen by envious non-government workers as “the last, 
most profligate manifestation of the pre-401(k) era.” As such, “the mismatch between the 
average worker’s post-crash retirement prospects and that of the average government 
employee has started to rankle voters” (Schurenberg 2010). Moreover, pundits and 
politicians politicize public employee unions when they draw attention to their members’ 
occasional 6-figure salaries, “double-dipping” by pensioners, gold-plated health care 
plans, job tenure, and union-negotiated pay increases in the midst of a recession. In this 
way, those on the Right who had been waiting for an opportunity to weaken the unions 
that serve as chief financiers of their political competition, seized upon the Recession as 
an opportunity to cast unions as a problem that needed to be solved. Justification 
supported by anecdotes drew clear lines from government inefficiency, to the financial 
crisis, to public employees and their unions, and then back to government inefficiency. 
This proved to be a popular position as anti-government sentiment mounted among voters 
discontented by the economy. 
Accordingly, public employee remuneration presents both a problem and an 
opportunity for elected officials in states facing steep budget deficits. On the one hand, 
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many states faced legitimate fiscal shortfalls exacerbated by public pension liabilities. In 
such instances, somewhat goliath-like public employee unions who are naturally resistant 
to pension reductions for their members present a problem that must be addressed in 
order to move forward with cost-saving reforms. One the other, as hot-button issues, 
purportedly lavish public employee compensation and benefits may be heralded to justify 
a long-sought program of collective bargaining reform aimed at weakening the influence 
of public employee unions in state politics once and for all.  
Further, the popularity of the “public employment = government inefficiency” 
meme coupled with growing anti-union sentiment also meant that public employee 
unions posed a unique problem for Democratic lawmakers, many of whom rely upon 
continued union support to defend their offices and repeatedly run on pro-labor 
platforms. This is because even in Democratic strongholds like Massachusetts and New 
York, strained state finances stoked demand for public sector reforms. Public pension 
reform has been deemed an essential component of addressing state budget deficits; 
increasing public employees’ health care payments has also been prominent on the 
reform agenda. Making such changes in the face of opposition from organized labor has 
been an especially difficult task for Democratic lawmakers. Unlike their Republican 
counterparts, Democrats need to enable employers (in this case, state governments) to 
circumvent labor unions in contract negotiations while still supporting them as interest 
groups who hold significant sway during election time. 
I argue that state lawmakers faced these dual imperatives in their efforts to 
address the “union problem” during the Recession, and they are largely mediated by 
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partisanship. Both may want to weaken unions, but in different ways to serve different 
ends. Republicans, then, may introduce reform packages aimed at reducing overall union 
density to ultimately extricate organized labor from politics. The passage of “right to 
work” legislation (which restricts the collection of union fees from non-members to 
thwart union formation and growth) under unified Republican governments in Indiana 
and Wisconsin exemplifies this policy-making approach.  
Democrats, on the other hand, may feel pressure to restrict unions’ leverage in 
collective negotiations in order to restructure public employees’ salaries, pensions, and 
benefits as part of a larger project of fiscal reform. Following this, instances of labor-
restrictive reforms being passed by Democratically-controlled legislatures in 
Massachusetts and New Jersey can be better understood. Backed up against a wall (or 
large budget deficit, Democratic lawmakers allied with Republicans to respond to the 
union problem by weakening unions’ influence so that putatively necessary fiscal reforms 
could occur. By leaving unions’ organizing rights intact, however, such policy reform 
approaches signal a much different approach (and end game) than the more sweeping 
union formation restrictions pursued by Republican-controlled governments during this 
time.   
In this way, the reform packages that I identify represent two different approaches 
to solving the labor problem during the Great Recession. I argue that the first motive—
the eradication of unions—can be seen through the pursuit of various labor reforms that 
seek to weaken the ability of unions to certify new bargaining units or to entice members 
to join existing ones. Right-to-work provisions in legislation provide an example of this. 
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The second motive, subtly diminishing union influence in contract negotiations, may be 
seen in a second constellation of reforms that seek to make technical changes to 
bargaining terms and mediation procedures while leaving union organizing rights intact. 
Provisions that aim to remove wages or pensions from the mandatory bargaining scope 
are an example of this.  
Following these observations, I offer a parsimonious classification scheme for 
grouping labor-related legislation into two broad categories based on whether bill 
provisions seek to structure incentives for labor union formation and membership 
outright, or instead seek to restructure the influence of labor unions in both contract 
negotiations and electoral politics. I refer to bills in the first category as “ex ante” reforms 
because they seek to preclude or encourage the formation of strong unions “before the 
event” by creating an institutional environment that is initially un/favorable to union 
certification and dues collection. Conversely, I refer to bills in the union influence 
restricting category as “ex post facto” reforms because they seek to weaken or strengthen 
the position of existent labor organizations “after the fact” (of union formation) during 
contract negotiations, impasses, and in political activities. In the analyses that follow, I 
further subdivide these categories into proposals that are either labor-restricting (anti-
labor) or labor-enabling (pro-labor), paying particular attention to the factors associated 
with states pursuing labor-restricting forms in either category.  
LABOR REFORM PACKAGES: STATE APPROACHES AND CLUSTERS 
I have argued that public sector unions presented a problem for both Republican 
and Democratic lawmakers seeking to soothe state budget crises in the wake of the 2007-
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2008 financial collapse. For Republicans, however, resolving the “union problem” 
promised a twofold victory: public sector pay and benefits could be reined in via reforms 
aimed at eroding unions’ membership bases, thereby reducing union influence and 
shrinking the public sector at the same time. For Democrats, however, addressing the 
union problem potentially proved trickier—and more costly. This is because strategies for 
reducing steep budget deficits coupled with public support for government belt-tightening 
had to be considered alongside the potential backlash from public sector unions should 
reforms go too far. Democratic lawmakers, then, could not pursue sweeping “right-to-
work” style reforms aimed at thwarting union formation because they could not risk 
eradicating their union allies from the political playing field. Rather, they needed to 
devise ways to erode the influence of public employee unions while keeping their 
membership bases intact.  
As I have previously shown, state political and fiscal characteristics play an 
important role in shaping the direction (pro-labor versus anti-labor) and intensity 
(frequency of introduced legislation) of state legislative agendas. In particular, intense 
anti-labor reform agendas are related to negative state fiscal conditions. Nonetheless, not 
all labor-restrictive reforms are created equally; lawmakers on both sides of the aisle may 
want to implement labor reforms but may pursue different tactics for doing so. In this 
section I develop a classification scheme that elaborates the types of reforms pursued by 
state government seeking to address the union problem in line with other (particularly 
partisan and fiscal) prerogatives. First, I classify labor reform proposals into two broad 
reform “packages” including several types of provisions. Categorizing reforms in this 
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way is both novel and useful because it reveals two distinct approaches to reforming 
labor relations that necessarily have arisen due to the unique commitments of states. 
Further, it enables me to parse a substantial amount of bill content data into a manageable 
conceptual schema. Next, I examine the characteristics of states that shape the reform 
tools pursued by governments seeking to address the union problem in the midst of a 
recession.  
To do this, I first divided the universe of collective bargaining legislation included 
in my dataset (approximately 2600 bills introduced across the 50 states from 2007-2014 
into 5 reform types (see below). Next, I collapse categories 1 and 5 together to form the 
ex ante reform package, and categories 2-4 to form the ex post facto reform category. I 
argue that the reform proposals contained within these categories reflect two very 
different approaches to reforming labor relations. I further find good cause to 
disaggregate bills in this broad way because states do exhibit clear tendencies in 
preferring one reform package over the other. Indeed, states appear to fall into two 
distinct reform “clusters” based on the distinct reform packages that they pursued during 
the Great Recession.  
Labor Relations Reform – Broad Types 
 Referring back to Chapter 2, Table 6, various components of state labor relations 
reforms were identified by my content analysis of the state collective bargaining reform 
dataset. These eleven components can be summarized along with their intended 
consequence as follows:  
1) Union representation and bargaining rights: restrictive/expansive 
2) Mandatory bargaining scope: narrows/widens 
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3) Impasse arbitration and mediation: restricts/expands 
4) Contracts and negotiations: approval required/public posting /continuation or 
expiration  
5) Union certification and election procedures: secret ballot/card check/legislative  
6) Employee strikes: prohibited/permitted or punishment lowered 
7) Transparency of bargaining and union activities: favors 
transparency/confidentiality 
8) Agency shop provisions: agency shop prohibited/negotiable/compulsory 
9) Dues deductions: check-off prohibited/negotiable/compulsory/require authorization 
10) Politics, money and influence: regulates union organizing/expenditures/reporting 
11) Contracting out and privatization: authorizes/permits within guidelines/restricts 
 
Upon further examination of these provisions, I find that reform components can be 
“packaged” based upon whether they: 1) impact the formation of unions by making it 
easier or harder to certify new bargaining units and collect dues and fees from members 
and nonmembers; or 2) alter the influence of existing unions by shifting the balance of 
power in contract negotiations and/or political activities toward or away from the 
government-employer. In the section that follows, I elaborate on these reform packages 
and provide examples of each.5 
Labor Relations Reforms “Packages” - Ex Ante Reforms 
These reforms preclude/encourage the formation of strong labor unions “before 
the fact.” In the labor-restrictive context they do so by erecting roadblocks before the 
bargaining unit certification and dues assessment and collection phases of union 
organizing. The labor-friendly variant of these reforms makes union organizing easier by 
establishing exclusive representation rights for labor organizations and streamlined 
procedures for certifying bargaining units and collecting union fees. This also includes 
                                                 
5 Note, it is important to understand that reforms are not mutually exclusive; any individual piece of legislation may contain provisions that 
relate to both union formation and influence. In such instances, bills are labeled as “omnibus” labor relations reforms if they include 
provisions that seek to alter both union formation and influence, and as such are categorized as ex ante reforms.   
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requirements that project labor agreements be used or not depending on the direction of 
the legislation. In sum, nearly 1200 bills were introduced that included provisions in the 
ex ante reform package. There were slightly more pro-labor bills introduced than anti-
labor, and roughly equal numbers of bills that affected union representation and 
certification and dues collection and deductions were also introduced (see summary 
below).  
Ex Ante Labor Reforms Summary 
Anti-labor: 557 
Pro-labor: 619 
Neutral: 10 
Union Representation and Certification: 584 
Dues Collection and Deduction Rules: 605 
Enables/Restricts Contracting Out: 195 
 
Some examples of enacted ex ante labor reforms from the period surrounding the 
Recession, from 2007-2014 are as follows: 
 
 Illinois 2009: SB2497 amended the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act to 
redefine "public employee" to include peace officers employed by school districts, 
thereby extending collective bargaining rights including rights to exclusive 
representation to school district peace officers. 
 Tennessee 2011: HB1605 outlawed the practice of a labor organization 
establishing any “maintenance of membership clause” that prohibits employees 
from withdrawing from a union or employee organization prior to an agreement's 
expiration.  
 Utah 2011: SB206 required that employers cease the automatic deduction of 
union dues from an employee’s paycheck upon the written request of the 
employee. Further stated that fulfillment of such requests could not be conditions 
by a labor organization's advance notice or consent. 
 Alabama 2011: HB64 proposed an amendment to the Constitution “to provide 
that the right of individuals to vote for public office, public votes on referenda, or 
votes of employee representation by secret ballot is guaranteed.” 
 Indiana 2012: HB1001 made it a Class A misdemeanor to require an individual 
to: “become or remain a member of a labor organization, pay dues, fees, or other 
charges to a labor organization…as a condition of employment or continuation of 
employment.” 
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 Colorado 2013: SB25 granted firefighters the right to negotiate collectively 
through an exclusive representative establishing “the right to organize, form, join, 
or assist an employee organization or refrain from doing so.”  
 Georgia 2013: HB361 amended the Code of Georgia to establish employees’ 
rights to participate in secret ballot elections (for union certification) and 
employers’ rights to refuse to recognize a labor organization based upon a review 
of authorization cards until a secret ballot election has been conducted in 
adherence with federal labor laws. 
 
Ex Post Facto Reforms 
These weaken or strengthen the position of public employees in bargaining 
situations “after the fact” (of certification or membership). They do this by restricting the 
ability of labor unions to secure gains for their members “after the fact” of being covered 
by an exclusive bargaining unit. Anti-labor variants of such provisions do not restrict 
union formation or membership, but rather narrow the bargaining scope, place 
restrictions upon contract negotiations, require increased transparence, reduce unions’ 
political influence, and weaken arbitration and mediation rights. Conversely, labor-
enabling reforms extend impasse procedures and seek to tip the scales toward employees 
during contract negotiations with employers. In this reform package, we find that much 
like the ex ante reforms, where are roughly equivalent numbers of reforms introduced on 
both sides, however in this package the advantage goes for the labor-restrictive reforms. 
Moreover, we see that impasse resolutions procedures were an important part of this 
reform package, as were provisions related to the mandatory bargaining scope and 
contract negotiation process.  
Ex Post Facto Reforms Summary 
Anti-labor: 624  
Pro-labor: 594 
Neutral: 141 
Impasse Resolution Procedures: 592 
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Contracts & Negotiations: 451 
Narrows/Widens Bargaining Scope: 360 
Regulates Political Activities: 144 
Procedural/Miscellaneous: 195 
 
Some examples of Ex Post Facto reforms that passed the legislature during this time 
include: 
 
 Michigan 2011: SB0158 made it a requirement for collective bargaining 
agreements between a public employer and public employees to include a 
provision that allows an “emergency manager” to reject, modify, or terminate the 
collective bargaining agreement as provided in the Local Government and School 
District Fiscal Accountability Act. HB4152 (also enacted in 2011) additionally 
required that wages and benefits for certain public employees be frozen during 
contract negotiations, and that retroactive wage or benefit levels could not be 
awarded upon commencement of negotiations. 
 New Hampshire 2011: SB1 eliminated the requirement that the terms of a public 
employee collective bargaining agreement automatically continue if an impasse is 
not resolved at the time of the contract’s expiration. 
 Louisiana 2012: HB89 prohibited collective bargaining agreements involving 
public employers from being accepted or presented for acceptance until the 
agreement has been made publically available (online) for a specified period. 
 Idaho 2013: HB261 provided that decisions to institute layoffs and the selection 
of employees subject to termination is the sole discretion of a board of trustees 
and not to be made based solely on consideration of employee seniority or 
contract status. 
 Missouri 2013: SB29 requires authorization by employees before labor unions 
may use dues and fees to make political contributions. Also bars unions from 
withholding earnings from paychecks for political purposes. (This was not signed 
into law but was passed by both houses.) 
 Vermont 2014: SB241 prohibited teachers and school administrators from 
striking and school boards from imposing contracts, establishing mandatory 
binding arbitration as an ultimate impasse resolution procedure. 
 California 2014: AB1611 made it a requirement for public school employers to 
give written notice to of any intent to make changes to matters within the scope of 
representation of employees represented by an exclusive bargaining 
representative, i.e. employee organization 
 
Finally, illustrative of the usefulness of my categorization schema two findings stand 
out. First, roughly equivalent numbers of reforms fit into either category, with about 1300 
on each side. Next, when state reform agendas were modeled using the frequency of 
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introduced legislation in either category, I find that states most states exhibit a clear 
preference for one reform package over the other. Indeed, in 34 states at least 40% more 
bills in one reform package were pursued than the other; in many states this preference 
was upwards of 80%. Further, when “low reform activity” states like Wyoming, West 
Virginia, Montana, and North Dakota are discounted I find that roughly equal numbers of 
states pursued ex ante versus ex post facto union restricting reforms. Such findings 
suggest that my scheme for classifying reforms in terms of their overall intention is 
illuminative: states do tend to “cluster” in their pursuit of a more draconian and highly 
visible approach to restricting union formation altogether, or a more technocratic and 
obscure approach to weakening unions’ abilities to secure gains for their members in 
contract negotiations. (See Table 14) 
Table 14. Reform Clusters: States favoring at least 20% more reforms in either package: 
Ex Ante/Union Formation Reform States 
(Percent of introduced ex ante reforms) 
Ex Post Facto/Union Influence Reform States 
(Percent of introduced ex post facto reforms) 
Alabama (85.7) 
Colorado (100) 
Delaware (60) 
Georgia (85.7) 
Indiana (80) 
Kansas (77.8) 
Kentucky (90.9) 
Louisiana(62.5) 
Maine (76.9) 
Maryland (90) 
Missouri (75) 
Montana (75) 
New Hampshire (75) 
New Mexico (72.7) 
North Carolina (88.9) 
North Dakota (100) 
South Carolina (100) 
West Virginia (100) 
Wyoming (100) 
California (85.7) 
Connecticut (76.9) 
Florida (68.2) 
Hawaii (72.5) 
Idaho (66.7) 
Illinois (81.3) 
Massachusetts (75.9) 
New Jersey (87.7) 
New York (73.9) 
Oregon (75.7) 
Rhode Island (82.5) 
South Dakota (66.7) 
Utah (75) 
Vermont (100) 
Wisconsin (75) 
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However, I am not arguing that labor-restricting reforms in either category are 
quantifiably less devastating for the influence of organized labor in a state. For example, 
individuals may be less inclined to support a union when they know that the legal 
bargaining scope is very narrow, for example. But narrowing the bargaining scope is 
categorized as a reform that weakens unions “after the fact,” not before. However, these 
reform packages still have arguably distinct aims. A question that follows, then, is: what 
is the difference between states union formation restricting versus union influence 
restricting reforms? 
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN ANTI-LABOR STATE REFORM APPROACHES 
 In this section, I analyze potential explanations for why states might prefer to 
adopt one type of labor-restricting reform package over the other. I theorize that party 
dynamics and labor union influence shape government labor reform agendas because 
they determine the costs associated with the pursuit of reforms that seek to impose losses 
on organized labor. In line with this expectation, I find that states with Republican 
Governors but Democratic legislatures pursued more ex post facto reforms that sought to 
limit the extant influence of relatively strong public employee unions. On the other hand, 
states with relatively weak unions and Republican legislatures were more likely to pursue 
ex ante reforms aimed at preventing increased unionization.  
Ex Ante Reform States  
 To reiterate, the goal of the anti-labor variant of ex ante collective bargaining 
reforms is to restrict the formation of strong unions by making it harder to certify new 
bargaining units or extract monies from employees covered by a bargaining unit. 
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Following this, a few observations about states that cluster into this reform pattern stand 
out: first, a considerable number of ex ante reform states have already been “right-to 
work” states for private sector workers for some time. This is particularly true among the 
southern states in this cluster—with Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, and North Carolina 
having been right-to-work states since the 1950s and Louisiana, since the 1970s. 
Resultantly, these states have low (single-digit) levels of private sector union density. 
Moreover, they also have much lower levels of public sector unionization than the 
national average of around 35%. Ostensibly, lawmakers in these states intend to keep 
unionization low by placing further restrictions on the formation of unions, particularly in 
the public sector who may not be covered under existing private sector right-to-work 
laws.  
 Conversely, states like Colorado, Delaware, Montana, Maine, and New 
Hampshire have relatively high levels of public sector unionization, but also displayed a 
preference for ex ante reforms. This may be in part due to the occasion of such states 
turning redder during the Recession following the 2010 midterms. In these states it 
appears that partisanship promoted the pursuit of a reform agenda aimed at reducing 
union density more so than state finances. Simply put, states with strong unions that 
trended Republican following the recession tended to pursue the most decisive package 
of public sector union-formation restrictions. This was also true regardless of whether 
they had support from the Governor. An additional goal of this particular constellation of 
reforms, then, may be to restrict the growth of labor unions to enable such states to 
remain red. 
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Ex Post Facto Reform States 
 Next, post facto reform states were more likely to be those with a legacy of 
divided government. In particular, such states tend to have Democratic-controlled 
legislatures but Republic Governors. Examples abound: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
and Vermont (until 2011), New Jersey under Christie, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and 
Idaho. Moreover, these are states that are typically union-friendly with strong 
unionization and relatively labor-friendly policies: in 2007, California, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Illinois (44.2), MA, New York, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont (42.6) and 
Wisconsin all had public sector union density rates of at least 10 points higher than the 
national average of 33% at that time. These are also more ideologically liberal states. 
Arguably, public employee unions operate as political “insiders” in these states and enjoy 
a fair amount of institutional support from elected officials in return for their political and 
financial support. 
 However, there are several seeming outliers that displayed a preference for post 
facto reforms—Florida, Idaho, South Dakota, and Utah. First, except for Florida these are 
right to work states with low unionization overall. Moreover, two of these outliers are 
“low intensity” reform states: Utah introduced 9 union-restricting reforms of either type 
during the 8-year period; South Dakota only introduced 10. Clearly, these are states 
where public employee unions on the whole do not enjoy much political or institutional 
support. Hence, they are not perceived as a problem to be solved or a threat to be 
extricated with union-restricting legislation. Nonetheless, individual public employee 
unions in these states may wield political or budgetary influence, like teachers unions in 
  101 
Idaho and Florida; lawmakers in these states have accordingly have tried to reduce the 
ability of key unions to negotiate gains for their members. 
 Following these observations, I examine the extent to which union presence and 
partisan control of government correlate with a state’s preferred “package” of union 
restricting reforms. Fiscal imperatives were still present in most of the American states 
that faced serious budget shortfalls during the Recession. However, I suggest that the 
political will to eradicate unions altogether was weaker in the states that pursues ex post 
facto reforms (with the exception of Michigan and Wisconsin, which became de facto 
right-to-work states for public employees during the Recession.) This is best explained by 
acknowledging that not all reforms are created equally. Moreover, the Wisconsin 
“Budget Repair Bill” contained aspects that both restricted union formation and 
influence, as did the Michigan bill. These examples may indicate that unified Republican 
governments are more likely to enact ex ante reforms once they assume power, but may 
pursue more technocratic ex post facto changes until then. 
 To evaluate these possibilities I ran several multiple linear regression analyses, 
both with pooled and individual state sessions that correlated the percentage of anti-labor 
reforms in either package with state political and fiscal characteristics. My findings are 
reported below for both the pooled sessions data and session #3, which I identify as the 
“Bellwether” legislative session because it occurred both following the height of the 
Recession (2011-2012) and the Republican’s midterm elections victory, and represents 
the most active legislative session for labor relations reform activity. The results of the 
analyses that follow basically comport with the explanations offered: partisanship, union 
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influence, and state financial indicators all appear to matter in determining the type of 
reform package that states pursued. (Tables 15&16) 
Table 15. Pooled Sessions, Summary: 
EX ANTE 
UNION FORMATION RESTRICTING 
EX POST FACTO/ 
UNION INFLUENCE RESTRICTING 
Non-Republican Governor* Republican Governor* 
Stronger Finances/More Budget Reserves* Weaker Finances/Lower Budget Reserves* 
Weaker Public Employee Unions** Stronger Public Employee Unions** 
N = 200 
Also included in the model, unreported because not found significant at the p > .10 level: 
Legislative Professionalism (Squire), Ideology, Unfunded pensions, HPI Change from peak, 
Income change from peak, Unemployment rate. 
 
Table 16. By “Bellwether” Session #3: 
  
EX ANTE/UNION FORMATION 
RESTRICTING 
POST FACTO/UNION INFLUENCE 
RESTRICTING 
Republican-Controlled Legislature* Non-Republican Controlled Legislature* 
Non-Republican Governor* Republican Governor* 
Stronger Finances/More Budget Reserves* Weaker Finances/Lower Budget Reserves* 
Weaker Public Employee Unions** Stronger Public Employee Unions** 
N = 50  
Also included in the model, unreported because not found significant at the p > .10 level: 
Legislative Professionalism (Squire), Ideology, Unfunded pensions, HPI Change from peak, 
Income change from peak, Unemployment rate. 
(This analysis uses 2011-2012 state political and economic characteristics) 
 
In summary, labor relations reform packages have been pursued across the 
board—in states with strong and weak unions, governed by Democrats and Republicans 
alike. However, much less attention has been paid to the reforms pursued by Democratic 
lawmakers than the highly publicized efforts of Republican administrations to weaken 
labor unions with sweeping union-organizing restrictions. The story of reforms pursued 
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and enacted by Democratic legislatures is important, I argue, because they reveal the 
sheer magnitude of the union problem states were tasked with addressing during the 
Great Recession. 
It is noteworthy that Democratic states experiencing strained finances exhibited a 
clear tendency to pursue post facto/union influence restricting reforms in response to the 
Recession. Was the pursuit of such reforms a mere technocratic approach to an 
intractable budget situation? In this way, did Democratic lawmakers who moved to 
restrict union influence hope to avoid permanently disrupting their states’ “pro-labor” 
ethos? Unlike their Republican counterparts who pursued more sweeping reforms with a 
clearer union-formation restricting intention, it is plausible that even Democrats felt 
intense pressure to weaken the influence of their union allies in order to implement 
collective bargaining restrictions aimed at enabling fiscal reforms in response to the Great 
Recession.  
In New Jersey, for example, a Democratic-controlled legislature has repeatedly 
compromised with minority Republicans to enact various collective bargaining 
restrictions promoted by the Christie administration. Next, in Massachusetts, the passage 
of a series of union-influence restricting reforms in late 2011 represented the first 
successful effort by a “solid blue” state to impose serious collective bargaining 
limitations on public employees, leading observers to question whether Massachusetts 
wasn’t becoming “Wisconsin-like” in its approach to resolving labor issues. I next 
discuss these cases in greater detail to illuminate the constraints faced by lawmakers in 
addressing the union problem in the midst of a state fiscal crisis, and to shed light on why 
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Democratic lawmakers have even been seen signing onto collective bargaining reform in 
this particular formation. 
EX POST FACTO REFORM STATE CASES: NEW JERSEY AND 
MASSACHUSETTS 
 
The advent of Republican Governors like Walker and Kasich leading the charge 
for collective bargaining reform during the Recession has received widespread attention. 
A straightforward reading of such events suggests that Republican Governors were able 
to pursue labor reforms of the more draconian ex ante variety because they enjoyed 
unified government in the midst of severe state fiscal crises. One of the major 
accomplishments of this legislation, for instance, was removing the “fair share fee,” the 
element of the legislation that made Wisconsin a right-to-work state for public 
employees. However, the highly publicized cases in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Indiana, where 
Republican governments imposed collective bargaining restrictions tell only part of the 
reform story occurring across the States during this time.  
Indeed, many Democratically-controlled and divided state governments quietly 
pursued a particular variety of labor reform in response to hard economic times during 
the Recession. In both Massachusetts and New Jersey, for example, Democratic 
lawmakers enacted major legislation aimed at weakening the influence of labor unions in 
these states during contract negotiations over pensions and health care benefits. More, 
while such reforms may appear “Wisconsin-esque,” I argue that they differ in that they 
are “ex post facto” reforms intended to weaken the influence of extant unions, rather than 
“ex ante” reforms seeking the ultimate eradication of unions from public sector labor 
relations. My rationale stems from the observation that these reforms were enacted in 
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states where public employee unions are important political actors. As such, they are not 
entities to be easily or entirely dismantled by [Democratic] lawmakers. Nonetheless, 
Democratically-controlled legislatures moved to constrain unions in many states in an 
effort to address fiscal problems exacerbated by ballooning public pensions and health 
care spending. To illustrate, I highlight New Jersey’s and Massachusetts’ enactment of 
key ex ante reforms during the Great Recession. 
Christie “Delivers Democrats” in Support of Pension and Health Care Reform 
 
Chris Christie ran for the Governorship of New Jersey at the height of the global 
financial crisis while the state was embroiled in a severe fiscal crisis. In his campaign, 
Christie laid out “88 Ways” he would fix New Jersey’s economy, education, and ethics. 
Prominent on his list of promises included repairing state finances by reducing employee 
health and retirement benefits and making full use of his veto powers to shape legislative 
budget policy (Reitmeyer 2010). Upon assuming office in 2010, Christie’s administration 
inherited a 1.3 billion dollar budget deficit. Then, roughly a month into his term, on 
February 11, 2010, Christie declared a “state of fiscal emergency” in the State of New 
Jersey via Executive order. A series of budget battles ensued between New Jersey 
Democrats who controlled the legislature and Governor Christie. Many of these related to 
public sector pensions and health insurance reform. The primary focus of Christie’s 
political agenda during this time centered on reducing New Jersey’s budget deficit. 
Collective bargaining reform aimed at enabling changes to public pensions and benefits 
were deemed an important component of this project.  
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Two examples reveal the nature of this reform agenda as being directed at 
weakening union influence “after the fact” or ex post facto of already strong unionization. 
The first occurred a year into Christie’s term, when he signed a controversial public 
pension and benefit reform bill that passed the legislature with support from Democratic 
leadership in the Assembly and Senate. The law required state and local government 
employees, including teachers, police and firefighters, to pay more toward their pensions 
and health insurance while barring collective bargaining on healthcare issues for at least 
four years. It was considered controversial for two reasons: first, because it split the 
Democratic Party. In order to secure a majority, a handful of Democrats let by Senate 
President Stephen Sweeny (and Iron Workers Union VP) joined with minority 
Republicans to pass legislation that was “virulently opposed” by two-thirds of 
Democratic lawmakers in the state. Secondly, it was controversial because it stripped 
public employees of their right to collectively bargain on the issues they value most, the 
act of which seemed strikingly reminiscent to Wisconsin (Magyar 2011). By narrowing 
the bargaining scope in an effort to shore up New Jersey’s budget problems, union 
influence has been greatly restricted in the state. In this way, the reform is 
quintessentially an ex post facto measure.  
The next example of union-influence restricting reform enacted with bi-partisan 
support was a two percent cap on base salary increases for public employees in 
arbitration awards; it was reauthorized at the beginning of Christie’s second term, in 
2014. By capping interest-arbitration awards the measure weakens the ability of unions to 
negotiate for pay increases that are outside of the constraints set by the law. This, coupled 
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with restrictions on collective bargaining over pensions and benefits, means that unions 
now wield far less influence in contract negotiations. However, New Jersey has strong 
unions, with the New Jersey Education Association and the New Jersey Communication 
Workers playing major roles in state politics. In acknowledgement of this, Democrats in 
the legislature have attempted to walk a fine line by agreeing to changes that restrict the 
influence of labor unions while resisting bigger changes to union certification and 
membership rules.  
In this way, these reforms do not appear to share the same broad goal of de-
unionizing the state of New Jersey as the right-to-work style reforms pursued by some 
unified Republican governments during the Recession. Presumably, this is because 
Democrats to not want to weaken the important political ally they have in organized 
labor. Still, New Jersey’s case highlights the willingness of Democratic lawmakers to 
compromise with Republicans during the Recession in order to enact what were deemed 
as necessary cost-saving collective bargaining reforms. In the case of Massachusetts, 
however, a different scenario emerged, with Democrats leading the charge for reform 
absent any pressure from Republican leadership. I argue that this shows the pressure 
lawmakers on both sides felt to address the union problem while further illustrating the 
distinctness of the approaches pursued by more liberal, pro-labor state governments 
compared to the right-to-work style reforms sought in Republican-controlled states. 
Massachusetts Democrats curtail collective bargaining, but it’s “not Wisconsin” 
 
Massachusetts is one of the “bluest” states in the US. The state legislature has 
been controlled by a Democratic supermajority for decades and Democrats enjoyed 
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unified government control under Deval Patrick for the duration of the Great Recession, 
from 2007-2014. Commonly used measures of citizen ideology also place Massachusetts 
toward the most liberal end of the scale (Fording 2012). Correspondingly, although a 
slew of Republicans occupied the Governor’s Mansion during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
and a Republican was recently elected to the position for 2015, Republican Governors 
from Massachusetts (like Mitt Romney and Paul Cellucci) tend to hold liberal views on 
key social issues, and even gun control in Cellucci’s case (Finucane 1998). Labor unions 
are also relatively strong in Massachusetts: overall state union density has remained 
roughly twice the national average over the past decade, peaking at 16.6% in 2009, and 
then falling to just under 14% in 2014 (in line with nation-wide de-unionizing trends 
following state legislative activity to curb collective bargaining). Moreover, public 
employee unionization in Massachusetts was particularly strong in the 2000s and early 
2010s, peaking at over roughly 63% in 2011, significantly higher than the nation-wide 
public sector union average during this time of roughly 37% (Macpherson 2015).  
Now, the fact that organized labor has a relatively stronger presence in 
Massachusetts than the national average and many other states is unsurprising given the 
state’s ideological and partisan composition. What is puzzling, however, is that such a 
liberal, pro-labor state with a unified Democratic government moved to severely restrict 
public employees’ collective bargaining rights during the Great Recession. Indeed, on the 
heels of the sweeping collective bargaining reforms that were enacted in Ohio and 
Wisconsin in 2011, Massachusetts became the first solidly blue state to restrict public 
employee collective bargaining rights with legislation that stripped police officers, 
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teachers, and other municipal employees of the right to collectively bargaining over 
health care. Moreover, a noteworthy observation of this particular charge to constrain 
collective bargaining rights is that it was led by Democrats, passing the Massachusetts 
House by a resounding 111 to 42 margin. Although all but two of the House Republicans 
voted in favor, the bill would have still passed without a single Republican vote 
(Goodnough 2011). It was also signed into law by a Democratic Governor Deval Patrick 
who enjoyed overwhelming union support in his bid for the Governorship and maintains 
longstanding political and financial ties (like many Massachusetts Democrats) to the 
state’s public employee unions (CapeCodToday.com 2006). 
As a result of this legislation, the design of municipal employee health plans 
would no longer be a permissible subject of collective bargaining. This came after the 
legislature had been urging municipalities to rein in health care costs for the past seven 
years. It was intended to bring local costs for health care “in line” with state costs 
because localities could now alter copayment rates or deductibles without entering into 
arduous collective negotiations with all the affected local bargaining units. Democrats 
who supported the legislation thus asserted the change was needed to avoid cost-driven 
layoffs and service reductions. According to Democratic chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee and co-author of the bill, Representative Brian Dempsey, the 
legislation was necessary to curb rising health care costs and avoid “disastrous” 
reductions in public safety and education services. Of the bill’s passage, he said, “We 
have to get a handle on this,” he said. “The fact of the matter is costs are going up and the 
money is not going to the areas we desperately need it to” (Goodnough 2011). 
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Like most of the US states during the recession, Massachusetts faced a steep 
budget deficit as demand for services outpaced state revenue growth. Massachusetts 
problems were also particularly severe, with a projected Debt/GDP ratio of over 20%, 
Massachusetts ranked among the top 3 most indebted US states in 2009 with steep 
unfunded pensions liabilities (37%) and health care liabilities (98%) (Snow 2010) 
According to lawmakers who supported the collective bargaining restrictions, the state’s 
fiscal problems were exacerbated by long-standing issues related to the rising cost of 
public employee health benefits in the state. The state’s fiscal situation coupled with 
rising healthcare costs, spurred significant changes to public employees’ collective 
bargaining rights. As such, a popular justification of the legislation is that this particular 
restriction of collective bargaining was necessary in order to save union members jobs. 
Said Michael J. Widmer, the president of the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, a 
nonpartisan watchdog group that supported the plan, “Yes, it’s a small curtailment of 
their collective bargaining powers…but with the corollary that it will save lots of their 
members’ jobs.” Further, Mark Jefferson, the Wisconsin Republican Party’s executive 
director, naturally praised the legislation, stating that it was “refreshing” to see liberal 
Democrats from Massachusetts finally acknowledging the importance of collective 
bargaining reform (Goodnough 2011). 
Nonetheless, Massachusetts labor leaders and public employees expressed mixed 
feelings about the passage of this legislation. For instance, Geoff Beckwith of the 
Massachusetts Municipal Association, acknowledged the necessity of enacting legislation 
aimed at curbing healthcare costs, adding that it still left employees with significant 
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bargaining power, making it “galaxies away from Wisconsin’s” (Smith 2011). Others felt 
outright betrayed by their supposed Democratic allies in the legislature. Massachusetts 
A.F.L.-C.I.O. President Robert J. Haynes signaled his dismay, stating, “It’s hard for me 
to understand how my good friends in the Massachusetts House, that have told me they 
support collective bargaining, could do this.” A local fire Captain, Doug Conrad, 
similarly stated that he felt betrayed by Democrat lawmakers that supported the 
legislation, many of whom he had considered loyal friends (Smith 2011).  
Finally, comparisons to Wisconsin also abounded. But the key point about these 
comparisons it that they highlight not so much the similarity, but the difference in these 
cases. So, although some like the fire captain Conrad worried Massachusetts may be 
“going the way of Wisconsin in one of the bluest states in the nation." Others have noted 
that the Massachusetts reform is quite different in its intention. AFL-CIO President 
Robert Haynes, for instance, had this to say: "I would not equate what happened in the 
House as Wisconsin-esque. I may have said it in a fit of anger here and there. But it is 
Wisconsin-like ... that you take pieces — particularly important pieces of collective 
bargaining away from us."  
Director of labor studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Eve 
Weinbaum, also acknowledged the significance of the reform occurring in a solidly 
Democratic state because “we don’t expect this kind of attack,” while adding the caveat 
“it's not same as Wisconsin, but it's part of the same trend." According to Weinbaum such 
legislation has arisen out of a “perfect storm” due to the heightened public awareness of 
public employees’ generous benefits during a time of growing economic uncertainty 
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among the working-class and distrust of government (Smith 2011). 
I argue that these observations from New Jersey and Massachusetts show that 
although such reforms may appear to be Wisconsin-like, it is important to evaluate the 
reforms pursued by state lawmakers for their intention and long-term potential effects on 
the position of organized labor. Moreover, by contrasting reforms implemented in 
Massachusetts that clearly limit the bargaining scope with more draconian reforms that 
limit the bargaining scope while also cutting unions off from their key source of revenue 
– union fees and fair share fees – we see two very different approaches being pursued by 
lawmakers who addressed the union problem during the Recession. On the one hand, 
Democratic lawmakers pursuing ex post facto reforms argued that they had no 
alternative, while Republican lawmakers made similar arguments they imposed reforms 
that could not be justified solely out of fiscal necessity.  
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
I have shown that states “cluster” in terms of the labor reform agendas they 
pursued during the Recession. My analyses of the patterns associated with state reform 
packages indicates that partisanship and labor union influence, combined with economic 
factors combined in states to determine the possible menu of reforms they pursued. I 
argue that during the Great Recession, state fiscal conditions provided lawmakers with 
the necessity and impetus to pursue public sector labor reforms. However, state 
governments had choices in the approach to reform they pursued, and exhibited clear 
preferences based on legislative partisanship, economic conditions, and the existing 
political influence of public employee unions.  
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Therefore, unified Republican-controlled governments pursued comprehensive 
union formation-restricting packages of reform, while Democratic-controlled legislatures 
resisted full-scale de-unionizing reforms to instead pursued union influence restrictions. 
Such reforms aimed at tipping the scales toward the employer in contract negotiations to 
enable reductions in public employee salaries and pensions while leaving union 
organizing somewhat intact. By highlighting the cases of New Jersey and Massachusetts, 
I have illustrated that even Democratic-controlled legislatures felt immense pressure to 
resolve the “union problem” during the Recession in order to force union concessions on 
public employee pensions and benefits.  
Still, a question is begged by these findings: were all public employees viewed 
equally problematic from the perspective of lawmakers during the Great Recession? 
Were reforms aimed at addressing the “union problem” applied evenly across all 
occupations, or were particular segments of the state and local workforce more apt to be 
targeted for reform? In the next chapter, I consider this underexplored aspect of state 
labor relations reform agendas: the occupational target of these reforms.  
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CHAPTER 4 : OCCUPATIONAL TARGETING AND THE WAR ON 
TEACHERS IN STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REFORM AGENDAS 
 
This project has so far highlighted variation in the direction, intensity, and content 
of labor relations reform agendas pursued across the American states in response to the 
Great Recession. I have shown that state reform agendas exhibit identifiable labor-
restrictive or labor-permissive characteristics and connected such state-level patterning to 
key fiscal and political determinants. I have further shown that states cluster in their 
approaches to addressing the “union problem” in the midst of a financial crisis, with 
some states exhibiting a clear preference for reforms that seek to restrict the formation of 
strong unions, and others pursuing reforms that aim to restrict the influence of presently 
strong unions. With such analyses, I have tried to clarify the where, what, and why of the 
Great Recession-era collective bargaining reforms pursued across American state 
governments. 
Based on these impressions, I suggest that such contemporary “assaults” on public 
employees’ collective bargaining rights may be emblematic of a global project of 
neoliberalism that is playing out across the American states due to the federated structure 
of public sector collective bargaining law in the US. In this chapter, I shed light on 
another important aspect of this putatively neoliberal labor relations reform movement: 
the occupational target of the reforms. I do this by examining which workforce sectors 
(state and local government vs. private) or personnel categories (K-12 teachers, police 
officers, transit workers, etc.) were specified by individual labor relations proposals 
pursued by state lawmakers in response to the Recession. With this data, I reveal 
  115 
significant occupation-based targeting in state reform agendas in order to illuminate 
whose collective bargaining rights were “under assault” during this period.  
First, I show that although public employees are widely known to have been the 
broad target of the Great Recession-era collective bargaining reform movement in the 
American states, the personnel category most frequently specified in labor-restrictive 
legislation was primary and secondary (K-12) school teachers and staff. Next, I compare 
the prevalence of proposals directed at K-12 teachers on state reform dockets to that of 
other government workers, noting that Scott Walker’s infamous “Budget Repair Bill” 
exempted uniformed public safety personnel like police officers and firefighters, while 
significantly curtailing K-12 employees’ collective bargaining rights. Finally, I assess the 
relationship between political and economic characteristics, unions’ political activities 
and partisan loyalties, and occupational targeting in state reform agenda.  
I find significant and positive relationships between more intense “anti-teacher” 
labor reform agendas and state-based teachers unions’ campaign contributions to 
Democratic candidates, legislative professionalism, underfunded pension liabilities, 
unemployment rates, and teacher union membership density. Conversely, I find 
significant and negative relationships in “Republican-friendly” states where teachers are 
more prolific political donors, budgets are stronger, and the electorate is more liberal.  
I take these findings to indicate that attacks on teachers’ collective bargaining 
rights are politically motivated. I then use these observations to forward the argument that 
political maneuvering and policy objectives more so than fiscal necessity has directed 
state labor relations reform agendas specifically toward the restriction of K-12 teachers 
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collective bargaining rights over other occupations in the public sector. I suggest that 
strategic Republican leaders are undertaking such actions in order to diminish an 
important revenue stream for the Democratic Party while weakening the Democratically-
aligned teachers unions who oppose market-driven education reforms 
IDENTIFYING OCCUPATIONAL TARGETING IN THE REFORM AGENDA 
Because public policy regarding non-federal government employees is set at the 
local level, states have various laws stipulating public employee collective bargaining 
rights that refer to either all public employees in the state, or particular categories of 
public employees like police officers, firefighters, transit workers, K-12 teachers, etc. I 
ascertained the relative vulnerability of various occupations by reading through the 
legislation in the original collective bargaining reform data set and coding individual bills 
based on which occupational class or category of employee they would impact (if 
enacted). I identified 11 categories of workers that legislation repeatedly referred to, 
described in Table 17. 
Table 17. Occupational category specified, all introduced bills, pooled sessions 
Occupation/Sector   Count 
State      242 
Local/Municipal/County   185 
K-12 Teachers/Staff    385 
Higher Ed Faculty/Staff    81 
State Police and Public Safety   171  
Municipal Fire    115 
Municipal Police   129 
Medical and Caregiving   108 
All Public Employees/Workers   1063 
Contractors    165 
Other/Private Sector    69 
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Next, I distinguished between labor-restrictive versus labor-permissive bills 
targeting each category of workers. I found that in addition to “blanket” reform 
legislation that aimed to impact the collective bargaining rights of all public employees, 
restrictive bills targeting K-12 teachers were the second most commonly found in the 
data. In fact, teachers faced a veritable onslaught of collective bargaining restrictions all 
across the county: in 21 of the states upwards of 15% of the universe of anti-labor 
reforms introduced from 2007-2014 specifically aimed to weaken the collective 
bargaining rights of teachers. This includes states with some of the highest levels of 
overall reform activity like Michigan, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Indiana (See Table 18). In light of these observations, two questions are raised: why 
teachers? Why now? 
Table 18. Bill counts and percentages for labor-restrictive reforms targeting teachers  
State     All Anti-labor  Anti-teacher  Percent anti-teacher 
Vermont 9 6 66.67%
Idaho 18 11 61.11%
Utah 8 4 50.00%
Rhode Island 57 25 43.86%
Wyoming 3 1 33.33%
Indiana 35 11 31.43%
Wisconsin 20 6 30.00%
California 28 8 28.57%
Michigan 73 20 27.40%
Tennessee 44 11 25.00%
Arkansas 8 2 25.00%
New York 37 9 24.32%
Colorado 17 4 23.53%
Pennsylvania 77 18 23.38%
Alaska 13 3 23.08%
Kansas 9 2 22.22%
Iowa 23 5 21.74%
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New Jersey 74 14 18.92%
Minnesota 39 6 15.38%
Maine 13 2 15.38%
Illinois 59 9 15.25%
 
WHY TEACHERS? WHY NOW? 
Competing mainstream narratives have been offered to explain state lawmakers’ 
fixation on curtailing teachers’ collective bargaining rights during the Recession. The 
first, favored by elected officials and neoliberal school reformers is that costs for K-12 
education have risen to “unsustainable” levels in recent years and have not been 
accompanied by commensurate increases in student performance. By this account, 
teachers unions hinder the implementation of necessary cost-saving and outcome-
improving reforms because they drive up salaries and benefits while protecting 
ineffective teachers from dismissal. Such arguments, although identifiable in public 
discourse surrounding the implementation of No Child Left Behind, gained increased 
traction during the Great Recession. As state budget crises threatened fiscal solvency 
across the American states, Republican Governors responded with education budget-
slashing austerity measures and revenue-reducing tax cuts. Justified from both a fiscal 
and policy perspective, weakening the influence of teachers unions through collective 
bargaining restrictions was simply part of the necessary package of education and fiscal 
reforms pursued during this time.  
However, the idea that teachers unions are to blame for state budget woes and 
lagging student performance is not a pill readily swallowed by labor sympathizers or 
educators. Indeed, those on the progressive left offer an alternative narrative to explain 
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lawmakers’ pursuit of steep education spending cuts and draconian collective bargaining 
restrictions surrounding the recession. In this account, such actions amount to an assault 
on teachers by those seeking to fundamentally restructure the American public education 
system. The media’s fixation of late on bad teachers aka “rotten apples” and the union-
negotiated protections that make their removal nearly impossible serves as evidence of 
this.6 So does the education reform movement, marked by Michelle Rhee’s tenure as the 
Chancellor of the Washington DC public schools and the proliferation of Teach for 
America, coupled with increasing political support for school vouchers and charter 
schools. In this narrative, state lawmakers are waging a war on teachers and their unions 
in order to remove the stranglehold that teachers unions hold on public education (and the 
Democratic Party). 
These mainstream accounts seem to imply that state government initiatives to 
restrict teachers’ collective bargaining rights have arisen for either mostly economic or 
mostly political reasons. In the following sections, I evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of such assessments. I then estimate several empirical models in an effort to 
shed light on the factors that coalesced to increase the presence of K-12 teachers on state 
reform dockets. I find that indeed, fiscal and political characteristics of states are 
correlated with more intense “anti-teacher’ reform agendas.  
                                                 
6	See Newsweek’s cover story: “The Key to Saving American Education: We must fire bad 
teachers (3/15/10); Time Magazine’s cover story “Rotten Apples: It’s Nearly Impossible to 
Fire a Bad Teacher” (11/3/2014); New Yorker article: “The Rubber Room” (2009); and 
2010 documentary film of the same name.	
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Related to this, I conjecture that political and policy objectives appear to best explain 
reformers’ fixation on curtailing teachers’ union organizing and contract negotiation 
rights surrounding the Great Recession.  
EXPLANATION #1 FISCAL IMPERATIVES – THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE 
Following from the (accurate) observation that k-12 education is the “single 
largest budget item for each of the 50 states,” laying off teachers and/or reducing their 
compensation became synonymous with “shrinking government” during the Great 
Recession as a cure-all for state fiscal woes (Conniff 2011). This is a novel development, 
according to the Center for Public Education, because education spending is traditionally 
viewed as a future investment that is popular with both partisan camps (Hull 2010). As 
such, education spending is usually one of the last budget items to be reduced. This 
changed during the Great Recession, however, because school districts suffered steep 
declines in both state and local funding as a result of reduced local revenues from real 
estate taxes following the housing market collapse combined with strained state finances 
at a time of increased service demand (Hull 2010).  
For example, a survey conducted by the American Association of School 
Administrators (AASA) found that 78 percent of districts anticipated budget cuts in 2010-
11, up from 64 percent in 2009-10. Moreover, many districts confronted reduced 
revenues for several years in a row during the recession, with four out of five districts 
suffering decreased funding from state and local revenues at the height of the recession in 
2010-2011 (Hull 2010). Policymakers addressed resulting budget gaps through a 
combination of revenue increases and spending cuts, particularly to K-12 education. 
  121 
Given that education budgets are primarily consumed by personnel costs related to 
salaries and benefits, reductions consequentially took the form of teacher layoffs, pay 
freezes, furlough days, and reductions to health and retirement plans. 
Moreover, as one of the largest, most visible, segments of the public sector 
workforce, teachers may have served as a convenient scapegoat used by reformist 
lawmakers to stoke working-class discontent in order to shore up support for their 
political agendas. This is because teachers are increasingly known to enjoy high levels of 
job security coupled with low-to-no premium health insurance plans and defined-benefit 
pensions that might be characterized as lavish by current American standards. Teachers 
also receive (or are perceived to enjoy) 3-month long summer vacations. Compared to the 
average American worker in private industry, especially during the Recession when 
unemployment reached double digits, teachers occupy an ostensibly privileged economic 
position.  
As Jay Greene of the Manhattan Institute observes (pre-Recession): “[In 2005] 
the average public school teacher was paid 36% more per hour than the average non-sales 
white-collar worker and 11% more than the average professional specialty and technical 
worker. Nationwide, public school teachers earn more than the average workers with 
whom they are grouped into categories by the BLS" (Green and Winters, 2007). 
Similarly, Frederick Hess of the Hoover Institution argues: "Public educators also 
receive generous benefits, including 'defined-benefit' pensions that do not require any 
contribution from the teacher. A career teacher, without ever having to contribute a 
nickel, can normally retire at age 55 and receive close to 70 percent of his or her salary 
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for life. There are hundreds of thousands of retired teachers drawing annual pensions of 
$40,000 or more — many young enough to begin second careers" (Hess 2004). 
In light of such observations, we begin to understand how reformers may have 
seized upon the narrative of teachers as an overpaid, yet underperforming class of 
workers in order to justify the repeal of their collective bargaining rights in the name of 
much-needed education and fiscal reform. Motivated by a challenging fiscal climate, 
restricting teachers’ collective bargaining rights has been deemed an essential, practically 
unavoidable component of curtailing state expenditures. This is because the growing 
influence of teachers unions has frequently been credited (and blamed) for this situation. 
One recent analysis produced by the conservative Cato Institute, for instance, highlights 
the effectiveness of teachers unions in satisfying several core objectives, including raising 
their members’ wages and opposing the implementation of “performance pay” policies 
(Coulson 2010). Academic research, particularly in economics, has also highlighted the 
relationship between teacher union strength (frequently measured in terms of density) and 
educator compensation, per-pupil education expenditures, and other K-12 policy 
outcomes (Hoxby 1996; Lemke 2004; Lieberman 1997; Lovenheim 2009; Stinebrickner 
2001).  
In light of such findings, claims that teachers unions have driven up their 
members’ compensation (and hence education expenditures) are considered “entirely 
uncontroversial” by conservative commentators like Coulson (2010) However, Coulson 
adds an important caveat, stating that the link between unionization and higher teacher 
pay cannot be attributed solely to teacher union success at the bargaining table. Rather, he 
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argues that this situation has been arrived at as a result of the inordinate political clout 
wielded by the two largest teachers unions (and their state-based affiliates): the National 
Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers. Coulson conjectures: 
“The NEA and AFT spend large sums on political lobbying so that public school districts 
maintain their monopoly control of more than half a trillion dollars in annual U.S. K-12 
education spending…We are paying dearly for the union label, but mainly due to union 
lobbying to preserve the government school monopoly rather than to collective 
bargaining” (2010). Lieberman makes a similar argument in a polemical book, The 
Teacher Unions, “the NEA/AFT are geared to political action, not as a supplement [to 
collective bargaining] but as a primary focus of union activity” (1997). 
A host of recent studies highlight the sheer magnitude of teachers unions’ political 
clout while linking permissive state legal environments (assessed in terms of collective 
bargaining regulations) to teacher union size, strength, and influence. Notable 
examinations by Berkman and Plutzer (2005), Moe (2011), and Winkler (2012), for 
instance, shed light on the upward trajectory of teachers unions in American politics, 
highlighting effects of increased unionization on teacher pay and benefits, education 
policies, and K-12 expenditures. A conclusion from this literature is that teachers unions 
have emerged as Goliath-like figures in American politics, with significant implications 
for teacher pay, working conditions, and public school policy.  
Adding insult in injury, teachers and their unions have arrived at this position at 
the same time that the political clout of private sector workers via unions has dwindled 
substantially. Private sector unionization was at an all-time low of around 7.4% at the 
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beginning of the Recession in 2008, and has dipped further to 6.6% in 2015. At the same 
time, teachers continue to be unionized at a rate of upwards of 50% of their overall ranks 
(although recent numbers show that state legislative efforts to weaken unions are 
shrinking these numbers) (BLS.com).  
Political figures have additionally trumpeted claims connecting underfunded state 
budgets to bloated teacher pay and benefits, ipso facto attributing state fiscal crises to 
teacher unions. For instance, when New Jersey Governor Chris Christie sought a wage 
freeze and benefit contribution hike for teachers in 2010 he stated, “When you put 
salaries and benefits together, [teachers] are making a significant amount of money” 
(Statehouse Bureau Staff  2010). Christie further called the New Jersey Education 
Association to task for their refusal to reopen contract negotiations so that he could 
pursue such education spending cuts founded in reducing teacher remuneration (as 
opposed to teacher layoffs): “If they care more about their status as the 800-pound 
gorilla, then they won't reopen the contracts, and they'll just lose members” (Heininger 
2010).  
The message being broadcasted to the “800-pound” teachers unions during the 
Recession was that by refusing to accept concessions they had given lawmakers faced 
with budget deficits no choice but to seek collective bargaining restrictions. This is 
because ostensibly, permissive collective bargaining regimes have empowered teachers in 
contract negotiations, resulting in unsustainable education personnel costs. Such a 
narrative offers one explanation for why K-12 teachers’ collective bargaining rights were 
particularly ripe for reform during the Recession. Fiscal imperatives, combined with 
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perceptions that teachers (via their unions) have contributed to state budget deficits 
created a perfect (and perhaps unavoidable) storm for lawmakers’ pursuit of collective 
bargaining reforms aimed specifically at teachers. Government officials tasked with 
balancing state budgets sought to renegotiate the employer-employee relationship 
because they had no alternative. 
However, such rationales are called into question by the observation that no broad 
pattern of heightened collective bargaining reform activity targeting other segments of 
the state and local workforce is detectable. For instance, one might also expect 
lawmakers to concentrate on restricting public safety officers’ collective bargaining rights 
for many of the same reasons provided to justify reforms affecting teachers. Police 
officers are, after all, among the “heavily unionized” occupations according to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, and workers in the “protective service occupations,” which includes 
police and corrections officers, as well as firefighters, enjoy nationwide union density of 
over 35% (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). Police, fire, and corrections officers are also 
generously remunerated in many states, and numerous studies have linked police officer 
pay to unionization and collective bargaining rules (Hall 1977; Ehrenberg 1973; Bartel 
1981; Feuille 1986). More recent work by Chandler et al (1995), Page (2013), and Anzia 
and Moe (2015) has linked public safety officer union political strategy to cost-related 
outcomes involving wages, benefits, and employment levels for police and corrections 
officers. 
As such, public safety officers unions are arguably as draining to budgets and 
politically influential as teachers unions. Nonetheless, few states pursued reform agendas 
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targeting public safety professionals (and some states, notably Michigan and Wisconsin 
exempted such individuals from comprehensive reform). Only two states pursued a 
higher proportion of labor-restrictive reforms targeted toward public safety personnel 
(which includes municipal police, state police, and corrections guards) than K-12 
teachers: Illinois and South Carolina (Table 19). 
Table 19. Bill counts for labor-restrictive reforms targeting public safety personnel* 
 
State      All Anti-labor  Anti-safety Percent anti-safety 
 
Illinois 59 21 35.59%
South Carolina 17 5 29.41%
Texas 14 2 14.29%
Oklahoma 22 3 13.64%
New Jersey 74 9 12.16%
Pennsylvania 77 9 11.69%
Oregon 38 4 10.53%
Rhode Island 57 6 10.53%
Maryland 21 2 9.52%
Washington 21 2 9.52%
Florida 22 2 9.09%
Michigan 73 6 8.22%
New York 37 3 8.11%
Massachusetts 29 2 6.90%
Wisconsin 20 1 5.00%
California 28 1 3.57%
Hawaii 51 1 1.96%
*Includes municipal police/peace officers, state troopers, highway patrol, and corrections 
 
In observation of this, it is puzzling that state lawmakers appear to have 
disproportionately targeted K-12 teachers for labor-restrictive reforms while sparing 
public safety officers from similar legislative activity. Must we conclude that Republican 
Governors like Scott Walker and Rick Snyder believe that teachers create deficits, but 
cops and firemen do not? What else might explain their fixation on restricting public 
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school teachers’ access to collective bargaining during the Great Recession, while leaving 
public safety employees labor rights largely intact?  
 
 
EXPLANATION #2 – THE WAR ON TEACHERS, EXTENDED TO THEIR 
UNIONS 
Voices on the left point out that collective bargaining reforms have broader 
implications than mere education expenditure reductions. While the latter cause 
temporary hardship to those teachers who have been required to forgo salary increases, 
take furloughs, and contribute more toward their pensions and health benefits, the former 
seek to permanently reduce the ability of teachers to influence policies impacting their 
long-term remuneration and working conditions (Donn 2013). In this way, repealing 
collective bargaining is viewed not as a fiscal adjustment strategy but rather as part of a 
concerted effort to reshape the teaching profession, and K-12 education along with it. 
Collective bargaining reforms aimed at teachers may thus amount to yet another assault 
against public education in an ongoing “war” against teachers. 
According to Joseph Ricciotti, a public schools advocate in Connecticut and 
retired educator, this “war on teachers” began with the George W. Bush Administration’s 
implementation of No Child Left Behind and has continued under the Obama 
Administration’s “Race to the Top” program. Ricciotti argues that these programs 
exemplify a “test and punish” system that aims to rank students and grade schools, while 
“demonizing teachers” for the inadequacies of the public education system (Ricciotti 
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2014). Republican governors have also pursued aggressive education reform agendas in 
the post-No Child Left Behind era. As 18 new Republican governors assumed office in 
2011, education reform efforts accelerated in conjunction with fiscal reforms. In addition 
to promoting the “school choice” movement through voucher programs and charter 
schools, proposals impacting teacher pay, promotion, tenure, and dismissal were also 
prominent on the agenda.  
Examples of successful initiatives undertaken by Republican Governors around 
this time abound: Gov. Rick Scott (FL) established merit pay and eliminated teacher 
tenure for new hires; Gov. Tom Corbett (PA) pushed for teacher merit pay, property tax 
reform, and the ability for school districts to furlough employees during a fiscal crisis; 
Gov. Mary Fallin (OK) signed a law streamlining the teacher dismissal process, making it 
easier to terminate teachers; while Gov. Bill Haslan (TN) raised the bar for teacher tenure 
and promotion (RGA 2015). Naturally, teachers unions oppose education reforms that 
threaten to weaken the job security and working conditions of their members. As such, 
reformist state lawmakers seeking to enact many of the aforementioned education 
innovations may find it advantageous (or downright necessary) to simultaneously restrict 
teachers collective bargaining rights. Otherwise, unwieldy teachers unions may block 
proposals at the bargaining table or wage public issue campaigns opposing them. 
Understood as such, collective bargaining reform agendas targeting teachers may signify 
the pursuit of broader political and policy objectives as well.  
At this point, an addendum may be offered to explain lawmakers’ excessive focus 
on curtailing teachers’ union organizing rights: the reform movement is also transfixed 
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with breaking teachers unions in order to weaken the Democratic Party. This narrative 
has been proffered by those on the political left, including labor scholars and activists, 
who argue that the disproportionate targeting of teachers and their unions during the 
Great Recession should be seen for what it is: an attack on the Democratic Party, who 
enjoys generous political support from teachers unions (Cantin 2012; Kirsten 2011; 
McCartin 2011).  
This assessment stems from several observations. First, state-based teachers 
unions reported contributing over 57% of their overall political donations in recent 
decades directly to Democratic candidates. Next, this is over five times more than the 
meager 11% that teachers unions contributed to Republican candidates, while the 
remaining 32% was donated to a combination of non-partisan issue campaigns or 3rd 
party candidates. Finally, there exists significant state-level variation in teachers unions 
partisan loyalties and political commitments, with state-based teachers unions ranging 
from staunchly pro-Democrat and prolific in their campaign contributions, to being 
moderately Republican-friendly and politically inert. (Appendix 3). 
For instance, 5 states contributed upwards of 90% of their political donations 
directly to Democratic candidates, including prolific contributors Iowa and Indiana, 
whose average yearly campaign contributions amounted to over two hundred thousand 
and half a million dollars, respectively. Next, over a dozen states contributed 70-80% to 
Democrats, including big spenders like Alabama (838k annual average overall) and 
Pennsylvania (638k annual average overall). In sum, over 2/3 of the states donated 
upwards of 50% of their campaigning coffers to Democratic candidates (Table 20). 
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Table 20. State-based teachers unions political donations to Democrats, 1980s-today 
 
STATE   $ to Democrats (as percent of overall) 
Rhode Island  94.70% 
West Virginia  94.01% 
Iowa   93.00% 
Vermont  91.66% 
Indiana   91.01% 
North Carolina  86.59% 
Tennessee  83.96% 
Alabama  83.06% 
Arkansas  81.68% 
Louisiana  80.09% 
South Dakota  78.93% 
New Hampshire 78.79% 
Virginia   78.74% 
Pennsylvania  78.51% 
South Carolina  77.65% 
New Mexico  76.06% 
Wyoming   71.73% 
Kansas   71.47% 
Montana  69.22% 
Texas   68.11% 
Nevada   67.85% 
Georgia   66.83% 
New Jersey  66.63% 
Delaware  63.88% 
Maryland  62.66% 
Florida   61.04% 
Hawaii   59.24% 
Mississippi  59.00% 
Michigan  58.62% 
Illinois   56.67% 
New York  55.38% 
Alaska   54.02% 
Kentucky  52.56% 
Moreover, this does not mean that they simply donated the other half to 
Republicans. This opposite is actually true. No state teachers unions contributed as much 
as half of their political donations to Republican candidates. Rather, many states donated 
significant sums to third-party candidates and issue campaigns in addition to Democratic 
candidates, thus diluting their overall contribution to Democrats while not 
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correspondingly increasing it to Republicans. In California, for example, where teachers 
unions are a veritable behemoth contributing an average of over 11 million dollars per 
year, they only contributed 15% of their overall donations to Democratic candidates, but 
they contributed nothing to Republicans. The rest, it seems, went directly to support 
education issue campaigns in a state rife with initiatives. However, there are still roughly 
a dozen states that donated sizeable percentages of their overall campaign contributions 
to Republians (Table 21). These additionally include states in which teachers unions are 
relatively large donors such as Illinois ($1.6m annual average overall) and New York 
(961k annual average overall). 
Table 21. State-based teachers unions political donations to Republicans, 1980s-today 
 
STATE   $ to Republicans (as percent of overall) 
Missouri  39.21% 
Mississippi  31.97% 
Delaware  28.48% 
Texas   27.18% 
Wyoming   27.08% 
Georgia   26.61% 
New Jersey  26.27% 
Illinois   25.57% 
New York  23.27% 
South Carolina  21.72% 
Alabama  19.25% 
Kansas   18.83% 
Pennsylvania  18.32% 
Kentucky  16.68% 
Virginia   15.83% 
Louisiana  15.37% 
North Dakota  14.55% 
Tennessee  13.42% 
South Dakota  13.02% 
Alaska   11.78% 
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Next, as further evidence that collective bargaining reforms are compelled by dual 
motives to weaken teachers unions and undercut the Democratic Party (as opposed to 
fiscal necessity alone), critics have pointed out that the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) has spearheaded much of the reform movement. ALEC describes itself 
as a non-partisan association of state lawmakers, industry leaders, and average citizens 
that, “works to advance limited government, free markets and federalism at the state 
level” (ALEC.org). Observers on the left, however, characterize ALEC as a powerful 
“corporate bill mill” that provides state lawmakers with ready-to-use legislation like the 
right-to-work style bills that proliferated in state legislatures all over the country 
surrounding the Great Recession (CMD 2014). Moreover, much of the model ALEC 
legislation cropping up during this time specifically targeted K-12 teachers for reform. 
For instance, the Indiana Education Reform Package incorporates model ALEC 
legislation related to teacher collective bargaining rights, evaluations, and licensing, as 
did myriad other bills introduced across state legislatures (Riley 2012).  
Ostensibly, such reforms driven by ALEC appear to be motivated by policy 
objectives. As a market fundamentalist interest group, ALEC supports efforts to 
restructure the American education system according to what might be appropriately 
deemed “neoliberal” principles. Moreover, critics of neoliberalism observe that various 
aspects of the American public sphere—from education to government partnerships with 
business—have been transformed according to market-driven agendas. This phenomenon 
is also not isolated to the United States. In 2008, before the Recession’s peak, the 
president of the largest teachers union in Europe, Lois Weiner, published a collection of 
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essays written by scholars, educators, and union leaders providing various perspectives 
on the “global assault on teaching, teachers, and their unions” (Weiner 2008). The core 
argument of the book is that global economic competition has driven advanced 
democracies to alter the meaning and goals of public education. Rather than being seen as 
a public good, education at all levels has been transformed into a product to be 
consumed. Parents and students are customers in this model, while teachers are like retail 
clerks, delivering a narrow set of curriculum while working under serious performance 
and resource constraints. Efficiency is being forced on teachers by increasing classroom 
sizes, standardizing course content and delivery methods, and routinizing assessment 
procedures. 
By examining neoliberal education reforms occurring in diverse locales including 
Denmark, Mexico, England, China, Australia, South Africa, Germany, and the United 
States, Weiner’s volume shows that neo-liberal education reforms are neither novel nor 
isolated to the United States surrounding the Great Recession (2008). Rather, they should 
be viewed as part of a global set of processes that have been occurring for decades. 
Related to this, the surge of restrictive collective bargaining reforms aimed at primary 
school teachers may be viewed as a logical component of restructuring the public 
education system in the United States. This is because under the neoliberal education 
model, teacher evaluation procedures connected to student performance serve as 
important carrots and sticks in forcing teachers to comply with encroachments upon their 
intellectual freedom while responding to market-driven pressures to deliver a 
particularized educational product. An integral part of applying such performance 
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pressures to K-12 educators, has been the loosening of collective bargaining rights and 
the weakening of teachers unions.  
For instance, reformers may seek to narrow the mandatory bargaining scope for 
K-12 teachers in an effort to implement performance pay measures, weaken (or 
eliminate) teacher tenure, increase class sizes, or alter other working conditions such as 
prep time, the length of the school day/year, etc. Therefore, a correlation is expected 
between the pursuit of market-driven education reforms and the restriction of teachers’ 
collective bargaining rights. In line with this, I argue that the nationwide surge in (state-
level) collective bargaining reform activity is indicative of a neoliberalizing trend aimed 
at shrinking the public sector by bringing it in line with market rationality and efficiency 
motives. Weakening public employee unions is important in this project because they 
oppose reforms that reduce their members pay, benefits, and job security. Moreover, 
weakening collective bargaining rights for particular sectors of the public workforce 
might provide insight into the content of neoliberal reforms being promoted. I find that 
K-12 teachers were disproportionately targeted for reforms in a majority of labor-
restrictive reform states. If collective bargaining restrictions are viewed as such we begin 
to see why.  
Following this, I suggest that the ultimate goal of labor-restrictive reforms aimed 
at teachers unions is not merely to bring certain public employees’ remuneration more in 
line with the private sector in order to curb government spending. Rather, it is to weaken 
the teachers unions who have in recent decades emerged as influential political actors that 
tend to align with Democratic candidates and causes. In this way, the budget-cutting 
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effect is secondary to the larger aims of facilitating neoliberal education reforms while 
undercutting an important campaign contributor and ally to the Democratic Party.  
EVALUATING THE COMPETING NARRATIVES 
I have outlined various factors which may help explain lawmakers’ efforts to 
curtail teachers’ collective bargaining rights in response to the Great Recession. Building 
from research identifying a relationship between teacher union density, compensation, 
and teacher-friendly education policies, the first underscores mainstream narratives 
purporting that teachers unions have driven up their members’ compensation to 
unsustainable levels, propelling state budget crises. Insomuch as teachers unions refused 
to cede concessions in negotiations over members’ pay and benefits, leaders in cash-
strapped states sought collective bargaining restrictions in order to regain control over 
ballooning education spending. I call this explanation the “fiscal necessity narrative.”  
This framing of the fundamental issue assumes that states experiencing budget 
and pension crises disproportionately targeted teachers because they are simply the best 
paid and benefited public employees. Hence, lawmakers had the most to gain by 
reforming teacher collective bargaining in order to reduce current and future K-12 
personnel expenditures. In order to evaluate the relationship between fiscal necessity and 
the reform agenda, I assess the influence of state fiscal indicators like the budget reserves, 
housing price changes, and unfunded pension liabilities alongside teacher union density 
on the proportion of a state’s total collective bargaining reform agenda targeted toward 
K-12 teachers.  
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An alternative explanation is that teachers unions, as significant contributors to 
the Democratic Party, were the primary target of collective bargaining restrictions aimed 
at reducing an important revenue stream for the Democratic Party. I call this the “political 
opportunity narrative.” Republican lawmakers disproportionately targeted teachers for 
labor reforms in order to break the behemoth teachers unions because they are huge (800-
pound!) supporters of the Democratic Party. To assess this account, I analyze the 
relationship between the proportion of anti-teacher reforms in a state legislative session 
and partisan campaign contributions from the top-two teachers unions. I characterize 
states that contributed at least some significant proportion of their donations to 
Republican candidates as being “Republican-friendly” as opposed to “pro-Republican.”  
Put differently, although there are no states that contributed more money to 
Republicans than Democrats, there are still a handful of states that contributed above 
average amounts to Republican candidates including Missouri (39%), Mississippi (32%), 
Texas (27%), and Illinois (26%) (See table 21). Now, in each of these states campaign 
contributions to Democrats outweighed those to Republicans, but we might still 
characterize these states as Republican-friendly rather than being outright antagonistic to 
Republicans like a states such as Iowa and Rhode Island, where only 1% of donations 
went to Republicans while over 90% went to Democrats.    
Following these observations, I anticipate that where teachers unions 
overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates, their members will be 
disproportionately targeted in the state labor reform agenda. Conversely, I expect that 
where teachers unions make more donations to Republican candidates, the opposite will 
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hold true and teachers will be more insulated from collective bargaining restrictions. I 
further anticipate that there will be a positive relationship between the average annual 
amount of political donations made by teachers unions and the proportion of reforms 
targeting teachers.  
However, it may also be the case that teacher-centric reforms were also pursued to 
complement policy other objectives. This is because teachers unions oppose many 
education reform projects promoted by politicians of both stripes such as school choice, 
vouchers, and charter schools. Therefore, weakening teachers unions also has potential 
policy goals in mind. Resultantly, I suggest that political and policy objectives should be 
evaluated alongside state fiscal characteristics to explain why K-12 teachers have 
emerged as the primary target of collective bargaining reform agendas. An additional 
justification for collective bargaining restrictions targeting teachers, then, is that they aim 
to facilitate greater education reform. I call this the “policy objectives narrative.” 
Insomuch as Republican governors have spearheaded the kind of education reforms 
opposed by teachers unions, I expect that the presence of a Republican Governor in a 
state will be positively associated with a disproportionately strong anti-teacher collective 
bargaining reform agenda. In sum, I seek to evaluate the relationship between state 
economic, political, and policy environments and the prominence of reforms targeted 
specifically at teachers in a state’s collective bargaining reform agenda. I expect that over 
and above fiscal necessity, political goals and policy objectives explain why many states 
went on the offensive against K-12 teachers’ union organizing and contract negotiating 
rights surrounding the Great Recession.  
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Table 22. Labor-restrictive legislation targeting K-12 teachers, bill counts 
 Expected values  
(standard errors) 
Change in baseline 
model + 1 s.d. or 
from O  1  
Baseline model 0.61 
(.18) 
 
 
Expected value + 1 s.d. 
 
 
 
Campaign $ to Democrats 1.16** 
(.42) 
+0.55 
Campaign $ to Republicans 0.37** 
(.13) 
-0.24 
Average annual political spending  0.42** 
(.12) 
-0.19 
Republican-controlled legislature 0.58 
(.20) 
-0.03 
Republican Governor 0.93 
(.29) 
+0.32 
Legislative Professionalism 1.40** 
(.47) 
+0.79 
Ideology 0.28** 
(.09) 
-0.33 
Unfunded pension liabilities 0.80* 
(.28) 
+0.19 
Days in budget reserve 0.44** 
(.17) 
-0.17 
Unemployment 0.76 
(.23) 
+0.15 
Teacher union density 1.14** 
(.31) 
+0.53 
RTW state 0.27 
(.31) 
-0.34 
Number of original observations 200  
Number of simulations  1000  
Prob> chi2  0.000  
+  Significant at the .10 level *Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level. 
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RESULTS OF EVENT COUNT MODEL: SIMULATED EXPECTED VALUES 
Similar to the count models described in Chapter 2, correlations between 
collective bargaining restriction for teachers and various predictors were first estimated 
using negative binomial regression with robust clustered standard errors (by state) to 
control for cross-case dependency. Significant statistical relationships between the 
predictors and the outcomes of interest were then detected and Clarify statistical 
simulation software (King 2000) was used to simulate expected values for the dependent 
variable at various quantities.  
In this model, I examine the relationship between the number of restrictive (aka 
anti-labor) proposals specifically targeting K-12 teachers in state labor relations reform 
agendas and other political and fiscal characteristics. According to the negative binomial 
regression the predictors positively and significantly correlated with more labor-
restrictive proposals directed toward teachers are: higher teacher union campaign 
contributions to Democrats (as a percentage of overall contributions), more professional 
legislatures, larger underfunded pension liabilities, and greater teacher union density. 
Alternatively, the predictors negatively associated with more anti-teacher proposals are: 
higher teacher union campaign contributions to Republicans, larger overall annual 
political contributions by state teachers unions, more liberal state ideology, and stronger 
budget reserves.  
Further, using Clarify (King 2000) to estimate the “baseline model” in which all 
continuous variables are held at their means and dichotomous variables at zero, we find 
that 0.61 bill proposals specifically targeting K-12 teacher are predicted. However, this 
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quantity is nearly doubled (to 1.16) when the percentage of campaign contributions to 
Democratic candidates is increased from its mean of roughly 57% by one standard 
deviation, to 83%. Alternatively, it is almost halved (to 0.37) when campaign 
contributions to Republicans are increased by one standard deviation from a mean of over 
10% to 21%.  
The identification of such correlations between the partisan composition of 
teacher union campaign donations, other economic variables, and the number of labor-
restrictive proposals aimed at K-12 teachers supports claims that collective bargaining 
reforms targeting teachers are both fiscally and politically motivated. First, the 
percentage of overall political donations contributed to Democratic candidates by state-
based teachers unions is correlated with a more intense, anti-teacher reform agenda. 
Conversely, higher percentages of donations to Republicans by teachers unions has the 
opposite effect of diminishing the number of proposals aimed at weakening K-12 
teachers’ collective bargaining rights. Next, larger annual amounts spent on political 
activities and campaigns (to candidates from either party) by teachers unions also has a 
muting effect on the occupational targeting of teachers in state reform agendas. In other 
words, in states where teachers unions have a stronger legacy as political actors, they 
were less vulnerable to being singled out for reform during the Recession. Lawmakers 
alternatively sought more frequently to target teachers for reforms when they were more 
likely to be seen as an exclusive ally of the Democratic Party. Conversely, in places 
where teachers unions contributed more money to Republican candidates, they were more 
likely to be insulated from collective bargaining reforms. Such findings suggest that 
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where teachers unions are friendly to both parties, rather than just the Democrats, they 
managed to avoid more concerted attacks on their collective bargaining rights. 
Moreover, I previously highlighted the lack of an equivalent reform agenda 
directed toward public safety personnel in spite of the observation that public safety 
occupations enjoy a high degree of union influence—and hence compensation, job 
security, and fringe benefits—that is relatively comparable to that of K-12 employees. As 
such, it appears contradictory for state legislative agendas to have primarily targeted 
teachers for reputed cost-saving reforms while recusing police and corrections officers 
from the agenda. I therefore argue that attacks on teachers unions were largely politically 
motivated. The questions then becomes: can this logic be extended to account for the 
relative lack of reform activity targeting the collective bargaining rights of police 
officers, state troopers, and correction guards? 
Put differently, if teachers are being more vigorously targeted in states where their 
unions are antagonistic to the Republican Party, then perhaps public safety unions aren’t 
being targeted in states where they are historically more Republican-friendly. In the 
sections that follow, I ask whether the dearth of labor-restrictive reforms directed 
specifically at public safety unions is explained by politics motivations as well. In light of 
the observation that public safety unions are not wholly antagonistic toward the 
Republican Party, and in fact are sometimes decidedly pro-Republican, I consider the 
relationship between public safety unions’ partisan loyalties and their vulnerability to 
collective bargaining restrictions. 
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IF TEACHERS, WHY NOT COPS? 
Nationwide, K-12 teachers were particularly vulnerable to efforts aimed at 
curtailing their collective bargaining rights during the Great Recession. Additionally, 
some states stand out as being more antagonistic toward teachers and their unions than 
others during this time. I discuss several factors that may help explain this phenomenon 
including underfunded state budgets, lawmakers’ policy objectives, and unions’ political 
commitments. While my research utilizes state variation to expand our understanding of 
the political and policy objective underpinning reforms targeting teachers, I do not seek 
to discount the genuine fiscal pressures that lawmakers confronted surrounding the 
downturn, and that many continue to grapple with during the “post-recovery” phase. 
Indeed, I acknowledge the impossibility of balancing state budgets without making cuts 
to public education, as K-12 education remains the largest expenditure from state funding 
sources (NASBO 2014).  
However, as I have also previously argued: not all collective bargaining reforms 
are created equally. I maintain that there is a fundamental difference between proposals 
that require public school employees to contribute more toward their pensions and health 
care, and the right-to-work legislation that states like Wisconsin and Michigan enacted 
that strips teachers of core collective bargining abilities. Furthermore, if stripping 
collective bargaining rights is to be lumped in with less-restrictive, “fiscally necessary” 
reforms, then why weren’t other large segments of the state and local workforce equally 
exposed to such efforts? If teachers, then why not cops? 
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Public safety employees’ salaries and benefits are paid out of the second largest 
state expenditure category (Kyckelhahn 2014). And yet, uniformed personnel like police 
officers and fire fighters were conspicuously exempted from sweeping right-to-work 
legislation enacted in Wisconsin and Michigan that leadership touted as fiscally 
necessary to repair state budgets. Further, my examination of bill introductions data 
reveals that these are not isolated cases. Rather, I find a notable dearth of collective 
bargaining restrictions aimed at public safety employees being introduced across the vast 
majority of states during the Great Recession. If lawmakers’ budget-based claims are 
true, then why weren’t police officers and correction guards at equal risk of having their 
collective bargaining rights curbed as part of states’ fiscal adjustment strategies?  
Various perspectives seek to illuminate what appears as a “teachers versus cops” 
phenomenon in state collective bargaining reform agendas. First, many maintain that 
because the work of police officers and other first responders is unique, they rightly 
should enjoy a higher standard of workforce protections. (This argument is however 
complicated by Governors who tout right-to-work laws as being about increasing 
“fairness” in the workplace). Related to this, perhaps citizens hold a deep-seated 
commitment to maintaining public safety and order that leads us to prefer that lawmakers 
leave police officers out of the fight over collective bargaining. After all, who wants to 
tick off the people tasked with protecting and defending us, particularly during a time of 
economic discontent? In this way, lawmakers may actually be trying to avoid electoral 
punishment by concentrating on teachers instead. However, others reflect that lawmakers 
utilized public distrust in government and economic discontent surrounding the downturn 
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as an opportunity to “divide and conquer” the public sector. Finally, claims that 
exemptions for uniformed personnel can be traced to blatant, politically-motivated 
preferentialism abound. I next elaborate upon the justifications that have been offered by 
lawmakers, labor leaders, and media outlets to explain why public safety employees have 
been largely insulated from recent assaults on public employees’ collective bargaining 
rights 
Republican Governors like Rick Snyder (MI), Scott Walker (WI), and most 
recently, Bruce Rauner of Illinois have offered similar rationales to explain why their 
states’ efforts to curtail public employees’ collective bargaining rights did not include 
“uniformed personnel.” Namely, that occupational exemptions are rooted in the unique 
nature of the duties that certain employees perform. For instance, when asked to explain 
why police officers and firefighters were exempted from the public sector collective 
bargaining restrictions that went into effect in 2011, Wisconsin Gov. Walker cited public 
safety concerns. Specifically, Walker said that he did not want to risk police and 
firefighters walking out on their jobs in protest of the rule changes, saying “that’s not an 
area to mess around with” (Bice 2011). Gov. Rick Snyder offered a similar justification 
for the framing of his state’s 2012 right-to-work legislation. This law repealed public 
employee unions’ abilities to levy “fair share fees” on non-members and prohibited 
striking, among other things. However, it did not apply to thousands of workers covered 
by the approximately 1700 bargaining units in that state representing municipal police 
officers and firefighters. According to Snyder, such workers are in a “unique 
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circumstance” due to the “dangerous nature of their work” that places them in a different 
category than other public employees (Daum 2012).  
Echoing this, Michigan lawmakers who supported the legislation said that it did 
not apply to police and firefighters because they were already barred from striking and 
subject to resolving disputes through binding arbitration instead, which the new law made 
applicable to all [other] public employees. Additionally, when asked to comment on why 
teachers unions, who were also previously restricted from striking were included under 
the act, lawmakers remarked that it was because they have a history of disregarding the 
law and striking anyway (Haglund 2012). Interestingly, in 2015, Republican state 
Representative Gary Glenn sought to extend Michigan’s right-to-work legislation to 
include public safety personnel, saying that he “never understood” why the original law 
did not apply to police, fire, and state troopers. However, another [Democratic] state 
lawmaker responded skeptically to Glenn’s proposal, saying: “Attempting to cut costs by 
weakening unions that are looking out for the best interests of our police and firefighters 
doesn't just hurt those public servants - it puts the public safety at risk” (Tower 2015). 
Such sentiment aligns with previous comments offered by Republicans to explain for 
why police and fire were left out of the initial legislation.  
Finally, a few “post-Recession” (but not post-state budget crisis) reforms 
underway in Oklahoma and Illinois in 2015 are also worthy of mention. Bruce Rauner of 
Illinois, for instance, appears to be emulating Walker and Snyder’s “targeted” approach 
to restricting public employee collective bargaining rights. After assuming office in 2015, 
Rauner went on the immediate offensive against state public employee unions by signing 
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an executive order barring them from assessing “fair share” fees. Shortly thereafter, the 
Governor presented his budget proposal to the Illinois legislature outlining steep cuts to 
pensions for all public employees—except, notably—police officers and firefighters. In 
defending this particular policy innovation during his budget address, Rauner stated: 
“Those who put their lives on the line in service to our state deserve to be treated 
differently” (Scheiber 2015). By the same token, an Oklahoma “paycheck protection” act 
was enacted in April of 2015 that barred teachers unions from collecting dues via 
automatic payroll deduction, while exempting police officers and firefighters unions from 
such restrictions (Murphy 2015).  
Such examples suggest that the trend of lawmakers exempting public safety 
personnel from broader public employee reforms has continued beyond the time frame 
considered by my analysis of state bill introductions. Detractors have pointed out, 
however, that many of the justifications offered to support restricting teachers’ collective 
bargaining rights but not police officers fall flat when assessed on their merits. Rather, 
they point out, these exemptions have the effect of driving a wedge between different 
groups of workers. As such, they may be part of a long-term political strategy aimed at 
permanently diminishing the influence of organized labor.  
Public safety employees and labor leaders expressed mixed reactions to being left 
out of sweeping public sector collective bargaining reforms enacted in Wisconsin and 
Michigan surrounding the Great Recession. On the one hand, some agreed that they 
indeed warranted special consideration due to the unique and potentially dangerous 
nature of their work. Said Dave Hiller of the Michigan Fraternal Order of Police, “Our 
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position is, given conditions we work under, we believe we are held to a higher standard 
than the average labor union,” (Hagland 2012). On the other, many felt uneasy about 
being pit against their labor brethren. However, driving a wedge between different groups 
of public employees might have been an essential part of the political strategy to enact 
public sector right-to-work laws.  
This is because garnering public support for such proposals tends to hinge on the 
popularity (or unpopularity) of the groups they target (Schreiber 2015). Perhaps, then, 
lawmakers carve out exemptions for police officers and firefighters when pursuing 
collective bargaining restrictions simply because it helps in courting public support (or 
avoid political punishment). As labor relations professor at the University of Illinois, 
Robert Bruno, observes: “When you get into structural differences, you’re hard pressed to 
see why anyone would argue that one group should be left out…This has to have more to 
do with the fact that it’s politically dangerous to attack these people” (Scheiber 2015). 
Therefore, as long as police officers and firefighters are viewed heroically by large 
swaths of the public (which might not be for much longer following recent controversies 
over police officers’ shootings of unarmed black men), it might be easier to exempt them 
from the reform agenda.  
The idea that lawmakers may have a strategic interest in dividing organized labor 
in order to conquer is given further credence by examples from state initiative, 
referendum, and recall campaigns occurring in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin over 
collective bargaining rights. For instance, police and fire fighters didn’t work alongside 
Michigan teachers unions to support a statewide initiative campaign that would have 
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enshrined collective bargaining rights in the constitution. Resultantly, Michigan’s 
“Proposal 2” failed to pass, paving the way for the state legislature to enact right-to-work 
legislation (exempting public safety) a few months later (Haglund 2012). Conversely, 
Ohio’s Senate Bill 5, a right-to-work law that would have impacted all public employees 
in the state, was decisively repealed by voter referendum in 2011 after a successful state-
wide campaign led by firefighters, police officers and teachers.  
Finally, in the wake of imposing draconian collective bargaining restrictions on 
teachers, but not cops and firemen, Wisconsin’s Scott Walker was able to both survive a 
massive recall effort in 2012 and win reelection in 2014. Walker was also endorsed by 
key public safety unions in his 2014 gubernatorial bid. Citing the Governor’s “strong 
commitment to public safety,” the Milwaukee Police Association, the Milwaukee Police 
Supervisors’ Organization, and the Milwaukee Professional Firefighters Association 
expressed their support for the Walker’s re-election (ScottWalker.com 2014). Such 
examples suggest that exempting public safety personnel from right-to-work laws may be 
a crucial element to their success and durability. Accounting for the political ambition of 
these reforms’ architects further indicates that driving a wedge between organized labor 
is viewed as a savvy political strategy by those with higher aspirations. Walker’s success 
in his 2016 presidential bid will certainly shed light on whether this calculation is proven 
correct. 
Now, there plenty of reasons to assume that public safety unions are not 
antagonistic toward, and may in reality be supporters of the Republic Party. The first is 
demographic; the vast majority of police officers, state troopers, and correction guards 
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are men, and among these about 75% are white (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2015). In 
observation of recent trends in the partisan identification and voting behavior of white 
men, it seems plausible, then, to assume that rank-and-file public safety union members 
are not strong Democrats. This is because about 43% of white men identify as 
independents and 33% identify as Republicans, while only 20% identify as Democrats. 
The next is ideological: public safety unions are concerned with issues related to law and 
order. They promote policies like “3 strikes” laws and tougher sentencing guidelines, and 
support “stop and frisk” and “broken windows” community policing strategies. 
Resultantly, public safety unions are likely to align with Republican candidates due to the 
Party’s longstanding efforts to appear “tough on crime” by supporting of such 
mechanisms for promoting law and order (Piven and Cloward  1993; Beckett 1997; Soss 
2011; Page 2013). Finally, remaining on good terms with the Republican Party may just 
be a wise strategy for unions to employ.  
Joshua Page illustrates the logic underpinning the relationship between public 
safety unions and the Republican Party in his analysis of the California Correction Peace 
Officers Association (CCPOA): 
Whereas other large public sector unions in California such as the California 
Teachers Association and California State Employees Association predictably 
align with Democrats, the CCPOA is—and  has been from its inception—
nonpartisan…The organization’s commitment to nonpartisan politics flows from 
its politically realistic philosophy. The CCPOA builds relationships with 
politicians who advance its cause, regardless of party label. (Page 2013, 54). 
 
According to Page, the CCPOA has risen in stature in California politics over the years as 
a direct result of behaving in what he terms as a “politically realistic” strategy whereby 
political friends are rewarded and enemies are punished. Nonpartisanship is an essential 
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element of this strategy because it allows the CCPOA to remain uncaptured, and hence 
able to take advantage of its ability to threaten and reward political leaders into 
compliance with its policy objectives. He argues: “Because the CCPOA is nonpartisan, 
both Democrats and Republicans seek (and get in almost equal measure) the CCPOA’s 
endorsement and money” (Page 2013, 55). In support of this, Page observes that the 
CCPOA contributed 63% to Democrats and 37% to Republicans in 2005 and over 1.7 
million and 1.4 million dollars to the California Democratic and Republican Parties, 
respectively, over the decade beginning in the early 2000s. As such, Page’s analysis 
sheds light on importance of remaining uncaptured by either political party to the 
CCPOA’s political success. Taken together, demographic, ideological, and strategic 
concerns serve to demonstrate that public safety unions are not automatic Democratic 
loyalists or Republican antagonizers. 
My data collection on the partisan composition of political donations made by the 
largest police, corrections, and trooper unions in each state confirms this. Public safety 
officers unions (omitting firefighters) are significant contributors to the Republican Party, 
however, this is not to say that they do not also contribute to Democrats. Averaged over 
the past 30 years, the “top two” state public safety unions have contributed roughly 28% 
of their overall contributions to Republican candidates and 44% to Democrats. Moreover, 
when you incorporate the “top three” public safety unions, donations to Republicans 
increase to 34% while Democratic donations remain the same. (See Appendix 4). 
This reflects the fact that in any given state, there exist several municipal and 
state-based police, corrections, and highway patrol organizations who may have opposing 
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or mixed partisan loyalties. Moreover, although public safety unions in aggregate appear 
to favor Democrats, there are many states in which they contribute decisively more to 
Republicans, or at least roughly equivalent amounts. For example, Republicans received 
over half of public safety unions’ political donations in in ten states including New York, 
Arizona, and Texas. The GOP further received at least 25% of overall political 
contributions from the “top two” public safety unions in half of the fifty states, including 
Wisconsin, where police unions contributed over 40% of their overall campaign 
donations to Republicans. Might this explain why public safety employees were 
exempted from Wisconsin’s and Michigan’s sweeping right-to-work style public sector 
reforms?  
Moreover, the “top two” state-based teachers unions have contributed a meager 
11% of their overall campaign dollars to Republican candidates over the past 30 years; 
this figure was 57% for the Democratic Party. Indeed, there are a few outliers like 
Missouri, where Republicans received 39% of donations and Illinois where the GOP 
received roughly 25%. But overall, the difference between teachers unions and police 
unions is stark: in 30 of the 50 states, teachers unions contributed fewer than 10% of their 
campaign dollars to Republican candidates and in no states did teachers unions donate a 
majority of their funds to Republicans. Such evidence suggests that teachers unions are 
largely “captured” by the Democratic Party in the vast majority of the American States. 
Public Safety unions, on the other hand, are a mixed bag whose partisan loyalties (and 
coffers) are potentially up for grabs. This may explain why Republican politicians 
aggressively sought to restrict teachers’ collective bargaining rights while remaining 
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more neutral toward public safety officers: they had nothing to lose (in provoking 
teachers unions), but everything to gain (by appeasing police unions).  
THE IMPLCATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL TARGETING 
Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin serve as important cases in point to illustrate my 
overall contention that reforms directed at teachers were politically motivated, and that 
being aligned with or at least not antagonistic toward the Republican party may have 
served to protect police officers bargaining rights. In all three states, we find unified 
Republican governments undertaking comprehensive public sector collective bargaining 
overhauls under the leadership of Governors Kasich, Walker, and Snyder. In Ohio, 
however, Kasich targeted all public employees for the repeal of their collective 
bargaining rights, whereas Michigan and Wisconsin’s laws carved our special 
exemptions for public safety personnel. When you compare the partisan breakdown of 
these two states campaign donations you also find that in Wisconsin, public safety unions 
were considerably more active and pro-Republican than in Ohio, where public safety 
unions only gave between 13-15% of their donations to either party. 
Interestingly, Wisconsin’s collective bargaining reforms have also proved 
considerably more durable than Ohio’s. Ohio’s reforms were unable to withstand a voter 
referendum, but in spite of multiple court challenges to key provisions of his legislation, 
most of Wisconsin’s reforms remain in effect at the time of this writing. Walker 
withstood a recall election and was then reelected. This may explain why Walker was 
emboldened to extend his measures to the private sector in 2015, making Wisconsin the 
25th “right-to-work” state. While I am unable to conclude that being a major campaign 
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contributor to Republican candidates helped to insulate public safety unions from attacks 
on their collective bargaining rights, I do conjecture that being anti-Republican hurt 
teachers, and that being more ambivalent (or perhaps strategic) in their partisan loyalties 
appears to have helped public safety employees. Finally,  
As we have seen, various political, fiscal, and economic rationales can be offered 
to explain why restricting public sector collective bargaining was a prominent part of 
state legislative agenda surrounding the Great Recession. Nonetheless, even in states 
pursuing intense anti-union agendas, legislative activity often targeted particular sectors 
within the government workforce for reform, notably K-12 teachers, while exempting or 
remaining silent on other public employees' rights. Related to this, I have revealed an 
additional, crucial distinction in the content of labor relations proposals: the occupational 
target of reforms. Academics and activists tends to assume that public employees were 
uniformly targeted for collective bargaining restrictions during the Recession. This is 
because conservative lawmakers were met with dual incentives to pursue cost-saving, 
union-weakening public sector workforce reforms during the Recession: personnel costs 
driven up by health insurance and pensions consume roughly half of state expenditures 
(McNichol 2012). However, divergent vulnerability to reform is also identifiable within 
the public sector, with K-12 teachers standing out as an occupational group most likely to 
be targeted by labor-restrictive legislation.  
In light of such observations, we begin to understand how reformers may have 
seized upon the narrative of teachers as an overpaid, yet underperforming class of 
workers in order to justify the repeal of their collective bargaining rights in the name of 
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much-needed education and fiscal reform. However, as a counterpoint to such arguments, 
or perhaps a point of clarification, I suggest that this notion that union-empowered K-12 
teachers occupy a privileged economic position (but somehow police officers and 
firefighters do not) needs to be placed within the broader political economy of the 
American labor market, and in particular, to be understood in light of observable 
gendered dimensions of the Great Recession and Recovery.   
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: “PENSION ENVY” AND THE “GREAT 
MANCESSION” 
 
The term “pension envy” has been used to describe the jealous resentment 
expressed by private sector workers toward public employees, whom they perceive 
enjoying superior fringe benefits like defined-benefit pensions and low-deductible, 
employer subsidized health care plans (Anderson and Mitchell 2009). A fair amount of 
debate centering on this issue arose during the Great Recession, pitting the private 
workforce and “Tea-party” conservatives against public pensioners and labor unions. 
However, a host of recent scholarship identifying gender-based patterns of dislocation 
during the recession and recovery phases surrounding the 2008-2009 economic crisis 
brings another perspective to this discussion. Following this, I posit: what becomes of 
pension envy when the gender profile of workers in major industries is taken into 
account? Put differently, what difference does it make that the majority of those with 
such “enviable pensions” are women employed by the government, while the majority of 
those with “pension envy” are actually men working in private industry? 
During the economic downturn, observers called attention to the narrowing gap 
between men’s and women’s workforce participation as a result of increases in male 
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unemployment relative to women’s. At the height of the recession, it thus became 
fashionable to emphasize the dislocation of male workers from the labor market as 
evidence of a “Man-Cession” plaguing the US economy (Contessi and Li 2013). Because 
the manufacturing and construction trades experienced more job losses than the (heavily 
feminized) public sector, at least initially, the recession was characterized as a major 
economic and psychological blow to male workers. Peterson observes: “In broader social 
commentary, the ‘Mancession’ loomed large as a threat to the ‘American Dream’, and the 
rise in women’s share of the work force was viewed as a manifestation of men’s 
declining power and status” (2015). So it was highlighted during the recession that men 
lost far more jobs than women simply due to the fact that labor markets are gendered, 
with a preponderance of men working in the manufacturing and construction trades, 
which are highly vulnerable to economic shocks, while women tend to occupy service 
and public sector jobs in education and health care, which are more resistant to market 
forces.  
However, various transformations to the US economy have occurred since the 
latter-half of the 20th century to ostensibly weaken the economic status of male workers 
relative to their female counterparts. I suggest that the Great Recession (or Mancession) 
merely served to highlight the significance of these ongoing processes, which include: 
technological change, globalization, and the decline of the US manufacturing sector, the 
growth of the service economy, private sector wage stagnation and benefit restructuring, 
the feminization of the public sector, and the divergence of public and private sector 
unionization. By drawing attention to male private-sector workers’ “disproportionate” (or 
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proportionate, when male labor force participation rates are factored in) job losses during 
the downturn compared to the relative job security enjoyed by the heavily feminized 
public sector, reformers and the mainstream media pit working men and women against 
each other in a zero-sum game in which protecting the jobs and benefits of (female) K-12 
teachers is seen as coming at the expense of male employment and income in the form of 
increased taxes.  
Reforming teachers’ collective bargaining rights, then, becomes justifiable as part 
of an economic policy aimed at “getting the men back to work.” Additionally, factoring 
in gendered beliefs about breadwinning and what is “fair” compensation may shed light 
on why the advent of male software engineers or construction workers earning 80k+ a 
year seems more palatable to the American public than female school teachers with equal 
or more education earning 60k, plus full pension and health care benefits (Contessi and 
Li 2013). Finally, If the proliferation of “right-to-work” laws and other de-unionizing 
efforts serve as any indicator, it appears that private workers seeking to take a feminized 
public workforce and K-12 teaching profession “down a peg” (by bringing their 
compensation and benefits more in line with theirs) have largely won the argument.  
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CHAPTER 5: ARE UNIONS STILL THE “MOST POWERFUL FORCE IN THE 
COUNTRY”? 
 
In a special issue of The Forum on Labor in American Politics in 2012, Fred 
Siegal avowed public employee unions to be the “most powerful political force in the 
country.” As evidence of this, Siegal maintains that public sector unions have flourished 
in both good times and bad—especially at the local level—whereby police officers, 
firefighters, and teachers have been typically insulated from making concessions (as 
opposed to federal and state government employees). He argues that this is due to the 
local political entrenchment of unions who effectively “elect their bosses” and then 
deploy an army of professional negotiators to protect their members’ interests in 
resultantly friendly employer-employee negotiations. In this way, Siegal’s account 
exemplifies the reading of public employees as political “insiders” who are able to shape 
government policy due to their unique ability to reward loyalty and punish opposition. 
Moreover, these friendly relations found between politicians and public 
employees via their unions are primarily occurring within the Democratic Party, where 
public sector unions have come to serve as an important local mobilizing force. 
Resultantly, the interests of the working class have been subordinated to the interests of 
public employees, whose generous salaries and benefits are rationalized as a model for all 
workers, to be realized through government intervention. As such, Siegal argues that 
there is a “utopian element” underlying the support of public sector unions because (by 
securing gains for a narrow segment of the new working class) they represent “an 
embossed version of an idealized future that’s been realized on a limited terrain” (2012). 
Siegal states, “The argument is that public employees are the vanguard of the working 
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class. As such, the benefits they achieve will eventually have to be matched by private 
sector employers” (2012). Public employee unions have thus managed to expand their 
political power as a result of maintaining friendly alliances with Democratic politicians 
while garnering popular support for the plight of government employees under the 
auspices that the job protections and benefits will somehow “trickle down” to the 
working class at large. But are public employee unions still such a powerful force? Will 
they continue to be, moving forward?  
On this topic, Siegal concludes his polemic agnostically (which was published 
shortly before a coalition of labor unions failed to unseat Scott Walker from the 
governorship of Wisconsin). However, there is no question that during the Great 
Recession, the alliances that public sector unions rely upon to fuel their political 
influence began to break down, first because working-class resentment toward public 
employees increased as the financial crisis dragged on, and second, as Democrats lost 
political control of many state legislatures and governorships during the 2010 midterms. 
By identifying relationships between state economic and political conditions and the 
direction, intensity, and occupational target of collective bargaining reform agendas this 
project contributes to our understanding of where and why organized labor lost influence 
in the era surrounding the Great Recession.  
I argue that the crippling downturn caused by the collapse of housing and 
financial markets stoked economic uncertainty among the working class. As a result, the 
predominantly non-unionized private sector began to feel envious toward public 
employees due to their disproportionate job security and relative insulation from the 
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crisis, especially in contexts and sectors of strong unionization. Finally, in states 
experiencing protracted fiscal stress materializing in budget crises a political opening was 
created for strategic politicians awaiting such an opportunity to weaken the influence of 
organized labor in order to both diminish their political opponents’ base of support and 
facilitate market-driven policy reforms, particularly in the field of public education. 
Consequentially, the “insider” status of public employee unions has been diminished in 
states that successfully implemented reforms.  
Overall unionization now sits at a historic low, with around 11% of the American 
workforce reporting belonging to a union in 2014. Much of this nationwide decline can 
be attributed to significant drop-offs in states like Michigan where unionization dropped 
from 16.3% to 14.5% between 2013 and 2014 after the enactment of sweeping right-to-
work legislation. However, between 2010 and 2014 many states that did not have a right-
to-work laws in place (at that time) experienced diminished unionization due in particular 
to the enactment of collective bargaining restrictions imposed upon public employees 
(effectively right-to-work laws targeting just public employees). In Wisconsin (which 
became right-to-work in 2015), for example, union membership declined from 14.2% in 
2010 to 11.7 percent by 2014. Similarly, in Indiana, unionization declined by 2.3 percent 
during this period. Much steeper declines were also observed in Pennsylvania (13.7%), 
Washington (13.4%), Connecticut (11.3%), Ohio (9.3%), and Minnesota (9.1%) 
(Milewski 2015).  
Such findings suggest that the pace of deunionization has continued well into the 
recovery phase of the recession. This is because although prominent American 
  160 
economists began declaring that the American recession was over in the summer of 2009, 
the impact of the downtown continued to reverberate across the American states for 
several years thereafter (The Economist 2015). Indeed, the “Great Recession” eviscerated 
state revenues more than any single economic downturn on record. In 2012, state 
revenues still lagged 5.5% below pre-recession levels, and by the summer of 2015 several 
states including Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Wisconsin still 
confronted significant budget shortfalls approaching fiscal year 2016 (Oliff 2012; 
Bosman 2015). Such persisting budget problems can be attributed to a combination of 
policy decisions including neglect of payment for pension obligation, tax cuts failing to 
boost economic inactivity, still-stagnant housing markets, and flagging oil revenue. The 
array of spending-reducing policy solutions also continues to include things that impact 
public employees such as layoffs, furloughs, benefit reform, and restrictions to collective 
bargaining. As the recovery continues, albeit slowly and unevenly across the states, 
public employees continue to be cast as convenient scapegoats for state budget woes by 
strategic lawmakers seeking to use public sector unions as political pawns. 
CONVENIENT SCAPEGOATS AND POLITICAL PAWNS 
By highlighting state-level patterning in collective bargaining reform agendas, my 
research draws attention to the widespread labor relations reform project occurring across 
the American states surrounding the Great Recession. A resounding observation 
emerging from this project and similar studies is that reformist state lawmakers went on 
the offensive against organized labor during the Recession (Kersten 2011; McCartin 
2011; Slater 2012; Vail 2013). Nonetheless, disagreement exists about the factors 
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underlying the push for reform. On the one hand, politicians have repeatedly cited dire 
state economic conditions for creating the impetus to restructure public sector labor 
relations in order to reduce government spending on public pensions, health care benefits, 
and other personnel costs. On the other hand, critics (mostly from the left) decry the 
recent wave of collective bargaining reform activity as a concerted partisan maneuver 
aimed at hobbling public sector unions as the last bastion of the American labor 
movement—and the Democratic Party along with them. 
For instance, according to McCartin (2011), public workers proved to be 
“convenient scapegoats” for newly-empowered Republican lawmakers tasked with 
balancing state budgets following the 2010 midterms in the midst of Recession. Myriad 
examples of state governments successfully restricting collective bargaining rights for 
broad segments of the workforce serve to support this assessment. My analysis in chapter 
2 of bill introduction patterns occurring from 2007-2014 also comports with this account: 
I show that labor-restrictive reform activity surged during this eight year period and 
spiked during the 2009-2010 session coinciding with the Recession’s peak and the GOP 
takeover of many state governments. However, I complicate the received wisdom that 
these reforms are merely political by showing that states with worse economic conditions 
did indeed pursue more intensive anti-labor reform agendas. Public employees may have 
been “scapegoated” during the recession, but fiscal factors appear to have enabled this 
course. 
I argue that such findings indicate that not all labor-restrictive reforms were 
rooted solely in political maneuvering—genuine fiscal imperatives also existed to compel 
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reforms. This is observable when the substance of public sector reforms pursued by states 
experiencing fiscal strain is evaluated. In chapter 3, I take the content of collective 
bargaining reforms into account to reveal that states cluster in their preferred reform 
toolkits or “packages” aimed at addressing the “union problem” during a fiscal crisis. 
Citing examples of enacted reforms in both Massachusetts and New Jersey, I illustrate 
that labor reforms putatively aimed at reducing government spending in response to 
revenue shortfalls are not all created equally.  
Following this, I maintain that state reform agendas rooted in restricting labor 
union influence rather than labor union formation reflect fundamentally different ways of 
restructuring labor relations. Reform agendas characterized by the former, for instance, 
may reflect an earnest effort to rein in public pensions and health care spending by 
restricting labor union influence during contract negotiations. Reform agendas 
characterized by the latter, however, are more illustrative of the labor offensive observed 
by McCartin (2011) because they readily seek to impede bargaining unit certification and 
dis-incentivize union membership. Such reforms pose stark implications for the destiny 
of organized labor in the states where they have been successfully implemented.  
As we have seen, various political, fiscal, and economic rationales have been 
offered to explain why restricting public sector collective bargaining became a prominent 
component of state legislative agenda surrounding the Great Recession. Nonetheless, 
even in states pursuing intense anti-union agendas, legislative activity often targeted 
particular sectors within the government workforce for reform, notably K-12 teachers, 
while exempting or remaining silent on other public employees' collective bargaining 
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rights. Related to this, I seek to reveal an additional, crucial distinction in the substance of 
labor relations proposals: the occupational target of reforms.  
Academics and activists tends to assume that public employees were uniformly 
targeted for collective bargaining restrictions during the Recession. This is because 
conservative lawmakers were met with dual incentives to pursue cost-saving, union-
weakening public sector workforce reforms during the Recession. First, personnel costs 
driven up by health insurance and pensions consume roughly half of state expenditures 
(McNichol 2012). Next, public employee unions have grown in membership and political 
influence in recent years, emerging as important actors in state and local politics who 
tend to support Democratic candidates and causes. Resultantly, restricting collective 
bargaining for public employees was desirable as both sound fiscal policy and savvy 
political strategy.  
Private sector workers and their unions, on the other hand, were not at the locus of 
debates occurring over labor relations during the economic downturn. Although some 
bills aimed at private sector workers did crop up in state legislatures across the country, 
especially prevailing wage and project labor agreement restrictions, these mostly applied 
to government contractors. This is because private sector unionization is miniscule in 
most states, and even where it is relatively high (like Alaska), such workers’ salaries and 
benefits (unless they are contracts) are not paid by taxpayers. Beginning from a weakened 
political position and deemed less relevant to state and local revenues, the unionized 
segment of the private workforce was understandably less vulnerable to efforts aimed at 
weakening their collective bargaining rights than public employees. However, divergent 
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vulnerability to reform is identifiable within the public sector, with K-12 teachers 
standing out as the occupational group most likely to be targeted by labor-restrictive 
legislation (See Table 17). 
In chapter 4, I draw attention to the disproportionate focus on restricting teachers’ 
collective bargaining rights in state labor relations reform agendas, as well as variation in 
the intensity of such targeting. I observe that in 17 states, upwards of 20% of labor-
restrictive reforms pursued between 2007-2014 aimed to specifically curtail teachers’ 
union organizing and contract negotiating rights. I then seek to evaluate key rationales 
that have been provided to explain the scapegoating of public employees broadly, and 
teachers particularly, during the Great Recession. Following the revelation that state 
fiscal characteristics such as weak budget reserves, underfunded pension liabilities, and 
high unemployment rates are related to more intense-anti-labor reform agendas, I 
examine the relationship between the political loyalties (assessed in terms of partisan 
campaign contributions) of state-based teachers unions and their vulnerability to reform. I 
find that campaign contributions to Democrats by teachers unions (as a percentage of 
overall political donations) are positively correlated with labor-restrictive bill 
introductions specifically targeting teachers. Conversely, when Republican candidates 
receive a larger portion of teachers unions’ political donations, fewer “anti-teacher” labor 
relations reforms were introduced. Finally, as teachers unions’ average annual political 
spending (to any party, or to issue campaigns) is increased, fewer teacher-restrictive 
collective bargaining reforms are also found.  
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In light of these observations, I conjecture that K-12 teachers were less likely to 
be singled out for collective bargaining restrictions where their unions are more 
politically active and “uncaptured” by either party. Under such contexts, teachers unions 
are able to operate as true political insiders, exercising their clout by flexing their 
financial resources to award loyalty and punish dissent. In a state like Missouri, for 
example, teachers unions have historically contributed nearly 40% of their overall 
political donations to Republican candidates. Resultantly, significantly fewer labor-
restrictive reforms singling out teachers were introduced by lawmakers in the state during 
the timeframe included in the analysis. Moreover, when right-to-work legislation was 
passed by the Republican-controlled Missouri legislature in 2015, it would have applied 
to all sectors and categories of workers (had it not been vetoed by Democratic Governor 
Jay Nixon).  
However, the reality is that most state-based teachers unions overwhelmingly 
back Democratic candidates and causes. In sum, over two-thirds of state-based teachers 
unions donated over half of their monies to Democratic candidates (with 16 of these 
donating over 75%). Therefore it makes sense that teachers were particularly vulnerable 
to the retrenchment of their collective bargaining rights coinciding with the recession and 
2010 GOP mid-term takeover of many state legislatures and governorships, especially in 
contexts where teachers unions are most active supporters of the Democratic Party. In 
this way, teachers have come to serve as pawns in partisan political contests, with their 
collective bargaining rights increasingly at stake in contexts where strategic Republican 
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lawmakers are seeking to undercut their Democratic rivals through the weakening of an 
important base of support in state teachers unions. 
Following this, I seek to explain another aspect of occupational divergence in 
state collective bargaining reform agendas: the exemption of public safety personnel such 
as police officers and firefighters from many states’ labor-restrictive agendas. This is 
observable both at the level of individual bill introductions targeting public safety 
workers, which were much less frequent that those targeting K-12 employees, and at the 
level of enacted sweeping legislation like Wisconsin’s Budget Repair bill, which 
notoriously exempted uniformed personnel from its most draconian provisions such as 
annual bargaining unit recertification and barring the practice of collecting “fair share 
fees” from non-union members.  
I suggest that the notable exemption of public employees like police officers and 
fire fighters from state reform agendas might be related to the partisan loyalties of public 
safety unions in a similar, but inverse way to teachers unions. This assessment stems 
from the observation that public safety unions are not uniformly supportive of the 
Democratic Party. Indeed, significant state-level variation exists in police, corrections, 
and firefighter unions’ partisan candidate endorsements and campaign contributions. For 
example, in roughly one-third of the states, the top two state-based police officers unions 
directed 15-40% of their political donations to Republican candidates (See Tables 20 & 
21). As such, I conjecture that public safety unions were a less desirable target for 
Republican lawmakers who seized upon the recession as an opportunity to impose 
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collective bargaining restrictions on [some] public sector workers in order to weaken the 
Democrats’ base of support.  
In sum, this project indicates that the Great Recession ushered in a new, more 
precarious era for public employee unions in the United States. This is a significant 
development, given that influential unions representing government employees had come 
to operate as political insiders, particularly at the state and local levels. As such, I suggest 
that several factors will continue to impact the political influence of public sector 
unions—and negotiating power of public employees along with them. These are union 
density, union strategy, the legal playing field, public opinion and state fiscal conditions. 
In particular, the ability to work with both parties in order to avoid being captured (or 
targeted) may prove particularly advantageous for public sector unions in the post-Great 
Recession era. For example, although the International Association of Firefighters (which 
has state-level affiliates across the country) acknowledges that there were a “large 
number of Republican governors” who wanted to “eviscerate” [unions], they are still a 
self-proclaimed “leaning-right union” who willingly entertained speeches by Republican 
Presidential candidates at a 2015 forum.  
Moving forward, future research should be attuned to examining whether public 
sector unions have begun to shift their strategic alliances by flexing their considerable 
financial clout in order to court favor from both sides of the aisle. Additionally, 
scholarship should consider the ways in which labor relations reforms aimed at public 
sector restructuring serve to promote projects of neoliberalism related to public education 
and government service provisioning. Finally, I argue that the 2016 election cycle will 
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provide a unique lens into the current state of organized labor, as politicians situate 
themselves in debates related to minimum wage laws, public sector compensation, 
workers’ rights, “right-to-work” and the role that labor unions can and should continue to 
play in defending the interests of the working class. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS GOING INTO THE 2016 ELECTIONS 
Although my data collection on collective bargaining reforms proposals 
encapsulates the time period between 2007-2014, various recent examples suggest that 
labor-restrictive activity will remain on the menu for state lawmakers and governors 
confronting challenging budget climates. Indeed, several ongoing confrontations between 
public employee unions and politicians serve to highlight the ongoing tension between 
organized labor and leaders in state government. In Nevada, for instance, Republican 
lawmakers introduced legislation in 2015 that the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) quickly dubbed the “Union Armageddon Bill.” This legislation would diminish 
public sector collective bargaining rights by preventing government supervisors and 
administrators from unionizing, requiring public posting of contract offers, ending 
binding arbitration for impasse resolution, and expanding local governments’ control 
over hiring and firing decisions. However, in spite of enjoying unified Republican 
government control, the controversial bill has languished in committee, perhaps as a 
result of SEIU’s successful opposition efforts in a state where overall union density is 
relatively high at 14.6% (2013) as a result strong private sector unionization among hotel 
and casino workers coupled with a public sector unionization rate of 38% (Rindels 2015).  
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Similarly, the Republican governor of Illinois, Bruce Rauner, has been embroiled 
in a series of policy fights over public employees’ collective bargaining rights, salaries, 
and benefits since assuming office at the beginning of 2015. Rauner’s labor-restrictive 
proposals, which are vehemently opposed by public sector unions and the Democratic 
supermajority in the Illinois legislature, have included an executive order restricting 
public employee unions from collecting representation fees from nonmembers and a bill 
that would eliminate pensions, pay, and health benefits from collective bargaining.    
Moreover, the 2016 presidential bid has brought together various Republican 
contenders with strong union-busting bonafides. Republican primary candidates Chris 
Christie, Scott Walker, John Kasich, and Jeb Bush have all publically clashed with public 
employee unions during their tenures as state governors. As such, vocally opposing labor 
unions for straining budgets and thwarting policy changes is a common refrain from 
Presidential hopefuls. Governor Jeb Bush, for example, has been a longtime critic and 
adversary of teachers unions in his state of Florida. According to Bush, teachers unions 
are primary culprits in blocking policy innovations in public education. Bush who has 
stated that public schools operate as “13,000 government-run, unionized and politicized 
monopolies who trap good teachers, administrators and struggling students in a system 
nobody can escape,” has frequently clashed with state teachers unions over the expansion 
of school choice programs, merit pay proposals for teachers, and school testing 
accountability programs (Reinhard 2014).  
As the Governor of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal also worked to implement a series of 
education reforms that the state’s teachers unions fervently opposed. Such proposals 
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included expansions to charter schools, school voucher programs, and online education as 
well as weakening teacher tenure protections (Allen 2013). Next, Ohio’s John Kasich is 
also no friend to public employee unions, having publically stated that he wants to break 
the back of teachers unions while also previously championed a failed movement to 
restrict their collective bargaining rights in 2011. Kasich came out in 2015 by proposing a 
budget with three anti-union provisions including a ban on the use of project labor 
agreements in public construction bids, a restriction on charter school teachers who 
unionize being able to join the State Teachers Retirement System pension fund, and the 
curtailment of college faculty members’ unionizing rights. Chris Christie has also 
repeatedly quarreled with public employee unions over pension contributions and health 
care plan payments, although he has not advocated for transforming New Jersey into a 
right-to-work state. Finally, Scott Walker, took his crusade against organized labor even 
further in 2015 by signing legislation making Wisconsin the 25th right-to-work state as he 
ramped up his bid for the White House. 
In conclusion, the observation that many of the numerous Republican presidential 
nominees also ferociously fought to curtail collective bargaining rights as core planks of 
their gubernatorial platforms suggests the 2016 may be a watershed moment for the 
future of organized labor in the United States. As the first regular election occurring since 
a majority of states have exited their fiscal crises under the context of an incrementally 
improving national economy—will the outcome provide any indication to the continued 
utility of pursuing right-to-work laws as a vote-courting, fiscal adjustment strategy? For 
instance, if a union-busting former governor is elected as the 45th president of the United 
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States, along with Republican majorities in the US Congress and the majority of state 
legislatures, will this mean the final death knell for organized labor in American Politics? 
Or, will an improved national economy have muted the private sector’s thirst for blood 
from the unionized public sector? Future research should thus be attuned to the interplay 
of politics and economics as these events unfold to determine whether the Great 
Recession was indeed labor’s last stand.  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Statewide political expenditures and campaign contributions by the “top two” 
teachers unions: 
State  Overall Political $ # of years recorded Average annual $
Alabama  15922704.00 19 838037.05
Alaska  535191.00 16 33449.44
Arizona  1945567.00 16 121597.94
Arkansas  324921.00 16 20307.56
California  198326071.00 18 11018115.06
Colorado  6615837.00 16 413489.81
Connecticut  880006.00 17 51765.06
Delaware  259636.00 16 16227.25
Florida  10793592.00 16 674599.50
Georgia   1464019.00 21 69715.19
Hawaii  782427.00 19 41180.37
Idaho  3510389.00 20 175519.45
Illinois  36145406.00 22 1642973.00
Indiana  9200949.00 17 541232.29
Iowa  3563619.00 17 209624.65
Kansas   1378074.00 18 76559.67
Kentucky  1825987.00 19 96104.58
Louisiana  967127.00 18 53729.28
Maine  1074328.00 18 59684.89
Maryland  1492419.00 6 248736.50
Massachusetts  8449982.00 16 528123.88
Michigan  15602131.00 21 742958.62
Minnesota  11317336.00 19 595649.26
Mississippi  376600.00 14 26900.00
Missouri  523200.00 17 30776.47
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Montana  791594.00 17 46564.35
Nebraska  2339515.00 18 129973.06
Nevada  6054972.00 19 318682.74
New Hampshire  269825.00 17 15872.06
New Jersey  4780458.00 17 281203.41
New Mexico  1108010.00 19 58316.32
New York  17301331.00 18 961185.06
North Carolina  1680987.00 21 80047.00
North Dakota  389901.00 15 25993.40
Ohio  27851988.00 20 1392599.40
Oklahoma  1367871.00 16 85491.94
Oregon  21451737.00 20 1072586.85
Pennsylvania  13403480.00 21 638260.95
Rhode Island  582942.00 19 30681.16
South Carolina  550375.00 21 26208.33
South Dakota  500452.00 14 35746.57
Tennessee  2355433.00 18 130857.39
Texas  2425075.00 18 134726.39
Utah  3610763.00 15 240717.53
Vermont  30462.00 14 2175.86
Virginia   1297392.00 18 72077.33
Washington   12707203.00 22 577600.14
West Virginia  1340738.00 16 83796.13
Wisconsin  8547630.00 23 371636.09
Wyoming   510421.00 17 30024.76
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Partisan political expenditures and campaign contributions by the “top two” teachers 
unions: 
STATE $ to Dems % to Dems $ to Reps  
% to 
Reps
Alabama 13226094.00 83.06% 3065547.00 19.25%
Alaska 289113.00 54.02% 63047.00 11.78%
Arizona 453642.00 23.32% 69522.00 3.57%
Arkansas 265396.00 81.68% 16700.00 5.14%
California 29039173.00 14.64% 769677.00 0.39%
Colorado 1359756.00 20.55% 50315.00 0.76%
Connecticut 359572.00 40.86% 44775.00 5.09%
Delaware 165863.00 63.88% 73948.00 28.48%
Florida 6588455.00 61.04% 56900.00 0.53%
Georgia  978348.00 66.83% 389555.00 26.61%
Hawaii 463504.00 59.24% 29375.00 3.75%
Idaho 1330037.00 37.89% 253794.00 7.23%
Illinois 20482481.00 56.67% 9242372.00 25.57%
Indiana 8373370.00 91.01% 778030.00 8.46%
Iowa 3314165.00 93.00% 43430.00 1.22%
Kansas  984846.00 71.47% 259478.00 18.83%
Kentucky 959789.00 52.56% 304500.00 16.68%
Louisiana 774605.00 80.09% 148693.00 15.37%
Maine 207358.00 19.30% 6050.00 0.56%
Maryland 935180.00 62.66% 22699.00 1.52%
Massachusetts 184433.00 2.18% 4629.00 0.05%
Michigan 9145654.00 58.62% 657772.00 4.22%
Minnesota 4509963.00 39.85% 228913.00 2.02%
Mississippi 222200.00 59.00% 120400.00 31.97%
Missouri 250865.00 47.95% 205152.00 39.21%
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Montana 547919.00 69.22% 14170.00 1.79%
Nebraska 199769.00 8.54% 191591.00 8.19%
Nevada 4108388.00 67.85% 346016.00 5.71%
New 
Hampshire 212590.00 78.79% 5785.00 2.14%
New Jersey 3185397.00 66.63% 1255994.00 26.27%
New Mexico 842763.00 76.06% 14725.00 1.33%
New York 9580614.00 55.38% 4025890.00 23.27%
North Carolina 1455627.00 86.59% 95846.00 5.70%
North Dakota 128716.00 33.01% 56725.00 14.55%
Ohio 8680481.00 31.17% 1329914.00 4.77%
Oklahoma 522685.00 38.21% 130826.00 9.56%
Oregon 8380464.00 39.07% 365357.00 1.70%
Pennsylvania 10522536.00 78.51% 2455998.00 18.32%
Rhode Island 552017.00 94.70% 7100.00 1.22%
South Carolina 427350.00 77.65% 119525.00 21.72%
South Dakota 395006.00 78.93% 65146.00 13.02%
Tennessee 1977653.00 83.96% 316180.00 13.42%
Texas 1651793.00 68.11% 659178.00 27.18%
Utah 697389.00 19.31% 212455.00 5.88%
Vermont 27922.00 91.66% 300.00 0.98%
Virginia  1021629.00 78.74% 205333.00 15.83%
Washington  2984176.00 23.48% 149599.00 1.18%
West Virginia 1260438.00 94.01% 74850.00 5.58%
Wisconsin 1357931.00 15.89% 119550.00 1.40%
Wyoming  366120.00 71.73% 138216.00 27.08%
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APPENDIX 3 
State teachers unions: 
STATE # 1 Teacher Union # 2 Teacher Union 
Aabama Alabama Education Assocation N/A 
Alaska 
NATIONAL EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION ALASKA N/A 
Arizona Arizona Education Association 
ARIZONA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Arkansas 
Arkansas Education 
Association N/A 
California 
CALIFORNIA TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION  
CALIFORNIA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS  
Colorado 
COLORADO EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
COLORADO FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Connecticut 
CONNECTICUT EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
CONNECTICUT FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Delaware 
DELAWARE EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  N/A 
Florida 
FLORIDA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
FLORIDA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION SOUTH 
Georgia  
GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF 
EDUCATORS  
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF GEORGIA EDUCATORS 
Hawaii 
HAWAII STATE TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION  N/A 
Idaho 
IDAHO EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  N/A 
Illinois 
ILLINOIS FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS  
ILLINOIS EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
Indiana 
INDIANA STATE TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION  
INDIANA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
Iowa 
IOWA STATE EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  N/A 
Kansas  
KANSAS NATIONAL 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
KANSAS FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS  
Kentucky 
KENTUCKY EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
KENTUCKY FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Louisiana 
LOUISIANA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS  
LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION OF 
EDUCATORS 
Maine 
MAINE EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  MAINE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
Maryland 
MARYLAND STATE 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
MARYLAND STATE TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION 
Massachusetts 
MASSACHUSETTS 
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION  
MASSACHUSETTS FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS 
Michigan 
MICHIGAN EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
MICHIGAN FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Minnesota EDUCATION MINNESOTA  
MINNESOTA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Mississippi 
MISSISSIPPI ASSOCIATION 
OF EDUCATORS  
MISSISSIPPI FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Missouri 
MISSOURI STATE TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION  
MISSOURI FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
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Montana 
MONTANA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
MONTANA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Nebraska 
NEBRASKA STATE 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION  
NEBRASKA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION CAPITOL DISTRICT 
Nevada 
NEVADA STATE EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
CLARK COUNTY EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
New Hampshire 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION  
NEW HAMPSHIRE FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS 
New Jersey 
NEW JERSEY EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
NEW JERSEY FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
New Mexico 
NEW MEXICO FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS  
NEW MEXICO EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
New York 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED 
TEACHERS  
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
North Carolina 
NORTH CAROLINA 
ASSOCIATION OF 
EDUCATORS  n/a 
North Dakota 
NORTH DAKOTA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  n/a 
Ohio 
OHIO FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS  OHIO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
Oklahoma 
OKLAHOMA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
OKLAHOMA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Oregon 
OREGON EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 
OREGON 
Pennsylvania 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION  
PENNSYLVANIA FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS  
Rhode Island 
NATIONAL EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION RHODE 
ISLAND  
RHODE ISLAND FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS & HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS  
South Carolina 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION  n/a 
South Dakota 
SOUTH DAKOTA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  n/a 
Tennessee 
TENNESSEE EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  n/a 
Texas 
TEXAS CLASSROOM 
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION  
TEXAS FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Utah 
UTAH EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
UTAH FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Vermont 
VERMONT EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  n/a 
Virginia  
VIRGINIA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  n/a 
Washington  
WASHINGTON EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  
WASHINGTON STATE 
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 
West Virginia 
WEST VIRGINIA 
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS  
WEST VIRGINIA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION 
Wisconsin 
WISCONSIN EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL  
WISCONSIN FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS 
Wyoming  
WYOMING EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION  n/a 
 
